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Abstract
In 2010, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) spent more than $35 billion
on information systems development and sustainment, with nearly $7 billion to defense
business systems investments alone. It is not surprising given the scale of expenditure and
complexity of the enterprise that its track record on business systems investments has not
been great. Indeed, the DoD's investment management practices have been the target of
many studies identifying critical concerns with how the taxpayers' dollars are spent. The
get-well plan, according to these same studies, is to apply "industry best practices" to achieve
the same results. Yet this view fails to adequately account for the underlying issues that give
rise to these symptoms.
Mistrust and confusion in governance decision structures, strategic goal
misalignment, externally driven metrics that incentivize the wrong behavior, and a culture of
guarding rather than sharing information were among the dominant challenges identified
through stakeholder interviews. Cross-cutting issues included language barriers between the
Services and Corporate DoD that impede knowledge integration and complicate performance
measurement. These systemic foundational problems are deeply rooted in the nature of this
public administration network and in the cultures of its strongly independent member
institutions.
Resolving these dysfunctional characteristics requires more than a transformation
"playbook" of best practice initiatives. This research sets the trajectory for meaningful
progress in defense business systems investment planning and management by outlining the
fundamental changes that must occur, anchored by a more robust and transparent governance
framework.
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CHAPTER 1. THE PLATFORM IS BURNING
1.1 MOTIVATION
In 2010, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) spent more than $35 billion
on information systems development and sustainment. By way of comparison, the DoD's
information technology (IT) expenditure was greater than the total military budgets of 95
percent of the world's nations as reported by the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI Institute 2010). Of that $35 billion, nearly $7 billion went to defense
business systems (DBS) investments (OASD (NII) / DoD CIO et al. 2010). With over 2.1
million active duty military and civilian personnel, it is the largest employer in the world's
largest economy and manages over 30 million acres in real property (DoD 2011). The DoD
consists of three military departments, 17 agencies, 10 field activities, eight staff
organizations, and nine Combatant Commands (OUSD (Comptroller) / CFO 2011). In every
sense, this is a very large, complex, enterprise.
True, the sheer size of its IT budget is daunting or impressive depending on your
point of view, but the interesting part isn't how much the DoD spends. The key issue is how
Total 2010 Military Expenditures DoD IT Budget Request for FY 2011
Highest Spending Countries* $ in Millions
70.0 Total:
60.0 U.S. Defense IT $36.8 Billion * Warfighting
00 -Expenditures = $35.6B
50.0 592 Systems
tA 40.0 UU(9,093 U Business40. --- - -----
30.0 SystemsNE20 14 t u 1  Enterprise
10.0 Infrastructure
Do2T0ugteustfrFY21
050 92Defense
I OIntelligence
*U.S. ($6988)and China (est. $1196) data excluded for scale Source: SNaPIT
Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), (https://snap.pae.osd.mil/snapit/BudgetDocs20ll.aspx)
Figure 1 Left: U.S. Defense IT expenditures in comparison to the total military budgets of the world's
highest spending countries. Right: FY 2011 President's Budget Request for IT. Sources: Adapted from
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's Yearbook 2010 and the Office-of the Secretary of
Defense Select & Native Programming Data Input System - Information Technology (SNaP IT),
https://snap.pae.osd.mil/snapit/BudgetDocs20 1.aspx.
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it decides what to spend it on. With such a large and complex enterprise, it should come as
no surprise that the DoD's investment management practices have been the target of many
studies identifying critical concerns with how the taxpayers' dollars are spent.
Even a brief glance at the series of Government Accountability Office (GAO),
Defense Science Board (DSB), and external independent reviews reveals several common
"pain points" for the Department's investment management. Duplication of effort, long
acquisition timelines in the face of rapidly changing technology, a cultural fascination with
systems over business process needs, system investments that are neither adequately
measured nor tied to business outcomes, and nonstandard, Service-unique implementations to
meet needs common across the defense enterprise are the usual suspects. It doesn't usually
take too much prompting to get those embroiled in the process to identify more issues,
regardless of whether they're inside or outside the Department. The reason it's so easy to
strike up the conversation is that these very same people are expressing frustrations about
something they care so much about.
Senior leadership isn't blind to these realities, either. In his address to the American
Enterprise Institute on May 24, 2011, Defense Secretary Robert Gates highlighted the
Pentagon's portfolio challenges, characterizing the decision framework as "a semi-feudal
system - an amalgam of fiefdoms without centralized mechanisms to allocate resources,
track expenditures, and measure results relative to the department's overall priorities" (Gates
2011). So if everyone agrees things need to change, why haven't they?
This is actually a trick question. Defense acquisition and investment management
policy is quite fluid, often changing in response to legislation which attempts to drive the
DoD toward the adoption of industry best practices that are the subject of countless private
sector case studies and public sector analyses in the management literature. As a figure of
merit, a recent review of DoD acquisition policy issuances revealed nearly 60 new or updated
policies in the last 24 months (OUSD (AT&L) 2011). These policies are intended to
implement the intent of Congress by institutionalizing industry practices through a cascade of
downward directed guidance that multiplies as it moves through OSD, the DoD agencies, and
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the Services. The underlying assumption is that these industry practices are directly
translatable to the defense business enterprise.
Is that assumption valid? Many of these practices have evolved in environments
representative of monolithic enterprises, yet as mentioned previously the DoD is far from a
strictly hierarchical monolithic organization. Indeed, the DoD might well be described as the
"Departments of Defense", with separate and sometimes overlapping authorities vested in the
Services and OSD. Certain decision mechanisms such as business systems investment
reviews chaired by OSD leadership overlay onto this network, providing centralized
authority schemes that mimic traditional hierarchical structures. However, the practical
outcome is that many such decisions are heavily influenced or determined by activity that
occurs outside the formal governance regimes, usually because the formal mechanisms are
inadequate to support the decisions required.
1.2 BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1.2.1 Overview
As mentioned previously, the DoD is a very complex network of organizations. As
shown in Figure 2, the Defense Department is a collection of separate organizations brought
together under the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 Amendment (1947; 1949).
The position of Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) was created to lead the new Department and
that position was assigned a Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) to assist in
managing the organization. The Department of the Air Force was established under that
same act and placed alongside the Departments of the Army and Navy under the Department
of Defense. Other notable additions to the military establishment were the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS), an advisory organization consisting of the military Chiefs of the Services and led
by an appointed military Chairman, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
providing policy and staff support to the SECDEF and DEPSECDEF. Over the years,
Defense Agencies and Field Activities have been established, merged, and eliminated,
evolving into the 27 separate organizations in existence today and reporting up through OSD.
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The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 further amended the
structure of the DoD by extracting warfighting command authorities from the respective
Services and placing them with a new set of Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) who
reported through the SECDEF to the President of the United States (1986). At the same time,
Goldwater-Nichols strengthened the hand of OSD to manage the DoD's policies and
investments, although the Services retained their statutory authorities to budget for and
execute activities associated with their organize, train, and equip functions.
OSD has itself changed many times since its creation. As of 2010, the staff had
grown from the three Special Assistants designated in the 1947 National Security Act to five
Undersecretaries of Defense (USD), the Director Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E),
Director Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (DCAPE), Director Administration and
Management (DA&M), the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO), four Principle
Deputy Undersecretaries (PDUSD), twenty-eight Deputy Undersecretaries (DUSD), ten
Assistant Secretaries (ASD), and a number of subordinate Director and other designated
positions. Changes to this distribution of positions were mandated in the FY 2010 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and are being enacted through the DoD's transition plan
(OSD 2010b).
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Deputy Secretary of Defense
Figure 2 Organization of the Department of Defense (top) and the Office of Secretary of Defense
(bottom) today. Source: OUSD (Comptroller) (2011).
1.2.2 Division of Responsibilities
Within the Department of Defense, many responsibilities are clearly divided between
the various major elements of the enterprise although there are numerous areas where those
responsibilities overlap.
II
- UnderSegetaries, Secretary Secretary Secretary Chairman of the
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1.2.2.1 Secretary of Defense
The chain of command for all matters related to defense runs through the SECDEF.
The SECDEF is the principle advisor to the President for all such matters and is responsible
to develop and execute defense policy in support of the President's National Security
objectives.
1.2.2.2 Deputy Secretary of Defense
The DEPSECDEF directly supports the SECDEF and is authorized to act on his or
her behalf with full authority to use any and all of the SECDEF's statutory powers as
necessary.
1.2.2.3 Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD is chartered to help plan, develop, and carry out National Security and Defense
policy, tasking the military departments, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified
commands. The five principle domains are policy, finance, personnel and readiness,
intelligence, and materiel support. Oversight for the DoD's investment management comes
primarily through the Defense Comptroller (USD(C)), the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), and more recently, the Deputy Chief
Management Officer (DCMO). This role is accomplished through a variety of mechanisms
including the management of the budgeting process, issuance of acquisition policy, and
authority for milestone review approvals on programs designated for their oversight'.
1.2.2.4 Military Departments
The MILDEPS organize, train, and equip defense forces to perform a variety of
missions in support of National Security and Defense objectives. Through their equip
responsibilities, the Services plan, budget, and execute acquisition programs to deliver
warfighting, combat support, and business system capabilities for Service-specific and joint
users.
'For an overview of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution and Defense Acquisition
Systems, see 4. 1.
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1.2.2.5 Joint Staff
The Chairman, JCS (CJCS) is the principle military advisor to the President and
oversees planning and coordination of military operations. Through the Service Chiefs the
CJCS helps coordinate Service positions on issues affecting the military force. The Joint
Staff also manages the system of requirements for defense materiel needs, validating
acquisition requirements for major programs and activities of joint interest2
1.2.2.6 Unified Commands
Six geographic and three functional unified commands provide the means for the
SECDEF to employ military forces worldwide. Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) lead the
unified commands and establish their own prioritized materiel needs that are accounted for
by the Services in establishing their long-term plans and budgets. These needs are
represented and validated through Joint Staff or Service-specific requirements oversight
mechanisms.
1.3 STRATEGIC DEFENSE CHALLENGES AND BUSINESS
PRIORITIES
1.3.1 Strategic Environment
As described by former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in 2010 (2010), the
strategic environment in which Defense priorities are established continues to evolve as an
outcome of world events, military and otherwise. The dominant challenge today is the reality
of the ongoing war in Afghanistan and the broader fight against Al Qaeda and its allies. This
includes support to a fledgling democracy in Iraq and regional security partnerships around
the world. At the same time, the wave of democratic revolutions associated with the Arab
Spring and continuing to threatened long-standing institutions throughout the Middle East
create uncertainty about the conditions under which the U.S. military will operate in the
future.
2 For information on the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, see 4.1.3.
15
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Elsewhere in the world, the growing power and influence of China and its
neighboring rival India require greater integration of other instruments of national power and
more nuanced application of military capabilities in partnership with a great many state
actors, some familiar and others no so. Economic disparity fueling rising tensions in the
equatorial belts and the increasing risk of global pandemics against the backdrop of climate
change also create conditions that could lead to conflict given the right spark.
At the same time, the Department's strategy must contend with other forms of
asymmetric warfare in nontraditional regimes. Space and cyber are tremendous assets to the
U.S., but those strengths are also sources of critical vulnerabilities, too. Weapons of mass
destruction remain in the collective conscious as state and non-state actors present continued
threats to international security. And organized crime is increasingly important as the U.S.
contends with its impacts within and beyond the borders and as a vector for terrorists and
other that would see harm done to America. In light of this complex and changing
environment, the Department of Defense reviewed its military priorities in 2010.
1.3.2 Defense Priorities
The strategic priorities for defense missions and resource allocation are formally
reassessed in depth every four years as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). As
required by U.S. Code Title 10 Sec. 118 (a), the QDR Report is delivered to Congress on
February 1 of the year it is due. The most recent QDR was performed in 2010, and it
outlines the long term objectives for the Department of Defense. As described in the report,
the emphasis for the Department following nine years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan and
with anticipation of contracting budgets was to rebalance the force in order to achieve four
key priorities:
* Prevail in today's wars
* Prevent and deter conflict
" Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies
* Preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force
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In support of these priorities, the QDR identified five thrusts to guide investment
decisions. The first was to rebalance the force, shifting resources and capabilities to cope
with the new environmental uncertainties. The second thrust centered on taking care of the
DoD's workforce and their families for both military and civilian personnel. Third, continue
to develop and maintain strategic partnerships throughout the world and establish regionally
tailored defense postures. Finally, the DoD will reform the way it does business, including
policies and processes for security assistance, export control, defense energy consumption,
and improving defense investment management practices. This last strategic thrust is in a
broad sense the primary motivator for this thesis, with particular focus on defense business
system investments.
1.3.3 Fiscal Realities
The Budget Control Act (BCA) signed into law in August 2011 was created to
enforce fiscal discipline by driving Congress to identify ways to reduce the growing deficit
under penalty of automatic budget cuts if it failed. On November 21, 2011, the Joint Select
CBO Projections from
2011 Budget Control Act Fiscal Reality
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Figure 3 Congressional Budget Office top-line budget authority projections under several scenarios.
Source: CBO (2011a).
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Committee on Deficit Reduction, better known as the "Supercommittee", declared defeat in
its challenge to find a bipartisan solution to the budget crisis. With that failure, Congress
opened the door to deep defense cuts starting in early 2013 through the so-called
sequestration triggers from the Budget Control Act of 2011, provided the cuts survive the
coming election year. Figure 3 shows the budget projections from the Congressional Budget
Office, with a roughly 16% reduction in defense budgets over the next 10 years relative to
the President's plan for 2012 (201la).
According to Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
(CSBA), those automatic cuts would slash non-war defense by nearly $100 billion from the
2013 numbers in the President's 2012 budget request (2011). In order to achieve this large a
cut in one year, the Department would necessarily target significant acquisition program
reductions by delaying, reducing, or canceling weapons buys, and the law currently requires
that all investments be cut proportionally.
Given the stark fiscal landscape projected for the next 10 years coupled with the
recognized imperatives for improving the way the Department of Defense spends money to
modernize and sustain its business operations, it is crucial that smart steps be taken in the
near term to fundamentally improve these planning and management practices, not only
within Corporate DoD but with the Services and Agencies as well. Fifteen years of critical
reporting and legislative mandates have directed the Department to adopt industry's
information technology investment "best practices", but is the answer really that simple?
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
This research seeks to identify the underlying enterprise factors that impair the DoD's
governance of its business systems investments. Are these factors similar to those faced in
industry? How are the DoD's challenges unique? Which governance practices that correlate
with effective investment practices in industry are relevant and translatable to the defense
environment? What steps need to be taken to create sustainable change within the
Department and what are the key obstacles to those efforts?
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In order to answer these questions the research followed a sequential discovery and
unfolding process incorporating methods from the Lean Advancement Initiative and the
Center for Information Systems Research, both at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
An extensive literature review informed the background and history of defense investment
practices and provided the theoretical basis for subsequent analyses and recommendations.
Building upon the body of research already accomplished and identified in the literature,
exploratory interviews were conducted with several key contacts at the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) in the National Capital Region and at the Electronic Systems
Center at Hanscom Air Force Base, MA. These initial discussions led to a series of formal
interviews with 12 senior level members at the Executive Schedule (ES), Senior Executive
Service (SES) and General Officer (GO) level within the DoD as well as two Government
Accountability Office members. Each interview was recorded and transcribed, then the draft
transcription was provided to the interviewee to validate accuracy.
In parallel, the research incorporated the results of a 4-month enterprise
transformation study in partnership with a commercial pharmaceutical company. This
transformation case study was researched by the author with a small project team that
included MIT students Sarvesh Saodekar (MIT System Design and Management 2011),
Nirmalya Bannerjee (MIT System Design and Management 2011), and Edwardo Sackey
(MIT Sloan MBA 2010) as part of an MIT Sloan course 3. As part of the case study
methodology, the team documented 20 interviews at various levels within the company's
business technology enterprise, using the same technique for recording the interview,
transcribing the notes, and validating with the interviewee. The results of the case study are
presented in Chapter 8.
Once the interviews were documented, the source notes were coded to identify
common vectors. Incidence of occurrence and recurrence across sources were tabulated to
assess the strength and commonality of the vector. A second coding pass-through was then
completed to group like vectors into major themes that became the root for a series of
narratives identifying the nature and context of the issue, challenge, or success story. The
3 Sloan course 15.571 "Business Strategy and the Role of IT, course instructor Dr. Jeanne Ross.
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Figure 4 Research methodology.
integration of these narratives became the DoD and commercial pharmaceutical case studies
that are documented and compared in Chapter 5 through Chapter 8.
1.5 NAVIGATING THE REMAINDER OF THIS THESIS
The remaining chapters in this thesis deal with various aspects of governance in the
defense business enterprise, structured in a fashion that allows the interested reader to
understand what governance is, how it has evolved within the Department of Defense, and
how stakeholders of that enterprise view its investment planning and management practices.
The reader can use the following guidelines as a pointer to areas of specific interest.
Chapter 2 begins by providing a brief introduction to governance frameworks using
the framework and organizing principles developed by MIT's Center for Information
Systems Research (CISR). Included in this framework is the taxonomy of governance
elements that will be applied to the DoD context.
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Chapter 3 reviews the history of business systems planning and management in the
DoD from the 1990s up through today. Key reports, studies, initiatives, and legislative
milestones are discussed to provide the background for how governance is applied today.
Chapter 4 follows the historical perspective with a detailed snapshot of the decision-
making system in use for business systems today. The parallels and divergences between
traditional weapon system acquisition and business systems are discussed and the reader is
presented with the environment within which the stakeholders interviewed for this research
live.
Chapter 5 through Chapter 7 capture the analysis of the stakeholder interviews,
bringing together perspectives from within and external to the DoD to shed light on the state
of practice, its issues and challenges, and change initiatives currently underway.
Chapter 8 presents a parallel case study of a global pharmaceutical company
struggling with similar challenges in its information technology investment governance. The
key issues identified in primary research with stakeholders throughout their IT and business
unit divisions are compared and contrasted with those noted in the DoD.
Chapter 9 synthesizes a future state reflective of a more effective defenses business
enterprise and aligns to the future state characteristics a set of recommendations for
substantive change. These recommendations are necessary elements for setting the
conditions needed for sustainable change within the Department.
Chapter 10 completes the journey by encapsulating the key research motivations,
findings, and recommendations and presents areas for further research.
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CHAPTER 2. A CURSORY LOOK AT INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO GOVERNANCE
Before moving further into a history of the DoD's business systems investment
management practices, it is helpful to baseline the definition of what is meant by
"governance". Rhodes highlighted the multiplicity of uses for the term, identifying at least
six different definitions in common use (Rhodes 1996). For the purposes of this study,
Stoker's explanation seems most appropriate: "the essence of governance is its focus on
governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of
government." (Stoker 1998, p. 17)
When an enterprise is faced with making complex decisions that affect many key
stakeholders, it creates governance mechanisms to bring those stakeholders together under a
prescribed set of rules for how those stakeholders will work together, who gets to provide
inputs to decisions, and who gets to make the ultimate decisions. In the realm of information
technology, a commonly accepted definition from Weill and Ross identifies IT governance as
"specifying the decision rights and accountability framework to encourage desirable behavior
in using IT." (Weill and Ross 2004, p. 2) The key point in the definition is that governance is
a system for decision-making, not the act of decision-making itself. That system includes
elements of governing bodies, alignment mechanisms, and communication tools, requires
clear definitions of roles and responsibilities, and must be driven by the overall strategic
goals of the enterprise, not just its IT ambitions.
The following sections build upon the Weill-Ross governance framework (2004) in
order to lay the foundation for describing the DoD's investment planning and management in
terms that can be compared with commercial industry. The first step is to identify the crucial
IT decisions that business leaders must consciously allocate.
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2.2 THE FIVE CARDINAL DECISIONS THAT MUST BE
ALLOCATED
The ability of an enterprise to align its IT investment priorities to its operating
essence and business strategy hinges on a conscious allocation of IT decision rights in five
key areas (Weill and Ross 2005). Leadership must first identify the guiding IT principles
that acknowledge the operating model and describe how the business strategy is enabled by
IT. They may also describe the role IT will play in enterprise transformation efforts to move
the organization from a current state to a desired future state. Those principles then set the
direction for decisions about the enterprise IT architecture. The architecture defines a set of
rules for how the business's operational processes are supported by IT, providing a business
context for technology and data standards that bound subsequent decisions about the
infrastructure and applications needs of the enterprise. Finally, leaders must provide a
system for evaluating and prioritizing investment decisions.
2.2.1 Principles
The operating essence of an organization is its fundamental organizing concept.
Some firms, for example, operate on the idea that business units must maintain a high degree
of specialized autonomy in order to achieve certain business objectives such as high growth.
Others may emphasize standardization and centralized decision-making in order to realize
the benefits of commonality when it exists across the firm's various business activities
(Brown and Grant 2005). Because this operating essence has a much higher degree of
organizational inertia associated with it than do business strategies-consider how hard it is
to reorganize a company as compared with changing its strategic goals-this essence
becomes an important anchor for deciding how IT will support.
An enterprise committed to strategic transformation must also assess how they want
to operate at some point in the future and decide how they plan to get there. Transitioning
from one model to another means building architecture flexibility to avoid making
irreversible decisions that limit future options (Rhodes et al. 2009).
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2.2.2 Architecture
The architecture provides a transition from strategic principles to a contextual
environment for business process and technology decisions. It describes the essential
organizational IT integration and standardization policies and business processes needed to
execute the strategy through the operating model and aligns supporting IT systems and
applications within that context. Weill and Ross provide virtually the same definitions for IT
architecture (Weill and Ross 2004, p. 30) and enterprise architecture (Ross et al. 2006, p. 9),
preferring "IT architecture" in the context of the five key decisions model and "enterprise
architecture" to more broadly indicate the importance of business strategy and processes.
Where such differences occur in this thesis the terms can be considered more or less
equivalent unless specifically distinguished in context.
2.2.3 IT Infrastructure
The IT infrastructure decisions encompass services, technologies, and data
management capabilities that support the enterprise IT needs, including hosting applications.
Some definitions of IT infrastructure characterize it as "centrally coordinated" and "shared"
(Weill and Ross 2005), although the choice to decentralize infrastructure capabilities to
support specialized needs falls within this domain as well. Decisions in this area consider
ways to build and evolve the infrastructure to be extensible and common, accommodate fixed
site and mobility needs, and might include options to outsource provision of that
infrastructure.
2.2.4 Business Applications
Decisions about business applications include strategies for building or buying
software systems to meet specific business needs. Much of the organization's workforce
experiences IT capabilities through these applications, and decisions about which
applications to procure, support, and sunset can be among the most contentious in the
investment planning process.
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2.2.5 Investments
Although IT investments are the decisions most commonly thought of in the context
of governance discussions, they should really be guided by the preceding decisions in a well-
structured governance framework. Oftentimes IT investment disasters can be traced to
making investment decisions ahead of laying a solid foundation based on principles,
architecture, and strategies for infrastructure and applications. The rules for investment
decision-making in the enterprise must address how investment options will be brought
forward, evaluated and prioritized, and resources allocated. The enterprise IT funding and
cost allocation models have a tremendous impact on these decisions, too. Funding models
describe who has the authority to budget for and spend resources, while cost allocation
models indicate how reimbursable expenses are distributed. When these models are
misaligned with the allocation of decision rights, the resource owners are empowered
(intentionally or otherwise) to second-guess the choices of the decision-makers. In
dysfunctional cases, the "official" governance system becomes little more than a paper
exercise with decisions made outside the formal channels.
When considering how to allocate those decisions, business leaders must determine
who will make the decisions and who is allowed to input to them. At one extreme, all
decisions are made in autocratic fashion without the benefit of consultation from anyone else.
At the other end, consensus reigns supreme and decisions are subject to review and
coordination from all corners. Additionally, the enterprise will determine at what level
within the hierarchy these decisions will be made. Clearly, the choice of decision-makers
and input-providers requires balancing concepts of unity of command and democracy, and
that balance often varies across the five decisions.
2.3 GOVERNANCE MODEL
2.3.1 Governance Archetypes for Decision Rights Allocation
The Ross and Weill governance construct presents six model archetypes for decision-
making based on research in the 1990s and early 2000s encompassing over 250 firms (2004,
p. 3). These archetypes represent patterns of decision rights allocation across the enterprise,
ranging from business monarchies, where decision-making occurs among the senior business
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executives, to federal models, a hybrid approach with centralized corporate and distributed
business unit participation, to anarchies where IT decisions are completely uncoordinated at
the individual level. The process of creatively synthesizing this governance view for an
organization forces leadership to intentionally plan how and where they want IT decisions to
be made. Instead of letting these decision rights allocations "just happen", it drives a
conscious choice to determine who gets to provide input and who gets to decide.
There is also an implied undercurrent to this framework that suggests that decisions
are distributed not just across the senior management level, but vertically within the
organization as well (Weill 2004, p. 228). Decisions will be delegated down to lower
governance levels with exception processes identified for elevating issues that must be
resolved at higher levels. Such tiered accountability approaches use thresholding criteria
often associated with magnitude of impact to the enterprise. For example, decisions about IT
principles might be retained at the executive level, but architecture decisions could be
handled by a council chaired by the CIO, while infrastructure and business application
standards might be pushed even lower. IT investment decisions above a certain high-dollar
threshold would require approval at the executive level with lesser valued tiers managed at
successively lower levels. This allows management to tie accountability to risk. A modified
version of the framework presented by Weill and Ross might look something like Table 1.
2.3.2 Decision-Making Structures
The most visible artifacts of a governance system are the decision-making bodies that
exercise the decision authorities. Often these take the form of boards, working groups, or
committees with representation from units or partner organizations in the enterprise. These
forums provide a structured means for addressing issues that require input, discussion, and
where necessary, consensus from the participants in order to move forward.
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Business Business executives (such as CxOs) acting individually or in groups with
Monarchy or without the participation of the Chief Information Officer (CO)
* IT IT executives&L Monarchy
IT IT executives working together with Business executives or Business
Duopoly Unit (BU) Leads
0 Federal
E groups, and may or may not include IT executives
Feudal BU leads or their delegates
Anarchy Individuals
Input Decide Input Decide Input Decide Input Decide Input Decide
Principles Architecture Infrastructure Applications investments Five Key
Decisions
input Decide Input Decide Input Decide Input Decide Input Decide
Level 1 CxO, Board of Directors, Presidents, CIO'
CLevel 2 10, BU Leads', Functional Division Leads, IT Division Leads
Level 3 BU Leads', BU IT Portfolio Managers, IT Division Leads
Multi-tiered governance structures may use bridging across levels by key participants to provide
vertical continuity
Table 1 Modified version of the MIT CISR "governance on a page". Determine for each of the five key
decisions who provides inputs and who makes the decisions. Addition of the lower half incorporating the
Tiers by this author conveys the priority placed by leadership on the decisions based on how far down
they delegate those decisions. Adapted from Weill and Ross (2004).
Two key elements of the decision-making structures are the roles and responsibilities
assigned to the participants and their governing procedural rules. Roles and responsibilities
determine who gets to provide input to decisions and who makes them, establishing order of
precedence and priority for participation. The governance archetypes presented in Section
2.3.1 above reflect the roles and responsibilities for the five IT decisions. The procedural
rules of the decision-making structures establish which issues are addressed, how and when
they are addressed, and the criteria for making the decisions. These can be more or less
formal, published or hidden, detailed or broad. The essential aspect is that they provide a
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shared understanding of how the governing bodies should operate, subject to stakeholder
interpretation of those rules.
2.3.3 Alignment Mechanisms
Alignment mechanisms are used to drive enterprise behavior in compliance with
established decisions and strategic directions. Specifically, these tools and techniques serve
to coordinate and synchronize the efforts of teams that would otherwise diverge. Alignment
occurs vertically in the enterprise to ensure that implementation at various levels of the
organization are in line with strategy and senior level decision-making, and in the reverse
direction to ensure those decisions are informed by the realities that exist at the working
level, with continuity of information up the chain. Examples of vertical alignment
mechanisms include policy, performance measurement schemes, incentives, and multilevel
governance tiers that use key personnel bridging between levels.
Horizontal alignment occurs across the enterprise to link activities and teams that are
related in purpose or interdependent in some way. In many organizations this might include
business process teams and portfolio management, business unit / IT relationship managers
(Weill and Ross 2009, p. 105), and project planning and execution coordination processes.
2.3.4 Communication Methods
The communication methods that an enterprise uses in its governance system provide
the connective practices for sharing and integrating knowledge. These include the channels,
both formal and informal, through which policies, decisions, successes, challenges, and
failures are distributed. They range from active approaches such as webcasts, town halls,
email campaigns, training and education services, and various status meetings, to passive
techniques leveraging web pages and enterprise databases. In some cases, an organization's
incentive scheme can also communicate priorities.
Foundations of a Defense Digital Platform:
Business Systems Governance in the Department of Defense
Decision-Making Alignment Communication
Structures Mechanisms Methods
- Executive Committees 0 Business Process Teams Knowledge Sharing
Steering Groups - Portfolio Management Incentives
0 Investment Boards - Performance ..
o Measurement
- Incentives
Figure 5 Three categories of governance mechanisms.
2.3.5 Funding Model
The means by which an enterprise resources its business system and IT initiatives
plays a critical role in solidifying the decision rights and incentivizing certain behaviors. The
funding model describes how these resources are allocated and who gets to decide how to
spend them. Ideally, the funding model should support the conscious allocation of decision
rights in the governance framework. When it does, the decisions made by those sanctioned
to make them are backed up by the power of the purse, thereby reinforcing their authority.
When the funding model is disconnected from the espoused decision rights, the decision-
maker's power is undermined and informal governance structures emerge to help those with
the resources make their investment decisions outside the official decision-making structures.
The funding model can also be a determinant for success in enterprise-wide
initiatives. Organizations that establish strategic goals for increased operational efficiency
through standardization, integration, and commonality, but distribute all the funding to
diversified business units will struggle to consistently find sponsorship and resources among
the individual business units for shared technologies and services, particularly when the
profit and loss responsibility resides with the business leads and the payoff from enterprise
initiatives is long-term. According to Weill and Ross, firms whose funding model is based
on clear priorities for investments, transparent decision processes, and feedback mechanisms
for measuring investment effectiveness get the most out of their IT dollars (Weill and Ross
2009, p. 50). Throughout the remainder of this thesis, the issue of distributed budget
authority and inter-Service rivalry will appear as a key impediment to the enterprise
efficiency objectives that have been outlined for improving Department of Defense
investment practices.
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2.4 AN IMPERATIVE FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE
Why is effective governance important for defense business systems investment
planning and management? Research in the commercial sector estimates that firms with
strong governance frameworks have 20% higher profitability as measured by return on assets
(Weill and Ross 2009, p. 91) and are 40% more effective in generating returns on their IT
investments than their peers (Weill and Broadbent 1998, p. 233). Granted, the Department of
Defense isn't in the business of generating profits, but they and their stakeholders are keenly
aware of the mounting pressure to demonstrate improving returns on their tax dollar
expenditures.
In the area of public administration networks, governance provides a structured
means for individuals and organizations that may have no formal relationships in chain of
authority to set direction, make decisions, and manage implementation. In practice, strong
stakeholder identification with their own organizations, responsibilities encoded in statute or
regulation, and cultural differences are the norm and can be significant challenges to
effective governance.
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CHAPTER 3. REVIEW OF DEFENSE BUSINESS SYSTEMS
INVESTMENT PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
3.1 BACKGROUND
A 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report identified that the DoD
relies on over 2,000 different business systems to manage its human resources, finance,
acquisition, and logistics functions (GAO 201 Oa). In many cases these functions are
duplicated across the various Armed Services and defense agencies, collectively referred to
as the DoD Components. In large part, this duplication occurs as a consequence of years of
accumulated IT capability growth and tailoring to meet requirements that at one time may
have seemed justifiably unique. However, given recent budgetary pressures resulting from
the economic recession and the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 defense budget mandate to bring
ongoing contingency operations costs in Iraq and Afghanistan under the budget baseline
rather than through supplemental funding, the DoD cannot afford to proliferate and sustain
multiples of its core business systems.
Indeed, issues such as these have been raised across a wide range of independent third
party assessments. Notable reports include those by the GAO, Congress itself, the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Defense Industry, and leading IT industry
analyst Gartner. Even within the DoD, there is a long-standing recognition of the need for
change. A joint Navy-Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) review conducted with the
RAND Corporation in 2007 emphasized the sheer volume of defense policy surrounding the
acquisition of IT systems in support of command, control, and communications (Gonzales et
al. 2007). One of the more influential studies was the 2009 "Report of the Defense Science
Board Task Force on Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for the Acquisition of
Information Technology" (Defense Science Board 2009), which provided a number of key
recommendations included in the FY 2010 National Defense Authorization Act as the basis
for a requirement to develop a new IT acquisition methodology.
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Legislative changes related to defense IT and business systems investment
management have been numerous as well. The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the
Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, the e-Government Act of 2002, and National Defense
Authorization Acts for the fiscal years 2005, 2008, and 2010 included substantive direction
for improving governance of defense IT spending. It's worth noting at this point that the
GAO alone has published over 1,100 reports on Federal IT issues, roughly 300 of those
involving the DoD (GAO 2011 b). What is listed here is a set of key reports that bear most on
the theme of this paper. The reader is referred to a much more exhaustive list accessible at
the GAO's web site. The next section provides a brief chronological review of the key
studies and legislative initiatives related to the DoD's DBS investment planning and
governance.
3.2 REPORTS AND FINDINGS
As mentioned previously, there has been no shortage of change initiatives with the
goal of improving the effectiveness and accountability of the DoD's investments. The
recurring pattern associated with these initiatives over the last 15 years seems to be a series
of critical reports from independent agents such as the GAO, Congressional Committees, or
the Defense Science Board (DSB), followed by legislation, then interim defense policy
changes, leading to reform initiatives that fail or are incompletely implemented, documented
in GAO reports, and on and on.
3.2.1 The 1990s
Although prior legislation had begun the journey toward building a coherent
framework for harnessing the opportunities afforded by IT to improve Government
efficiency and effectiveness, the first significant steps toward a systematic approach to
Federal IT investment management came through the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of
1995 (1995). The PRA of 1995 required agencies to evaluate the role of information
resources in meeting their business needs and tasked those agencies with incorporating best
industry practices in their investment planning. Further, the PRA encouraged the use of
common standards across the Federal government to maximize interoperability and the
effectiveness of IT spending for the taxpayer.
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The Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) of 1996, formerly the Information Technology
Management Reform Act of 1996 (1996), refined the requirements of the PRA by
establishing more specific accountability in Federal IT management. The overall objective
of the CCA was to focus attention on how the Federal government managed its IT
investments. Specifically, it required each agency to establish a Chief Information Officer
(CIO) and elevated overall leadership of Federal IT management to the Director, Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). Additionally, it stipulated the need for adoption of
commercial industry best practices and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies where
possible.
One of the more interesting elements of the law was that it required the DoD CIO to
consider the economic analysis of a major IT investment before approving its CCA
certification, a prerequisite for meeting an acquisition milestone review. Through these and
other provisions, the CCA guided Federal agencies toward thinking in terms of strategic
goals and business processes first before buying systems. OMB published Transmittal 3 to
its Circular
A-130 "Management of Federal Information Resources" in 1996 (OMB 1996) and
Transmittal 4 in 2000 (OMB 2000) to further clarify the CCA requirements. However, both
the law and the OMB Circular lacked clear implementation guidance and effectively left each
agency to its own devices in establishing its enterprise architecture and management
practices.
3.2.2 The Early 2000s
In 2000, the GAO created the Information Technology Investment Management
(ITIM) framework for assessing organization maturity as a next step beyond the CCA.
Analogous to the Capability Maturity Model Integration system developed by the Software
Engineering Institute in coordination with the defense community, the ITIM provided an
assessment methodology by which an enterprise could determine the extent to which its own
investment management mechanisms reflected generally accepted industry best practices.
Additionally, the ITIM was intended to drive enterprise improvement efforts through a five-
stage maturity model, linking investment decisions and processes to effective outcomes. The
ITIM was later published by the GAO in 2004 as report GAO-04-394G, "Information
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Technology Investment Management: A Framework for Assessing and Improving Process
Maturity" (GAO 2004a).
With the increasing importance of IT in Federal spending, Congress again directed
the GAO to review the planning and management practices of 26 Federal agencies in 2004.
The report identified inconsistent application of required and recommended practices. The
GAO determined that less than half of these agencies had implemented the 30 key strategic
planning and investment management practices either required by law already or
recommended in guidance from OMB or the GAO. Their recommendations to the
Department of Defense were similar to those for other agencies as well: incorporate
information security resource requirements and implementation timeframes into their annual
performance plan; institutionalize a framework of measurements to assess progress in
meeting IT goals; and establish a set of IT performance metrics to track expected and
realized business benefits derived from the use of IT. In addition, the GAO suggested the
DoD document how its IT portfolio management related to "other departmental processes
and the department's enterprise architecture" (GAO 2004b).
3.2.3 2005 and Beyond: A Turning Point
FY 2005 signaled a shift in the Congressional view of the DoD's ability to manage its
business investments. Previous legislation had largely stopped at identifying the desired
outcomes the Department should achieve. The NDAA language in 2005, however, directed
the use of a specific governance model, down to the level of detail of specifying who would
participate in the senior-most review boards and what supporting governance bodies they
should establish. This reflected dissatisfaction with the degree of structure, rigor, and
leadership involvement in the defense business systems investment management practices.
The FY 2005 NDAA included language that required the DoD to institute a new
methodology for planning and executing its DBS investments. Section 332 of the FY 2005
NDAA (referenced to the US Code as Section 186 of Title 10) required the establishment of
the Defense Business Systems Modernization Committee (DBSMC) as the senior-most
decision making body on issues related to the continued development of the defense Business
Enterprise Architecture. Further, the law also identified the need to designate Certification
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Authorities and establish Investment Review Boards (IRBs) to reviews DBS investment
proposals and provide recommendations to the DBSMC. The high-level guidance for the
implementation of this management structure was also prescribed in the NDAA
(incorporated into 10 USC Section 2222), which spelled out requirements for annual
certification of new and ongoing DBS programs. Finally, the law directed the DoD to submit
to Congress a report in March of every year documenting compliance with the requirements
of the statute and describing the cost savings benefits realized for each successful
modernization (2005).
In 2007, the GAO took aim at the DoD's approach to managing its enterprise
portfolio. In their report, "Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to
Weapon System Investments Could Improve DoD's Acquisition Outcomes", the
Congressional watchdog agency compared DoD's investment management approach to
successful commercial industry practices. In the firms highlighted, investments were
managed at the enterprise level using a framework that ensured a mix of current business
sustainment, business enhancements, new business capabilities, and breakthrough
opportunities in support of strategic goals. Investments are traded against one another and
the overall effect of the investment "ecosystem" in achieving the organization's business
imperatives guides decision-making rather than letting each business unit optimize its own
performance in isolation.
In contrast, the GAO characterized the defense enterprise as rigidly divided along
Service lines, with warfighter requirements, budgeting, and program execution occurring
separately. The GAO acknowledged that statutory authorities specifically granted to the
Service Secretaries for independently managing their enterprises is a contributing factor, but
they go on to note that by the time investment proposals are brought to the level of corporate
DoD decision-making, they've built up so much political momentum from the Service
stovepipe processes as to make "no" decisions exceptionally rare. Additionally, the GAO
noted that Defense Department tended to select preferred solutions earlier and with greater
uncertainty than their commercial industry counterparts. As a result, requirements, program
scope, and risks are less defined at the point where budgetary commitments are made. At the
time of the report in 2007, its authors identified pilot programs within the DoD to establish
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and manage according to joint capability portfolios as a first step toward portfolio
management best practices (GAO 2007).
In March of the following year, Kathleen Hicks of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) authored "Invigorating Defense Governance", the culmination
of a six-year, four-phase Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study of various aspects of the defense
enterprise and strategic decision-making. The report took a senior leadership perspective in
exploring the state of defense governance, that system of decision authorities, governing
bodies, and accountability established to manage the decision-making processes. According
to Hicks, the principle decision-making obstacles for the DoD are complexity and
disconnectedness, stakeholder underrepresentation, lack of accountability, absence of cross-
talk and feedback among the various governance processes, and a slow, bureaucratic decision
machine (Hicks 2008). Ms. Hicks is now the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Strategy, Plans, and Forces.
In parallel, the FY 2008 NDAA (2008) further refined business transformation
guidance to the Department, designating the role of Chief Management Officer (CMO) for
the Deputy Secretary of Defense and commensurate CMO roles for the Undersecretaries of
the Services. The NDAA also created the office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer
(DCMO) to assist in managing the Department's business transformation efforts. One of the
key DCMO responsibilities was to serve as the vice-chair of the DBSMC in place of USD
(AT&L), a move designed to increased dedicated oversight of business systems investment
decisions. DCMO is required to publish a biannual Strategic Management Plan (SMP)
describing high-level goals and performance measures for business transformation with key
initiatives and oversight procedures.
With little substantive progress in improving the speed and success of defense IT
capability delivery, Congress also inserted a requirement into the FY 2008 NDAA for the
DoD to reexamine the suitability of the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) for information
systems development. Specifically, the Act required the Secretary of Defense to direct the
Defense Science Board to review and make recommendations for the improvement of the
DAS. Furthermore, the DSB was to be tasked to look at roles and responsibilities across the
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various acquisition governance bodies, the relevant existing defense acquisition policies
embodied in DoD Directive 5000.1 "The Defense Acquisition System" and its derivative
documents, metrics and reporting mechanisms, and the adequacy of weapon system test
resources for information systems. The sense of urgency was high, and Congress gave the
DoD 12 months to provide a report of findings. The response was captured in the March
2009 "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Department of Defense Policies
and Procedures for the Acquisition of Information Technology".
The DSB report was clear in its findings: the conventional hierarchy of processes for
acquiring weapons systems is ill-suited to the demands of information systems that depend
on rapidly changing technology and which require continuous upgrades for currency and
security. This is especially true for systems that are built on COTS technologies, and the
momentum of the past decade was pushing the DoD to institutionalize the use of COTS
wherever possible. The DSB recommended the establishment of a new, separate acquisition
system for IT. The centerpiece of this new approach would be an agile, incremental
acquisition philosophy aimed at structuring programs with more up front program definition
and requirements analysis in the first two years followed by capability releases on 18-month
timelines. Historically, so-called "big bang" IT acquisitions were taking 91 months from
initial identification of requirements to initial operational capability. Additionally, the DSB
makes passing mention of the need for centralized enterprise IT governance to provide
"conceptual integrity", but the discussion occupies only one paragraph and has no
accompanying recommendations (Defense Science Board 2009).
Curiously, the DSB report makes no mention of the DoD's Business Capability
Lifecycle (BCL), an acquisition process developed in 2007 for defense business systems
based on the DBSMC and IRB governance model directed by the FY 2005 NDAA. The
BCL had several features in common with the DSB-proposed IT acquisition process,
including a more robust business case analysis and small, short increments of capability. A
key feature of the BCL that was lacking in the DSB report was the requirement for business
process reengineering in combination with planning for a materiel solution. This latter point
was noted in the lone dissent by John Stenbit, DSB member and former Assistant Secretary
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of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (Defense Science
Board 2009).
Congress commissioned its own study of defense acquisition beginning in March of
2009. On the heels of the DSB report, the House Armed Services Committee Panel on
Defense Acquisition Reform (DAR) began a year-long review of the DAS based on the sense
that the acquisition framework was increasingly out of touch with the kinds of investments
being made. The DAR Panel noted, for example, that services and IT acquisitions were the
majority of acquisition spending, yet the provisions of the DAS were often inappropriate to
the needs of those systems. Although the Panel's recommendations for improving IT
acquisition were general in nature and tended to reflect observations made since the mid-
1990s, their emphasis on looking to commercial industry was clear. Notable among these
were development of IT-focused performance metrics to augment or replace the traditional
financial execution and acquisition process metrics in use for major weapon systems, and
greater emphasis on commercial market analysis for mature solutions before considering
technology development (Andrews et al. 2010).
At the same time the HASC DAR Panel was developing their findings, Congress was
putting into place additional direction to the DoD to revamp its IT investment management
practices. The FY 2010 NDAA established a requirement for the Department to develop a
new approach to building and buying information systems. Section 804, titled
"Implementation of New Acquisition Process for Information Technology Systems", drew
heavily on the 2009 DSB study, including explicit language to develop a process "based on
the recommendations in chapter 6 of [the report]" (2010). Section 804 also required the DoD
to submit its plan for instituting the new process by late 2010. The plan was to include a
description of the process, any justification for departing from the DSB recommendations, a
timeline for implementation, applicability criteria for various types of IT systems, and
recommendations back to Congress for supporting legislation.
The FY 2010 NDAA also strengthened the requirements for business process
reengineering, emphasizing a best practice that had been championed in policy and statute
alike since the mid-i 990s. Section 1072 of the law required the appropriate Component
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CMO to attest to the fact that the business processes supported by each business system
modernization had been reviewed and streamlined wherever possible and that any tailoring of
commercial systems integrated into the solution had been minimized to avoid costly
customization and protracted specialized support contracts.
The DoD was working on its Section 804 Report to Congress when the GAO
published GAO-1 1-53, "DoD Business Transformation: Improved Management Oversight
of Business System Modernization Efforts Needed" (GAO 2010a). In it, the GAO pointed to
the classic vicious cycle of IT acquisition: modernization efforts experience cost overruns
and schedule delays that force the Department to invest in maintaining costly legacy systems
longer, thereby reducing funds available for the modernizations. Specifically, the GAO
looked at the DoD's Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) programs, and they found that none
of the four major ERP programs reviewed had a comprehensive integrated master schedule,
and three of the four lacked uncertainty and sensitivity analyses within the cost estimates.
Perhaps more importantly, the GAO assessed that the DoD was not measuring the impact of
these ERP systems in terms of improving business operations. As a result, there is no
traceability from dollars spent to benefit achieved. In a letter of response to the GAO, the
Deputy Chief Management Office agreed with the recommendations to implement
scheduling and cost estimating best practices and for the Department and Services to
establish business systems performance measures.
In December 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed out the DoD's Section
804 Report, "A New Approach for Delivering Information Technology Capabilities in the
Department of Defense". As directed in the FY 2010 NDAA, the document included a high-
level discussion of the DoD's plans for implementing a new acquisition framework for IT
systems consistent with the recommendations of the 2009 DSB report. The new framework
would emphasize a shift from large monolithic information system programs to portfolios of
related smaller projects delivering relatively frequent increments of capability on much
shorter schedules. Further, it would enforce an enterprise perspective in requirements
development to ensure that requirements sponsors look toward common, open standards, and
modular approaches rather than customized solutions to meet their needs.
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From a governance perspective, the Section 804 Report also identified goals for
reducing redundancy in oversight and establishing a tiered accountability system that places
authority and responsibility at a level appropriate to the magnitude of the investment. These
decision-makers would adopt a portfolio management approach in which project decisions
and trade-offs are considered in the context of a system of related efforts within a capability
roadmap rather than on an individual project basis. At the same time, the DoD identified
improvements in its governance of business systems, pointing to the growing use of business
process reengineering and the establishment of the Business Capability Lifecycle acquisition
system.
The GAO gave the DoD some credit for its efforts in its June 2011 report "Further
Actions Needed to Institutionalize Key Business System Modernization Management
Controls", but highlighted the need for better progress with the Components in developing
and populating their respective enterprise architectures. Several common issues were called
out: lack of standardization, duplication of functionality among different systems, multiple
separate instances of the same data on multiple systems, and lack of automated information
exchange (GAO 201la).
As the preceding history shows, the DoD's evolving IT and business systems
investment planning and management practices have matured over the past decade and a half,
often in reaction to critical review or Congressional direction. The FY 2005 NDAA marked
a new chapter in defense business systems governance with the congressionally-directed
establishment of the DBSMC, the use for investment review boards, and the requirement to
certify business systems modernization programs as a prerequisite for spending the money
appropriated to them. A chronological summary of the studies, legislation, and reform
initiatives is contained in Figure 6. Figure 7 through Figure 9 presents a more detailed view
of the principle themes recurring in reviews of DoD investment planning and management,
recent reform initiatives, and legislative activity.
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Figure 6 Chronological view of key studies, initiatives, and legislation. The most important items are
shown in orange highlight.
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Figure 7 Key shortfalls in defenses business systems governance.
Foundations of a Defense Digital Platform:
Business Systems Governance in the Department of Defense
Impetus
for Change
statutorily
Mandated
internally
Driven
Congress directed the
establishment of the
Defense Business
Systems Management
Committee and use of
Investment Review
Boards
WW Key efforts havebeen terminated
before achieving
objectives
1995 2000 2005 2010
DoD has struggled with self-initiated business
transformation initiatives
Figure 8 DoD investment management reform initiatives.
Impact on Defense
Business Systems Important Statutory Milestones
Investment
MajoroD Clinger-Cohen Act 2005 NDAAOrganizational 200N
and Policy FY 2010 0
Transformation
FY 2008 NDAA
0
SignificantDoD FY 2009 NDAA
Investment g
Polcy Change FY 2003 ND
Paperwork
Reduction Act
Broad Goals
For Federal
Investment e-Government
Policy
1995 2000 2005 2010
Congress has taken a more active role in redefining DBS
investment management over the last 6 years
Figure 9 Legislative activity related to defense business systems.
The preceding history and discussion reveals a recurring pattern of stagnation in
which characteristic problems as observed from the outside by the GAO and others are
reported to Congressional stakeholders, who eventually reach a level of frustration that leads
to legislation intending to correct these symptomatic problems. OSD reacts to the legislation
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by issuing compliance policy which then flows down to the Services and Agencies. These
institutions in turn issue their own implementing policy, and the combined weight of this
"guidance" sits upon the PEOs and Program Managers who must build or adapt acquisition
strategy and execution to accommodate. When policies are unclear or create too sever a
burden, the Services and programs resist, attempting to restore equilibrium with familiar
practices. Change fails to manifest in the form envisioned by Congress, GAO notes the lack
of progress, and the cycle continues as illustrated in Figure 10.
GAO observes little or no
progress in addressing their
recommendations
Reforms Fail to
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Organizations Problems
resist the
changes,
attempt to
restore
equilibrium
Avalanche of policy overhead
imposes additional "tax" on
programs
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Recommends can't always access the
Solutions underlying issues
Congress
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Reform Mandates Near-term
oriented,
often doesn't
account for
"side effects"
Translation of statute to policy
not always clear, reactive to
near-term goals
Figure 10 The cycle of stagnation in defense investment practices.
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CHAPTER 4. DEFENSE BUSINESS SYSTEMS
GOVERNANCE TODAY
4.1 THE TRIAD
In traditional defense systems, no discussion of governance would be complete
without recognizing the classic triad of governance systems: the Defense Acquisition System
(DAS), the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), and the
Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) System. Although an in-depth
discussion of these systems is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth a few words to
briefly introduce the role that each plays in defining our defense force structure as a backdrop
to discussions of DBS investment planning and management today.
4.1.1 Defense Acquisition System
The DAS is the DoD's framework of policies and procedures for managing the
Department's investments for developing and maintaining military capabilities. Although
the DAS can be considered generally to encompass any and all defense procurement
oversight, it is typically used in the context of the rules prescribed in the DoD Directive
5000.01 establishing broad, top-level themes, and its more detailed counterpart, DoD
Instruction 5000.02. As embodied in these governing documents, the DAS provides a
structured, standardized, and to some extent, tailorable set of guidelines for how programs
should be planned and executed.
The DAS uses a set of acquisition milestones set at key points along the active
investment portion of the system lifecycle with statutory and regulatory entry and exit
criteria. Programs reaching the milestone review will typically undergo a tiered review
process en route to the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), including organizational and
Component readiness reviews and an Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT)
consisting of key senior level stakeholders that advise the MDA. OSD has recently added a
series of senior level small-group reviews with the Principle Deputy to USD (AT&L) in
Foundations of a Defense Digital Platform:
Business Systems Governance in the Department of Defense
order to work out issues prior to the actual review with the MDA. At the milestone review,
programs are expected to demonstrate compliance with the appropriate entrance and exit
criteria and to present a coherent plan for executing the program, with a particular focus on
addressing risk. Key elements of the review process include certification of full funding and
consensus from the requirements sponsor that the system adequately meets the user's need,
providing a measure of intersection with the budgeting and requirements processes,
respectively.
4.1.2 Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System
The PPBE framework is the Department's system for planning resource requirements
and monitoring execution realities in order to maintain as accurate as possible a view of
defense spending needs. The PPBE feeds into the annual President's Budget submission
process but is itself a two-year cycle to produce those inputs. Fiscal guidance for a given
budget year is provided by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) two years earlier
and funding requirements are updated by the Components during Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) development. Following an iterative series of POM and budget
reviews at all levels within the Components and with OSD, the Components finalize their
budgets for submission.
In planning for business system acquisitions, the Components must operate within the
two year lead time cycle, projecting forward their budgetary requirements while being
mindful of potential changes in requirements, budget realities, and technology change. When
these systems are reviewed at acquisition milestones, they are required to demonstrate that
they are fully funded, meaning all the funding needed in each year of the program is already
encoded within the current Service or Agency budget. The requirements sponsor, preferably
acting in coordination with the system development office, builds the compelling business
case during the POM process to ensure the program meets this full funding criterion. This
tight linkage between the acquisition governance and the fixed budgetary cycles is important
for self-consistency, but it contributes strongly to long development cycles and rigid
procurement processes.
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4.1.3 Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
The JCIDS system is the DoD's mechanism for reviewing and validating user
requirements that drive capability development and integration. In its ideal form, the JCIDS
process drives the user's requirements sponsor to view the need through the lenses of
Doctrine, Operations, Training, Materiel, Logistics, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) to
consider to what extent the need could be met by some combination of each of these
approaches rather than just by creating a new tool. For example, a particular need could be
met by retraining operators to use existing systems in new ways rather than buying a new
system. In reality, many requirements are established as extensions or new versions of
existing systems and begin their life as materiel needs with the other six factors (DOT-LPF)
brought in afterwards in such a way as to support the conclusion that a materiel solution is
needed. For Joint interest programs, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is the
senior-most governing body for validation of joint requirements.
As mentioned previously, an acquisition for a new system or a modernization to an
existing system cannot begin without a validated requirement. The requirement sponsor
must work closely with the program office not only in the JCIDS but as well in both the DAS
and PPBE frameworks in order to ensure all elements of the program are choreographed to
meet Component, regulatory, and statutory requirements. For defense business systems, the
standard JCIDS processes and documentation are set aside in favor of the Business
Capability Lifecycle (BCL) business case review, although the JROC can designate business
systems as Joint interest and require JROC review of the business case documentation
(McChrystal 2011).
Although each has evolved in its own right, the DAS, PPBE, and the JCIDS have
long been the systems that the defense community has had to work through, and sometimes
around, in order to acquire and field capabilities that enable this nation to maintain its
defense posture. External critics and internal practitioners alike have recognized the need to
streamline these for all weapon systems and in particular for information systems. Recent
initiatives in defense business systems governance and IT acquisition reform are attempting
to do just that while continuing to improve our ability to effectively manage the resources at
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Figure 11 The Defense Requirements - Acquisition - Budget ecosystem.
our disposal. In the next section, we take a look at the investment planning and management
framework for defense business capabilities today.
4.2 DEFENSE BUSINESS SYSTEMS GOVERNANCE MODEL
As mentioned previously, the current high-level structure of the DoD's business
systems governance model was driven largely by the FY 2005 NDAA Section 332 which
provided the language incorporated in 10 USC Sections 186 and 2222. These established the
Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC), its membership, and the
board's responsibilities. The law also required the DoD to identify Certification Authorities
and charter supporting Investment Review Boards (IRBs), and it encoded the criteria by
which investments could be approved.
4.2.1 Defense Business Systems Management Committee
The DBSMC as originally established by the law was to be chaired by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) and included membership by the Undersecretaries of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) and Personnel and
Readiness (USD (P&R)), the Defense Comptroller (USD (C)), the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Networks and Information Integration / DoD Chief Information Officer (ASD
NII / DoD CIO), the Service Secretaries, and others as appointed by the Secretary of
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Defense. The statute allowed the DEPSECDEF to appoint a vice-chair, and from 2005 until
2008 this responsibility fell to USD (AT&L) (Wolfowitz 2005). The FY 2008 later
designated the newly created DCMO as the vice-chair and updated Service membership to
the Undersecretaries acting in their CMO capacities rather than the Secretaries themselves.
As directed by law, the DBSMC has three key functions. First, it recommends defense
business systems policies and procedures to the Secretary of Defense. Second, it must
review and approve any addition or change over $1 million to the Business Enterprise
Architecture. Third, the DBSMC is charged with managing cross-domain integration.
Congress also added new purse string powers to the DBSMC, requiring that DoD Component
owners of new modernization programs over $1 million gain certification approval from the
DBSMC before they would be allowed to spend program dollars. Those same systems
would thereafter be reviewed annually for recertification for permission to continue spending
money. Penalties for obligating resources without this certification are severe, classified as
violations of Federal law under the Anti-Deficiency Act.
The FY 2005 NDAA also clearly delineated responsibility for management of four
core business areas across five portfolios as shown in Table 2. The certification authorities
vested with these responsibilities are the Principle Staff Assistant's to the Secretary and
Business System Mission Area Certification Authority
Acquisition, Logistics, Installations and USD (AT&L)
Environments
Financial Management USD (C)
Human Resource Management USD (P&R)
Information Technology Infrastructure and ASD (Nil) / DoD C10
Information Assurance
Any Systems Not Otherwise Covered DCMO*
* DCMO replaced "the Deputy Secretary of Defense or an Under Secretary of Defense, as designated by the
Secretary of Defense" as originally stipulated in the FY 2005 NDAA.
Table 2 Approval Authorities for Defense Business Systems in core mission areas as established in
FY 2005 NDAA.
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Figure 12 DBS governance structure. Adapted from "DoD IT Defense Business System Investment
Review Process Guidance" (BTA 2009, p. 7).
Deputy Secretary of Defense for their respective areas, and each is required to certify to the
DBSMC that the modernization programs they bring forward for review meet one of three
key criteria:
* The system complies with the DoD's business enterprise architecture
* The system is required to meet a critical national security need
* The system is required to avoid significant adverse impact to another critical
national security capability
4.2.2 Investment Review Boards
The approval authorities, also referred to as Certification Authorities (CA), were
directed to charter Investment Review Boards (IRB) that would manage day-to-day portfolio
coordination, develop and maintain business area sub-architectures, and review the
modernization programs in the portfolio. By 2009, the structure had evolved to five core
mission areas with Acquisition, Logistics, Installations, and Environments breaking out into
Weapon System Lifecycle Management and Material Supply & Services Management in one
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derivative portfolio and Real Property and Installations Lifecycle Management into its own
portfolio. The IRBs were renamed as shown in Figure 12.
The function of the IRB is three-fold. As mentioned previously, IRBs review
programs for certification or recertification in accordance with 10 USC 2222. However, they
also review DBS programs in an acquisition support role when the Milestone Decision
Authority (MDA) is USD(AT&L), ASD(NII), or DCMO (England 2009). In this capacity,
they provide advice to the MDA with respect to the readiness of the program to pass the
milestone. In practice, IRBs perform a third function, managing the development of business
mission area enterprise architectures and recommending process and data standards needed
to support integration across the systems in those architectures. It is this broad, end-to-end
perspective within the core mission areas that makes the IRB the first line of defense to
identify and mitigate potential duplication of investment. Given the sheer number of
programs requiring DBSMC review and approval and the limited time available to do so, it is
quite likely that the IRB is also the only place that this horizontal integration occurs.
Figure 12 also shows the linkage from the Component system owners into the IRBs
for programs over $1 million. The FY 2008 NDAA had established the roles of the
Component Chief Management Officers (CMO), requiring that they establish oversight that
includes pre-certification of the business systems prior to review at an IRB. Although each
Component has a different institutional review process, all culminate in the submission of
programs into the Defense Information Technology Portfolio Repository (DITPR). Although
specific IRB procedures differ among the mission areas, the Component's certification
package for each system will include an attestation from the Pre-Certification Authority
(PCA) as to the readiness of the system for review as well as documentation supporting
regulatory compliance, economic analysis, and business process reengineering results
(OUSD (P&R) Information Management 20l1 a).
4.2.3 Business Capabilities Lifecycle
In response to the recognized challenges of acquiring business systems under
traditional Defense Acquisition System and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System processes, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
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(USD(AT&L)) Kenneth Krieg directed the Department in February 2007 to outline a
streamlined requirements and acquisition process better suited for these IT-intensive systems
(Gansler and Lucyshyn 2009). The resulting Business Capabilities Lifecycle (BCL) was
proposed to the DBSMC in April of that year, and on May 18, Undersecretary Krieg issued a
memo requiring that the BCL concept be refined for implementation later that year (Krieg
2007a). On November 15, 2010, USD(AT&L) Ashton Carter directed all defense business
systems to be acquired in accordance with the BCL under interim guidance (Carter 2010)
which was formally reissued as Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 11-009, "Acquisition
Policy for Defense Business Systems (DBS)" (Carter 2011).
The BCL was designed to consolidate the functions of the JCIDS requirements
mechanisms and DAS acquisition processes, incorporating both into a model that emphasizes
incremental development. Under this model, business systems would be structured as multi-
increment programs with business case and materiel solution analysis for the entire series
occurring up front and individual prototyping, engineering development, limited fielding, full
fielding, and operations and support phases for each increment as shown in Figure 13.
Governance for the BCL occurs through the IRBs described earlier and the designated
Milestone Decision Authority for the acquisition. The IRBs provide acquisition review and
recommendations to the MDA much like the Overarching Integrated Product Teams
mentioned in Section 4.1.1.
Although the BCL was established in 2007, it has seen limited use for actual business
systems acquisitions. This will change as more systems coming through the acquisition
pipeline come up to their Milestone Decisions. Indeed, given the objectives of the BCL and
their similarity to those identified as necessary characteristics for the Department's new IT
Acquisition Framework (OSD 2010a), the BCL may serve as the model for future
information systems acquisition as well. Comparison of the BCL to the model proposed by
the Defense Science Board in 2009 (2009) suggests their common heritage.
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In the next chapter, stakeholder perspectives on this governance framework, its
strengths, and weaknesses are explored in depth. This provides a way to compare what is
described here in Chapter 3 reflecting formal policy with the real-world experience of those
involved in its implementation who struggle to translate top level guidance into day-to-day
execution for investment planning and management. As is true in other environments, policy
lose C
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A
K>
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represents the aspirations of how to implement an intent that many share with different
interpretations. The results as experienced are often considerably different.
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CHAPTER 5. CURRENT STATE IN PRACTICE:
DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES
5.1 CHALLENGES IN DECISION-MAKING
The most important governance structure in defense business systems investment
management is the IRB. Although the DBSMC makes the decisions to approve
certifications, the work to assess their business case and alignment to the business enterprise
architecture occurs in the IRB. Additionally, the IRB serves two purposes: review programs
for both certification and acquisition oversight. Although tightly coupled, these two
functions address different statutory obligations. The first supports a recommendation up to
the Certification Authority and eventually the DBSMC that a system meets one of the criteria
specified in Section 2222 of Title 10 of the US Code. This certification simply means that a
determination has been made that the system is compliant with the architecture and that it
meets a critical need. It is a prerequisite for authorization to spend money on the
modernization and must be obtained at the start of the program and every year thereafter
unless multi-year certifications are granted (in which case the IRB must still review that
program annually). Note that decertification is not the removal of the authorization to spend
money, but a reduction in the amount authorized-decertified programs are still authorized to
proceed. Neither the Certification Authorities nor the DBSMC itself has the explicit
authority to cancel programs, although they can withhold the certification approvals required
to spend money on them.
The second function supports the Milestone Decision Authority in making acquisition
decisions at key points in the program lifecycle. Programs can be approved to proceed to the
next phase with or without conditions, delayed with a rescheduled milestone, restructured, or
cancelled. The annual report to Congress on Defense Business Operations includes
tabulation of Certifications, Recertifications, Decertifications, as well as Milestone decisions
including approvals, delays, and milestone deletions. Milestone deletions are not explicitly
defined in the report and may indicate a milestone is no longer appropriate for a restructured
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or rescoped program, that the program was placed on hold, or that it was cancelled. There is
no way to determine through this report how many systems were disapproved or rationalized.
In order to perform these functions effectively, the IRB must review each eligible
program with considerable diligence, a task which is complicated by a several key reasons
highlighted in the stakeholder interviews. From the view of IRB members, many programs
come through the process having already garnered substantial political support from their
Services or Agencies who are also represented on the IRB. The decision apparatus must
contend with influence from external and internal sources, and the IRBs must spend time
peeling away the veneer that some interviewees referred to a spin and marketing. Because of
the significant numbers of modernization programs that must be reviewed, the IRBs often
have insufficient time for this critical analysis.
One of the coping mechanisms used by decision-makers to get around these problems
is to work issues directly with the program stakeholders in separate meetings apart from the
formal governance structures of the IRBs. These workarounds provide expedient pathways
to make forward progress, but they create variability and reduce transparency in the decision
process and serve to undermine the accountability of the IRBs. In addition, it was
universally recognized that OSD has historically lacked the political will to disapprove or
cancel programs. This serves to compound the workload as problem programs require
greater oversight and recurring reviews while new systems are being added to the portfolios
all the time. From the view of the programs, the governance structure and processes are not
clear. Multiple accountability chains supporting the certification and acquisition
requirements drive a proliferation of reviews and pre-reviews, and the rules of the road for
implementing the defense business systems acquisition framework are still maturing.
5.2 POLITICAL MOMENTUM AND SUPPORT FOR SYSTEMS
When programs come before the IRBs, they have already undergone extensive review
and coordination within Service channels. This begins with the preparation of an extensive
set of documents that are summarized in the Business Case required of all defense business
systems. These documents are co-developed with the Functional Sponsor and coordinated up
through two separate paths. Within the Service acquisition channels, the documentation is
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reviewed to ensure everything is in order for a Service acquisition review board. This
acquisition board is effectively the Service Milestone Review (and in fact serves as the
highest level milestone review for smaller programs) and approval results in the issuance of
the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) Compliance Memo required for the Milestone
A and B reviews. In parallel, the Service CMO will review documentation related to the
certification process in order to validate that the system is compliant with the Business
Enterprise Architecture before approving release of the package to the IRBs.
The long process of precoordination is primarily designed to ensure programs are
ready to meet the OSD reviews, but it also has the effect of building up political support for
the program along the way. The degree of attention and support given will correspond to the
magnitude of the program and its impact to the Service, and coalitions will form, activating
informal networks in OSD and with key stakeholders to influence the governance process.
One interviewee described the phenomenon in the following way:
"By the time it gets up to OSD it's already been filtered, a couple
times, and whatever the major programmatic issues are, a lot of
capital has already been expended in that networking we do so well"
Additionally, several interviewees voiced the concern that IRB participants who are
also proponents for other programs in that board's purview are hesitant to raise challenges
during system reviews:
"One of the weaknesses of the IRB is that participants' decisions are
impacted by their desire for their sponsored investments to be
successful, so they may be less inclined to say no to someone else's
program.
It is possible that explicit or implicit expectations exist for these IRB members to do their
best to ensure their institution's systems succeed, and in at least one case, the IRB chair is
outranked by Service participants, which may impair his or her ability to ensure an objective
process.
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5.3 INSUFFICIENT TIME SPENT REVIEWING EACH PROGRAM
Programs prepare for the IRB by building an IRB documentation package
coordinated within Service or Agency channels beforehand as described earlier. Ideally, the
IRB would review the packages and validate the content before and during the IRBs.
However, the time available for each decreases as the number of programs under review
increases. Although the workload varies by IRB, one interview indicated that each board
meeting lasts around two to two and a half hours over which they review three or four
programs, and they have as many as three or four meetings in a given week. With only 30 to
45 minutes per program, the reviews go into less depth and begin to reflect a box-checking
exercise to ensure all the entrance and exit criteria are satisfied rather than to objectively
assess the value of the investment and its compliance with the architecture. Many of the
OSD interviews revealed that programs with problems often come in with a polished
message representing the Service position about how they've got it under control. A
functional representative to one of the IRBs stated
"I find in the IRB there's insufficient time to get into what's
underneath that, so it comes across as a lot of spin."
Several other IRB members expressed some frustration that this "spin" serves in their
view as an impediment to constructive dialog about resolving issues and getting to the core
of how the proposed system fits within the architecture. As the time available to consider
each investment decreases, the opportunities to ask hard, probing questions decreases and the
IRBs are left to take the system owners' word for the content in the packages.
5.4 THE RISE OF AD HOC GOVERNANCE
Perhaps because of the recognition that there is insufficient time to review each
program adequately, decisions are sometimes made in separate meetings outside the formal
governance structure. These discussions include a different and likely smaller set of
stakeholders, allowing the decision-maker to engage in a focused, streamlined assessment
and negotiation. Although more expedient, these "one-off' meetings lead to pro forma IRBs
at which issues identified have already been addressed or are otherwise taken off the table.
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"Those IRB members that weren't part of the other forums will ask
questions and the response back is that 'we've already covered that'
or 'we've got that handled'... it's not like an IIPT'. ..you don't get to
ask the hard questions... not everyone should be in agreement with the
program, but you should understand what the differences are."
As a result, IRB members are deprived of the chance to highlight issues that might
otherwise bring a valuable stakeholder perspective to light, and they may question the
productivity of the time -spent in IRB meetings.
5.5 OSD DOESN'T SAY "NO" TO PROGRAMS
Despite the popular view from the programs that OSD exists primarily as an obstacle
to progress, those on the IRBs and in the participating organizations want the Services to be
successful. Although it's difficult to define "success" in this context, it appears to be a
shared view that there is a stigma associated with cancelled programs that one IRB member
characterized as "politically embarrassing". A cancelled program represents an admission
that the investment committed already has gone to waste, and the desire to try to salvage
something for the warfighter often leads decision-makers to rationalize continuation of
troubled programs based on "sunk cost arguments". Said one senior leader,
"Despite knowing better, we still often frll back on sunk cost
arguments to justify continuing to spend resources on poor
investments."
In the eyes of another interviewee,
"OSD hasn't demonstrated enough courage to tell a program no,
because you want the program to be successful and you trust that the
Services know what they're doing. So we give them a little more room,
and they come back, and we give them a little more room...
These factors combine to make system disapprovals exceedingly rare as the DBSMC
receives recommendations to certify or recertify the vast majority of systems reviewed.
4 Integrating Integrated Product Team (IIPT) is an acquisition milestone preparation review for
programs, bringing together working level stakeholder representatives from the Program Office, the user, OSD,
the test community, and other key offices. The programs present their milestone review material and address
critical feedback that must be addressed prior to the Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) review with
senior level advisors to the Milestone Decision Authority.
Foundations of a Defense Digital Platform:
Business Systems Governance in the Department of Defense
Interestingly, the annual DBO Report doesn't identify whether any programs were rejected as
not having met the certification requirements. In FY 2010, the DoD reported that it
conducted 173 certification reviews and another 100 non-certification annual reviews across
the five IRBs (DCMO 201 la, p. 35-36). In addition, acquisition reviews were conducted for
programs meeting major milestones, although it wasn't clear from the report how many
additional discrete reviews were required. Because programs must be reviewed each year and
new programs are being established continuously, systems will continue to accumulate,
further reducing the time available to review each given the fixed human resources for
governance. Using a stock and flow analogy, the inflow continues at a steady pace while the
drain lets out only a trickle. Eventually the stock will overflow, and the situation on the
horizon looks even worse.
Congress is currently considering draft language in the FY 2012 National Defense
Authorization bill under review in the Senate (201 ib) that will remove the term
"modernization" as a qualifier to the types of programs subject to the defense business
systems certification process. Under existing statute, business system modernizations over
$1,000,000 must be certified and reviewed annually. If the Congressional language survives,
and there is every indication from the interviews that it will, then the IRBs will need to add to
their docket all the current systems in the field with total lifecycle expenditures over
$1,000,000. A cursory look at the FY 2011 Presidents IT Budget Request available from
OSD (OASD (NII) / DoD CIO et al. 2010) indicates there are conservatively 695
documented systems in current operation not designated as modernizations that meet the
threshold for review. This is likely a lower bound due to the probability that many systems
in sustainment haven't been documented on the IT budget request. Although one might
expect a lesser degree of scrutiny for systems in sustainment relative to modernizations, this
still represents a minimum 400% increase in the number of certification reviews required.
5 The data are available as a spreadsheet from https://snap.pae.osd.mil. The data were filtered to
remove duplicate entries for the same system, then filtered to extract only Business Mission Area investments
over $1,000,000 across a four-year period including the prior year, current year, budget request year, and the
year after. This list was then filtered for Current Services funded with Defense Health Program, Operations and
Maintenance, or Working Capital Fund appropriations to remove entries for Military Personnel funding,
Military Construction, and the like.
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Projected Increase in IRB Certification Review Activity
Including Systems in Sustainment
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Figure 15 Comparison of IRB certification review activity for defense business modernizations with
projected increases if systems in sustainment are added.
Another potential factor that may impact the ability of OSD to manage its business
systems is an initiative under consideration by DCMO to expand the role of the existing
Central IRB (CIRB) to integrate reviews from all the IRBs into one board. The concept is to
consolidate the review process to improve horizontal integration and reduce the effects of the
functional categorization that currently defines the IRB structure. It is not clear whether the
existing IRBs would be retained as precursor steps or removed altogether. If the CIRB
becomes a central clearing point for certification and acquisition reviews, they will need to
find a way to manage the flow of nearly 1,000 certification reviews and the associated
additional acquisition events.
5.6 WHAT IS THE GOVERNANCE?
From the point of view of the Program Executive Officers and Program Managers,
there is a fair degree of confusion about what the defense business system governance really
is. The high-level policies may be clear, but the message doesn't appear to have crystallized
at the program level. Under the traditional DoDI 5000.02, there is a clear prescription of the
actions each program needs to complete and the documentation required to meet the next
milestone, and over the years an extensive support system has evolved both within the
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Services and OSD to help programs understand what they need to do to pass the next
milestone. The framework is cumbersome but thorough.
Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 11-09 "Acquisition Policy for Defense
Business Systems" also describes the milestone structure and required documentation within
the Business Capabilities Lifecycle (BCL). However, the BCL is still a relatively immature
system, having been exercised for only a dozen or so programs since its inception in 2007
according to one source at OSD. As a result, the support structure hasn't developed yet.
Theoretically the BCL, like the DoDI 5000.02, is tailorable in terms of reporting
requirements, although it can be difficult to find the OSD stakeholder willing to give up the
document they are primary office for. Yet programs must risk the extensive time and effort
preparing for and navigating the wickets leading to a milestone only to be told they haven't
yet met the burden of proof to show they are ready to pass the next milestone. An Air Force
PEO struggled with how to apply his Major Defense Acquisition Program experience to
form strategies and make decisions for an IT portfolio, then came to the conclusion that much
of that experience "just doesn't apply". Although the BCL holds the promise of streamlining
acquisition procedures by integrating elements of the JCIDS, the DAS, and the IRB/DBSMC
governance systems, the framework is not well defined at the program level. Additionally,
when agreements and decisions are made outside the formal governance channels, the rules
become even more obscured.
Once separate acquisition and certification governance frameworks were created for
defense business systems, they necessarily drove derivative frameworks in the Services.
Each Service now has a CMO and Deputy CMO who work through business transformation
channels in coordination with the DCMO at OSD. In parallel, there have long been Service
Acquisition Executives who work through coordination with USD (AT&L) on their
respective programs. Further clouding the situation is the fact that the DCMO has been
delegated acquisition Milestone Decision Authority for some business systems but not others.
The PMs and PEOs who are the "customers" of the Service and OSD processes that
ideally should result in well-structured programs are not always clear whether the preparatory
6 Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) are the largest of the DoD's acquisition efforts with
very tightly controlled statutory and regulatory requirements for planning, execution, and reporting.
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meetings and reviews they are attending are driven by the acquisition side or the CMO side,
and the two chains aren't always in agreement as to how to proceed up the governance path.
One interviewee from the Government Accountability Office commented that it seems PMs
spend more time reporting out on their programs than they do managing them. Whatever the
cause, programs and Services are left to innovate their own governance procedures at the
lower level. Even within the Services, PMs are faced with meeting many governance boards
and complying with a diversity of policies as they get direction from multiple chains of
authority above. One PEO confessed his bewilderment at the multitude of review boards:
"The first three or four months [on the job] I lost count of the number
of governing bodies we had to report out to. How is governance of
ERP7 and IT systems done? I don't know. It's just not clean and
clear... it adds to the 'fog and friction of war' and slows down
progress.
One of the side effects of this confusion about procedure and proliferation of
governance boards is to default within the programs to a safer checklist approach to
compliance. Interviewees from several IRBs noted that many PMs come to the reviews with
a box-check mentality and an inability to articulate the business value of their investments.
The former may in part be a result of the lack of clear direction and the latter is certainly
related to the question of who defines value. Asking a PM to articulate how their system fits
into the end-to-end business processes of the Department of Defense and may potentially
meet the needs of other external stakeholders implies a level of insight and visibility that may
be mismatched with their place in the enterprise.
7 Enterprise Resource Planning systems
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CHAPTER 6. CURRENT STATE IN PRACTICE:
ALIGNMENT MECHANISMS
6.1 PROCESSES AND PORTFOLIOS
6.1.1 'Supported' and 'Supporting' Relationships: the Business Process and the
Portfolio
Much of the focus for DoD business systems investment planning and management
over the last ten years has been on the goal of implementing portfolio management (PfM) as
a way to get a more enterprise-level view of its investments. IT PfM is defined by Jeffery
and Leliveld (2004) as "managing IT as a portfolio of assets similar to a financial portfolio
and striving to improve the performance of the portfolio by balancing risk and return."
However, in contrast to instruments in a financial portfolio, which are largely independent of
one another and whose benefit is almost entirely associated with their financial value,
enterprise business systems exist in an ecosystem with other related systems that work
together to support an integral business process. Their value is in their contribution to the
overall process. The presence or absence of a small cap fund in your financial portfolio has
no tangible effect on the performance and value of any other asset in your portfolio. The
presence or absence of a contract payment financial system has a significant impact on your
contract management system because of the interdependencies between the two in your
business process.
As noted previously, however, the emphasis on business processes has only come
along recently. In the broader topic of IT portfolio management, sources in the literature
differ as to the specific set of best practices needed to implement a successful PfM approach,
but they universally agree that aligning portfolios to business strategy is a necessary
prerequisite for that success. In the context of defense business systems, each such system
should be providing functionality that supports a portion of an overall business process.
These processes then constitute a natural alignment mechanism for interdependent systems
that deliver the end-to-end business capability in support of the strategy. In other words, the
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business processes define the business system portfolios, and conversations about portfolio
management should occur in the context of and not apart from the business processes they
support. The following observation came from one IRB member:
"We're still working to build portfolios and establish portfolio
management responsibility. Currently each system has to show how it
maps individually to the end-to-end processes, but this needs to move
to a portfolio approach where the systems supporting a particular line
of business are considered together rather than as isolated cases."
As business processes are reassessed, capability gaps can be identified in those
processes that then provide the impetus for system investments and architecture initiatives.
In another IRB, the interviewee noted that a business process perspective allows them to
prioritize their focus:
We're not so interested in trying to identify the alignment of every IT
system to the architecture, but if a capability gap is identified, we need
to be able to deep dive on all the systems affected or involved. With a
problem this big, we need to start with the pain points rather than
trying to boil the ocean."
Documenting and assessing the enterprise business processes is therefore an important
precursor to establishing the business systems portfolios.
6.1.2 Stovepipes and Systems
The most common complaint to come out of the interviews was the frustration with
"stovepipes" where business systems and process management occur separately in isolation
across various parts of the enterprise. This manifests itself through multiple instances of the
same systems, multiple instances of the same data in different, incompatible formats, systems
that don't talk with one another, and a host of other ills that recur in many of GAO's reports.
These stovepipes have evolved through two nested effects: Service or Agency stovepipes,
and within that, functional stovepipes. The Service stovepipes play the dominant role
because the forcing functions are stronger: Title 10 of the U.S. Code gives each of the
Service Departments the authority to organize, train, and equip its forces in support of
strategic defense capability and force structure planning. Although the National Security Act
of 1947 and its 1949 amendment had created the Secretary of Defense position at the head of
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the Department of Defense as a single focal point for defense capabilities (1947), and the
Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 had reduced the power of the Service Chiefs in favor of a
stronger central corporate function (1986), the Services retained the budget authority and
accountability for developing and supporting defense systems within their domains.
Functional stovepipes occur within specific lines of business, such as finance or
human resources. Systems built entirely within one functional domain without consideration
of interoperability across the domains foster duplication of investment and replication of data
for common aspects of their business. An example provided by one interviewee referred to
installation management and the three key data elements that define these property assets:
the location, cost, and personnel associated with the installation. An asset inventory system
might use one set of information codes and databases to track this data, while a finance
system developed for accountability purposes might use a different set, and a human
resources yet another. When the data calls come out to determine how many installations we
have, how much they cost, and how many people are occupying them, how many different
answers would we get? According to the interviewee,
"This makes it impossible to get a single, unambiguous site picture on
DOD assets because everyone defines the assets and their
characteristics differently."
To their credit, OSD and the Services have embraced the concept of authoritative data
sources, which enforces traceability of data validity back to a single source that all other
instances of the data point back to.
Stovepipes aren't necessarily apparent unless there is a larger context within which to
view them. An organization that perceives itself to be largely self-sufficient may not view
itself as a stovepipe, particularly if its mission is clearly demarcated from other similar
organizations. Opening the aperture to consider the organization as part of a greater
enterprise allows one to see the effects of the partitioning and recognize opportunities for
leverage. As stated by one senior leader,
"What is the enterprise? The way in which you define your enterprise
defines the lens through which you address questions of optimizing
your business. Moving from local domains to enterprise-wide view is a
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big change... it strikes at issues of personal control and ownership of
the money. Functioning as an enterprise allows you to reduce
duplication, but that increases interdependence across organizations
and systems within the enterprise and architecture."
Interdependence in this context implies risk that another Service on whom you have
to rely for business capabilities fails to adequately account for your organization's needs or
potentially fails to deliver at all. From the perspective of the Service giving up control of and
resources for the business system, the benefits are not clear cut. True, the enterprise as a
whole benefits long-term, but unlike commercial firms that can reward enterprise-level
thinking with bonuses based not only on individual but company performance, there is no
equivalent incentive to take the risk. The hedge against this risk is to champion the notion
that your Service's needs are unique.
6.1.3 Adopting a Business Process Perspective
One of the earliest emphasis areas for federal government business systems
investment management was to transition from a system-focused view to a business process
view. The concept of business process design was first formalized by Davenport and Short
(Davenport and Short 1990) and separately by Hammer (Hammer 1990). The idea centers on
leveraging the power of automation and speed brought by IT to workflows that are by their
nature cross-functional. The business process reform movement gained momentum in the
1990s and 2000s as a way of streamlining business operations while improving the flexibility
and responsiveness of services delivered to customers. It forced firms to reassess their
business strategies and align their business process to those strategies, weeding out
unnecessary processes and driving cross-functional integration to reduce duplication while
promoting information sharing.
When those business processes span multiple organizations within the enterprise, the
difficulty is magnified accordingly. Gulledge and Sommer (2002) discussed business
process management in the DoD and noted the challenges associated with holistic business
process analysis in this stovepiped organizational structure. These processes are part of the
fabric of the individual member organizations, representing an evolution over time in the way
work gets done. Changing them in one organization to better align with standards developed
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in another organization for the benefit of the larger enterprise implies expenditure of local
resources with little likelihood of near term return on investment relative.
One of the far-reaching implications of this division of authority has been the
bottoms-up approach the Department has traditionally taken to developing and delivering
business system capabilities, with the Services looking first at what they could build or
modify to meet their own needs and then thinking about how to hardwire those systems
together where interoperability was required. Although the Clinger-Cohen Act identified the
requirement to perform business process analysis as part of the decision scheme for
approving information systems acquisitions, business process reengineering (BPR) was not
institutionalized until it became an explicit prerequisite for business systems certification in
Section 1072 of the FY 2010 NDAA (2010). An OSD senior leader noted
"We need to start first with defining the problem by reassessing the
business processes first rather than thinking in terms of IT system
solutions. Develop the end-to-end processes, which drives the search
for process commonality in the "to-be" approach, then buy IT systems
to support that."
However, another interviewee from one of the IRBs cautioned that business process
reengineering has to consider the capabilities inherent in the technology, a theme echoed in
the literature (O'Neill and Sohal 1999; Reijers and Liman Mansar 2005). Doing so allows
the reengineering to more fully capture the benefits of automation.
The acquisition framework reinforces this system-over-process focus. The Defense
Acquisition System is organized around the program as the atomic unit of activity. The rules
for planning and executing these programs are directed toward ensuring that the business
case for the program is compelling, the requirements are clearly defined and achievable, the
acquisition strategy is sound, and that resources for the program are sufficient to execute the
strategy. It wasn't until the Business Capability Lifecycle (BCL) was rolled out in 2007 that
acquisition for business systems was placed in a more holistic context that considered the
end-to-end processes the systems were intended to support. The BCL was developed by the
DoD's Business Transformation Agency at the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense
in order to increase the speed of business capability delivery and improve the quality of
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investment decisions. Yet even with the renewed emphasis from the BCL and the statutory
requirements of the FY 2010 NDAA, the focus for business processes is still at the program
level.
The DoD's most recent BPR guidance places responsibility for BPR on the business
system owners, despite the fact that end-to-end business processes almost always extend well
beyond the scope of the constituent systems: "if it is determined that appropriate BPR efforts
were not undertaken, the appropriate Military Department CMO or DCMO shall require the
program manager and senior functional sponsor(s) to develop a plan to conduct the
appropriate BPR efforts, or restructure or terminate the modernization." (McGrath 2010, 2)
One of the critical success factors for BPR is that it must derive from an overarching
reassessment of the business strategy of the enterprise. For example, in the commercial
world, a firm that is focused on achieving rapid growth and matching their agility to the
demands of their customers may choose to design their business processes differently than a
firm that wants to emphasize operational effectiveness in order to maximize return on assets.
These are decisions that require senior strategic direction, yet the imperative to drive BPR
down to the program level only ensures that individual subprocess elements will be
reengineered with predictable results (GAO 1997a; O'Neill and Sohal 1999).
Another obstacle to end-to-end integration along these business processes is the lack
of Process Owners to lead the BPR planning efforts, coordinate change management across
the affected components and system owners, and assess the degree of performance
improvement. The GAO identified this as a key enabler (1 997a) and empirical research in
the private sector indicated that the lack of accountable process owners for reengineering
efforts and outcomes was a significant contributing factor to BPR failures (Grover et al.
1995). These process owners must be empowered to champion the effort and have some way
of either influencing or compelling member organizations to sacrifice near term expedience
in favor of greater enterprise performance across the full spectrum of the end-to-end process.
At present, the DoD has not identified formal process owners for the major end-to-end
business value streams, which impairs accountability, fragments decision-making, and
creates challenges for performance assessment of the reengineered process and its constituent
systems.
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One potential reason for this is reluctance on the part of OSD to overreach in
prescribing how the Services should spend their dollars. This contrasts sharply with private
sector firms that generally have the ability to internally mandate and empower process
owners. However, the FY 2005 and later Defense Authorization Acts have given OSD
significant powers to deal with these constraints. As codified in the FY 2005 NDAA, the
DBSMC makes business system certification approvals with recommendations from the
appropriate Certification Authorities, who in turn rely on their respective IRBs to manage the
precertification and acquisition reviews of each DBS. These certifications are statutory
prerequisites for spending money on any business modernization effort over $1 million
across its lifecycle. In effect, process owners working through the IRBs would have a
significant influence on the "power of the purse" in business system development. With their
end-to-end view of the core business processes, process owners at the IRB level would be the
ideal choice to lead business process reengineering.
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6.1.4 In Search of Clearly Defined Portfolios
As mentioned previously, the DoD began thinking in terms of capability portfolios as
an outcome of the Transformational Planning Guidance of 2003 signed out by Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld (2003). Although there has long been a focus on portfolios within
the DoD, the understanding of how they fit into the actual work has been slow to follow. The
DoD first established policy for IT portfolio management as a subset of its larger defense
systems portfolios in a 2004, assigning responsibilities for IT systems supporting Joint
Warfighting Capability Assessment areas, business domains, and the information enterprise
(Wolfowitz 2004). These were refined in 2005 to align to the four mission areas in use
today: Warfighting Mission Area (WMA), Business Mission Area (BMA), DoD portion of
Intelligence Mission Area (DIMA), and Enterprise Information Environment Mission Area
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(EIEMA). Around the same time, the FY 2005 NDAA established portfolio accountability
for all defense business systems under the BMA to four Certification Authorities as shown in
Figure 16 below. After several years, the Business Transformation Agency had refined the
IRB structure to include five such boards supporting the four CAs.
In parallel with the development of the business systems portfolios, the DoD had
established the Joint Capability Area (JCA) construct for capabilities-based planning,
investment decisions, portfolio management, and operational planning. Under the JCA
Capability Portfolio Management (CPM) model, the Portfolio Managers integrate force
structure planning along functional lines and advise decision-makers on budgetary decisions
to support these integrated needs. In a 2006 DEPSECDEF memo, OSD identified four test
CAPABILITY CPM CPM SWarF CPM FUNCTIONAL
PORTFOLIO CIVILIAN MILITARY JS CAPABILITY
AND TIER 1 JCA LEAD LEAD LEAD* OPR* BOARDS*
COMMAND AND ASD(NII) USJFCOM USJFCOM J-3 USJFCOMCONTROL I__________
BAWRE S USD(I) USSTRATCOM USSTRATOOM J-2 J-2
NET CENTRIC ASD(NII) USSTRATCOM USSTRATCOM J-6 J-6
LOGISTICS USD(AT&L) USTRANSCOM USTRANSCOM J-4 J-4
The below boxes reference capability portfolios in interim phase through the Fiscal Year 2010 Program
Objective Memorandum.
PARTNERSHIPS USD(P) Director, J-5 USJFCOM N/A J-5
PROTECTION USD(AT&L) Director, J-8 USSTRATCOM N/A J-8
FORCE SUPPORT USD(P&R) Director, J-8 USJFCOM N/A J-8
USJFCOM
FORCE USD(AT&L) JROC USSOCOM J-8 J-8APPLICATION USD(P) USSTRATCOM
CORPORATE
MANAGEMENT DCMO DJS N/A N/A N/A
AND SUPPORT
* As designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Les : I
ASD(NHl) I Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks Information and Integration)
USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)
USD(I) Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
USD(P&R) Under Secretary of Defense (Personiel and Readiness)
DCMO Deputy Chief Management Officer
DJS Director, Joint Staff
JROC Joint Reqmrements Overssght Council
J-2 Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate
J-3 Joint Staff OperationsDirectorate
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Figure 17 Tier 1 Joint Capability Areas. Source: DoD Directive 7045.20 "Capability Portfolio
Management" (2009, p. 4)
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case capability portfolios aligned to the Joint Command and Control, Joint Battlespace
Awareness, Joint Net-Centric Operations, and Joint Logistics JCAs (England 2006). These
were later broadened (England 2008) to nine JCA portfolios as shown in Figure 17.
Interestingly, there is no alignment of these portfolios to the business system
portfolios discussed above. Since each system must be mapped to a budget line item that
falls under one of the JCAs, each business system should be accounted for in the JCA
governance. This implies, however, that portfolio management under the JCAs occurs in
conflict with portfolio management under the IRBs and the DBSMC. Furthermore, OSD
identified in its November 2010 Section 804 Report to Congress "'A New Approach for
Delivering Information Technology Capabilities in the Department of Defense" (OSD 201 Oa)
that it had aligned it's IT systems into three primary portfolios: "AT&L oversees the
acquisition of warfighting systems; the DoD CIO currently oversees the acquisition of
infrastructure, communications, and command and control capabilities; and the DCMO
oversees the acquisition of DBS." Finally, the latest OSD direction on the acquisition of
defense business systems clearly identifies USD(AT&L) as the Milestone Decision Authority
for all Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) and Major Automated Information
System (MAIS) business system programs. These apparent conflicts lead to the confusion
implied in Figure 18 that arises in attempting to sort out what the portfolios are and who is
accountable for them.
6.1.5 The Difficulties of Managing Asynchronous Systems
Stakeholder interviews also revealed an interest on the part of OSD to further
empower PfMs to perform the "management" part of their role. In addition to the lack of a
consistent and institutionalized approach to portfolio management across the core business
domains, PfMs would face the challenge of the sequential nature of business systems
reviews. As one senior official stated,
"The asynchronous nature of investment reviews through the monthly
IRBs makes it hard to take a holistic look at the various investments in
the portfolio to determine the extent of duplication or overlap if
different systems are boarded at different times."
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Figure 18 The Department's guidance on how portfolios are implemented and managed is not clear and
at times appears to contradict itself.
It becomes difficult to compare the contributions of various like systems to the
business processes and architecture when the systems are reviewed at boards that are
potentially months apart. On the other hand, IRB reviews of systems are driven by the
systems' readiness for acquisition or certification decisions at key points in their lifecycles,
making concurrent reviews of different systems on varying timelines impractical.
One of the related concerns identified in the interviews was the inability of the IRBs
to gain insight into legacy business systems already in use in the field. Additionally, without
the authority to decertify legacy systems as with modernization efforts, the IRBs have had no
way to manage the operational baseline systems that make up a significant portion of the
integrated architectures. Ideally, a modernization would target a capability gap that exists
because of old systems that are no longer able to provide the needed functionality or
interoperability, or they're on technology baselines that are no longer supported. The
modernization would deliver a new system or a major upgrade to replace the legacy system
USD(AT&L), USD(C), USD(P&R),ASD(NIl)/DoD CIO, and DCMO are
responsible through the FY 2005 NDAA for managing plans and investment
decisions for defense business systems within their respective portfolios
...except that...
The JCA CPMs are responsible through DoDD 7045.20 for providing
recommendations to the Deputy's Advisory Working Group (DAWG) on
capability needs and investments planning
...except that...
The DCMO is responsible for all defense business systems oversight as
stated in the Section 804 Report to Congress
...except that...
USD(AT&L) is the Milestone Decision Authority responsible for acquisition
decisions on all Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAPs) and Major
Automated Information Systems (MAIS) business systems but may
delegate this authority to the DCMO as per DTM 11-009
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within the business process
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4 y.. At any given IRB, systems from
different Services and Agencies
supporting different operations are
Navy reviewed together, making it difficult to
take a holistic look at gaps and
duplication
Figure 19 Notional example demonstrating asynchronous investment reviews.
and a "sunset date" could be established to decommission the old platform. However, it is
rarely this clean, as captured in this view from an IRB member:
"We don't sunset systems. We build systems, plan for their
replacements, but always seem to find ajustification to keep the legacy
systems around, which drives more interfaces. It's driven by the
lengthy budgeting process and governance bodies such as the IRBs
that only look at modernization efforts and what we're buying today.
For example, we have a Procure-to-Pay business process with 118
legacy systems, but only 50 of them have sunset dates that probably
aren't criteria-driven."
From the Services' perspective, though, there may not be a perfect overlap of
functionality between the old and new systems. A senior OSD leader provided the following
observation:
"New systems typically don't overlap 100% in functionality with the
systems they replace, so we end up keeping those systems longer... it's
good for the business case to say that your new system can allow you
to eliminate a legacy system, but in reality the system owner often
finds a need for retaining the legacy capability even after the new one
is online."
Cost overruns and budget cuts can drive descoping of modernization functionality that leaves
the user to choose between continuing to spend money sustaining the old systems or to go
without needed capability. In general, users will choose the former. This fact isn't lost on
OSD leadership, either.
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6.2 PERFORMANCE GOALS AND MEASUREMENT
6.2.1 Assessing and Motivating Performance through Measurement
A common theme in assessments of defense acquisitions and business systems
investment management is the pervasive lack of meaningful performance measurement. The
push for broader application of measurement systems in the DoD began in the early 1990s as
part of the federal government reform initiatives such as the National Performance Review
and the Government Performance and Results Act (Gansler and Lucyshyn 2009). As stated
by Cavalluzzo and Ittner, the purpose of the performance measurement wave of reforms was
to improve Congressional insight and oversight as well as to translate the benefits derived in
the private sector from augmenting standard execution metrics such as cost and schedule
with outcome-based measures (Cavalluzzo and Ittner 2004).
At the highest level, performance measurement systems serve as the connective tissue
between the strategic business goals and successive echelons of objectives and task
execution. Alignment of strategic objectives across the enterprise is a critical prerequisite to
alignment of effort, but it must be accompanied by the measurement framework to assess and
motivate progress toward achieving the driving goals. When measures exist and are
functioning properly, leadership has a more accurate picture of the strengths, weakness, and
performance patterns. Adjustments can be made and the effectiveness quickly assessed to
ensure corrections are driving the enterprise in the right direction. When the measures are
inadequate or nonexistent, business decisions can be misguided or made "in the blind".
Organizations in the private and public sector struggle to build and maintain effective
performance measurement systems. Some of the more prevalent challenges include
"identifying appropriate goals in environments characterized by multiple and conflicting
objectives, measuring performance on hard-to-evaluate or subjective goals, [and] overcoming
deficiencies in information systems," among others (Cavalluzzo and Ittner 2004).
Additionally, organizational differences in terminology and definitions of the quantities
being measured across different parts of the enterprise can distort the information sought and
conveyed in the performance measurement feedback loop. Frequent leadership turnover and
the corresponding shifts in strategic focus can also prevent the maturation of robust
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measurement systems. This is particularly common in federal government agencies due to
the relatively short tenure of politically appointed senior leadership (Marcum 2001).
It is important to distinguish between measurement of behaviors and measurement of
outcomes. The former is focused on gauging performance of activities in progress that
support the realization of a goal. They assess how well these activities are being performed
as a way to control the quality of the process, with the expectation that well-performing
processes lead to good outcomes. However, well-executed processes don't always lead to
desired outcomes, particularly if the processes aren't well-aligned to the goals.
Outcome measures, on the other hand, emphasize direct evaluation of the results.
These results-based measures have gained tremendous emphasis in public sector
management over the last 20 years (GAO 1994; GAO 1997b; GAO 2004b) with the
recognition of the importance of answering the question "What did we actually get out of
those taxpayer dollars?" The challenge with outcome measures is that there is no feedback
mechanism during execution to help correct poor performance that undermines goal
achievement: by the time you know you've missed the goal it's too late to do anything about
it. In practice, both behavioral and outcome-based measures are used together to support
regulatory reporting, control enterprise processes, make decisions, validate strategy, and
motivate performance.
The DoD operates within a certain Congressional contradiction that exists because the
value and importance of outcome-based measures is undermined by the statutory
requirements for regular and frequent status reporting. Although this reporting can be an
effective tool to strengthen oversight, it also drives DoD leadership to focus all efforts on
demonstrating near-term progress that can be reported in monthly, quarterly, and annual
submissions. As a result, what starts out as an event-driven, outcome-based measurement
accumulates many intermediate calendar-driven milepost "events" and gives way to
behavioral measurement.
6.2.2 Aligning the Goals
Lack of alignment of strategic priorities across the DoD enterprise has long been
among the top planning criticisms identified by the GAO in its review of DoD investment
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management (GAO 1997b; GAO 2004b; Walker 2004). The networked nature plays a strong
role in the difficulties the DoD has faced over the years. In deference to the statutory
authorities of the Services, the Department has allowed them broad latitude to define
strategic plans for meeting the business needs that support the forces they bring to the joint
fight. Yet the point to bringing them together into a common DoD enterprise is to leverage
their individual domains of excellence under unity of purpose toward common objectives.
Ideally, such alignment reveals economies that can be realized when common objectives can
be resourced with less financial and human capital than divergent goals. These economies
are even more critical in an environment of constrained resources.
Parallels exist in industry as well, where the Services might be viewed as analogous
to strategic business units. Norton and Russell identify these business units as "the
organizational building blocks of customer value" (Kaplan et al. 2005, p. 31). As part of the
highly acclaimed and widely used Balanced Scorecard methodology, they emphasize
alignment of strategic objectives within the enterprise:
"The key to creating organizational synergies is to ensure that the
individual units are aligned around shared goals and objectives. For
without alignment, there is little rationale for assembling the strategic
business units into a single enterprise." (Kaplan et al. 2005, p. 31)
Beginning in 2008, the DCMO developed the Strategic Management Plan (SMP)
under the direction of Congress to link business priorities to strategic defense goals in the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The SMP identifies these goals and supporting SMP
Objectives along with Performance Measures (metrics) for each, and every objective is
mapped to a DoD Strategic Goal and an accompanying DoD Objective. Also included in the
SMP are listings and brief descriptions of Service priorities and goals. The Services have
established linkages from their priorities back to the QDR, but in reviewing the SMPs from
each of the last 3 issuances, it is difficult to trace clear alignment from the DoD Business
Goals to the Service Business Goals (DCMO 2008; 2009; 2011 b).
Table 3 shows the alignment of Service goals to DoD business goals identified in the
SMP. In some cases, Service goals included one of more supporting objectives that partially
addressed a DoD business goal and were presented as partial alignments in gray text. Among
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the three Services, the Navy goals appear to align well to the SMP goals, while the Army and
Air Force goals appear to map only partially. "Support the All-Volunteer Force" was the
only business goal where all three Services included goals with unambiguous linkages to the
DoD goal. Even looking down the columns under "Support Contingency Business
Operations" and "Reform the DoD Acquisition and Support Processes" where all three had
some degree of alignment to the goals, it is hard to identify a consistent theme. Clearly, the
Services have divergent missions that require different focus areas, but there could be
significant areas of common interest that should trace directly and unambiguously back to an
overarching DoD business strategy.
6.2.3 Placing an Emphasis on Better Business Operations
As enacted in the FY 2008 NDA (2008), the SMP is both a contract between the DoD
and Congress and a communication tool to the enterprise. It represents the identification of
key focus areas that the Department commits to addressing and the means by which both the
DoD and Congress will know whether that commitment is being met. The contractual
commitment is a forcing function for achieving the goal because defense resource decisions
are made on the basis of goal achievement as seen through the eyes of the Armed Services
Committees. Yet strategic plans should also be communication tools, creating alignment by
explicitly identifying priorities and removing goal ambiguity throughout the enterprise.
SMP
Figure 20 Service priorities are driven by QDR priorities with less clear traceability to the SMP.
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Table 3 Strong Alignment in black text, Partial Alignment in gray text; numbers denote goal order as
listed in the SMP.
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Many of the interviews indicated a desire to shift to a more holistic business process
perspective, but in reviewing the SMP, its Objectives, and their associated measures, the
emphasis is still on systems. Although there are a few references to metrics and initiative for
improving core business processes and standardizing data, they are distributed throughout the
document, diluting the message that improving planning is important too. One of the
common criticisms of ineffective performance measurement systems is that they fail to align
the metrics to the organization's business processes (Neely 1999). Absent from the SMP are
goals and objectives related to completing definition of common end-to-end business
processes across the Department and establishing aligned portfolios. There is therefore no
contractual forcing function within the SMP to drive the collective sense of urgency, nor a
focused message reinforcing leadership's emphasis on the importance of these reforms.
To illustrate this point, the DoD's 15 core business processes are identified in Chapter
2 of the SMP (DCMO 2011 b), but there are no Objectives associated with further defining
these processes, moving the Department toward standard processes, leveraging common
technologies, or rationalizing systems to reduce duplication. Nearly all Performance
Measures related to improving business practices focus on business system program
execution rather than on improving the planning practices that lead to investment decisions.
6.2.4 Aligning Measures to Strategy
Linking strategic objectives is an essential step toward achieving alignment of
purpose, but those objectives must be measured and the measurement must reflect the
outcome or behavior desired in order for the enterprise to determine if it's achieving the
goals. Three problems can occur with respect to reinforcing objectives through performance
measures. First, leadership can fail to measure a goal at all. Besides the obvious challenge
this creates for controlling the direction and efforts of the enterprise, it can signal that the
goal is unimportant. Second, having too many metrics places an overemphasis on
intermediate processes and dilutes focus that should otherwise drive toward specific
outcomes. This can indicate that leadership doesn't know what's really important but they're
hoping to catch whatever it is through an abundance of metrics. The third issue revolves
around the choice of measures and the potential that the metrics are misaligned from the goal.
Foundations of a Defense Digital Platform:
Business Systems Governance in the Department of Defense
The message conveyed in this circumstance is that what leadership really values is not what
is espoused in the strategic goal, but some other objective that may not headline as well.
As an example of this third issue with strategy-to-measurement alignment, one of the
SMP goals above is to "Support Contingency Business Operations". The definition for this
goal in the SMP is as follows:
"Defense business operations must provide adaptable, responsive,
effective support for the warfighter. Accordingly, the multifaceted
objectives, measures, and initiative in this Business Goal apply lessons
learned on the battlefield, adapt industry best practices to support
deployed warfighters, and provide the flexibility needed to address
new, future challenges at home and overseas. Because of the
multifaceted nature of this Business Goal, it supports several DoD
Strategic Goals. "(DCMO 201b, p. 13)
This goal has an SMP Objective to "Provide Effective Business Operations to
Support Overseas Contingency Operations". On the surface, one might expect from the
aforementioned description to see reference to a full spectrum of metrics measuring logistics
support8 in theater or perhaps turnaround time to field gap-fill capabilities on Joint Urgent
Operational Needs9 among others, but the only metrics identified were "Percent assigned of
required Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) supporting Afghan contingency
operations", "Percent of in-theater Army central disbursements, using cash", and "Percent of
contract actions tied to entitlements and disbursements in the systems of record". The focus
appears to be much more directed toward addressing the contingency contracting oversight
deficiencies implicated in the Congressional reports on wasteful defense spending in Iraq and
Afghanistan (Commission on Wartime Contracting 2009). Ironically, one of the
recommendations offered by the Commission was to resolve internally conflicting business
systems and processes, but that objective and accompanying metrics don't appear in the
SMP.
8 Logistics support is identified in an objective under a separate SMP Goal to "Reform the DoD
Acquisition and Support Processes".
9 Joint Urgent Operational Needs, or JUONs, are a special category of warfighter requirements for
rapid development and fielding of critical capabilities needed in theater. These acquisitions receive special
dispensation to avoid many of the usual statutory and regulatory procedures that would otherwise slow down
the fielding significantly, but are limited in scope to only what is needed to temporarily fill the urgent
requirement until a formal acquisition effort can deliver a permanent solution if needed.
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6.2.5 The Language Gap and Its Effect on Performance Measurement
As mentioned previously, the evolution of service cultures has led to Service-specific
business data definitions and terminology. These variations impact performance
measurement in several ways. First, when new metrics are established, each Service or
Agency must interpret the requirement, mapping into its own ontology in order to create its
own version of the metrics. This may create a gap between what was intended by OSD to be
collected and what the Services believe is needed. The data collected in this fashion is
passed back to OSD who then must reinterpret back, introducing another opportunity for
translation error. In the absence of standardized metrics, the IRBs will sometimes accept the
Service measures as they are and forego the translation as described by one IRB member
talking about architecture compliance by the programs:
"From a metrics perspective, we rely on the programs to lay it out for
us and we evaluate them based on what the system's supposed to do
and what criteria were considered, and we might be a little critical if
there's not enough plus points that suggest this was the right decision,
but we're probably not going to say anything negative about it."
In this case, the IRB may not get the information it felt it needed, but what it got gives them a
general sense of understanding of the condition the metrics were intended to describe. If that
understanding is imperfect, the IRB sacrifices a degree of control in "taking the program's
word for it."
In addition to the impact of the errors on the IRB's understanding of the program's
viability, collating the information in its diverse formats from the different Services and
programs can be very manually intensive. As an example, defense real property accounting
has historically undergone labor-intensive annual reconciliations to accurately count the
facilities in use by defense organizations worldwide (Krieg 2006) rather than relying on
integrated real property databases. When data definitions vary, manual data calls in support
of performance measurement are the fallback position, with deconfliction and normalization
of the results consuming significant resources and time.
Several IRB members expressed the desire to establish a standards compliance
"litmus test" that would require systems to demonstrate standards compatibility through data
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transaction tests. An IRB representative compared the idea to testing in traditional weapon
systems:
"We're much better at checking boxes rather than verifying that
systems address capability gaps and meet standards. What we need is
an 'Operational Test' for business systems to verify systems are
complying with the architecture and standards through test... did the
system reference the proper data types according to established
standards to allow for data interchange and interoperability?"
This operational test would eliminate the ambiguity of translation errors, an effective
approach for low level technical measures that would roll up to improve the accuracy of
measuring progress in bringing the Department's systems into alignment with the business
enterprise architecture.
Establishing that common lexicon is inherently more difficult across public
administration networks when organizational identity and cultural differences are celebrated
as they are among the Armed Services. Fiol (2002) noted within institutions individual
members' identification with the institution aggregates to amplify that institutional identity,
and a stronger institutional identity engenders greater degrees of individual member
identification. This cycle of reinforcement is a strength upon which stable institutions build
to maintain coherence and resilience, but it also serves to inhibit transformation, particularly
when that transformation is viewed as externally imposed. Changing the language of the
institution's business processes can be very disruptive as observed by an IRB member
drawing comparisons to military uniforms:
"We spend a lot of money on uniforms... we could save a lot of
money-well, not a lot in the grand scheme of things, but we can't
[adopt a common uniform] because nobody wants to give up their
identity. If it's that emotional for a unform, think how much more
emotional it would be to make everyone use the same business
process?"
This example highlights just how powerful organizational identity can be in resisting
a disruptive impulse. However, Fiol also notes that language can be used to help transform
the institution because of its dual role as an artifact of the institutional identity and the means
of expressing it (2002, p. 655). Adopting a common business process language in concert
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with a consistent leadership message reinforcing common business processes where
applicable is a powerful and essential step for achieving that goal.
The IRBs are making gradual strides in standardizing data structures, but the Service
CMOs can help by identifying their own Service Business Process leads that support the IRB
Process Owners in establishing and institutionalizing terminology and definitions.
6.2.6 The Challenges of Leadership Turnover
Leadership turnover is a challenge that all enterprises face from time to time, but in
public sector organizations, change at the top occurs more frequently. A study of political
appointee turnover in federal government drawn from Office of Personnel Management data
over the period from 1982 to 2003 revealed an average tenure of 2.8 years in executive
branch departments (Wood and Marchbanks III 2008)10. In comparison, a similar study of
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) tenures in large U.S. corporations indicated average time in
position of just under 7 years (Kaplan and Minton 2008).
In public sector organizations, however, top leadership is often engaged primarily in
managing external relationships (Boyne et al. 2011), leaving deputies and other elements of
the senior management team to control the organization. Some would argue under these
conditions that leadership turnover should have little effect on performance. Contingency
theorists, on the other hand, would contend that leadership has a more substantive impact but
that the circumstance of the organization must be considered. Top management change can
be good or bad depending on the prior performance of the organization: poor execution
requires change, but disrupting high-performing teams is destructive. Unfortunately, prior
studies in the literature focus a microscopic lens on the issue of leadership change, looking
only at individual changes and examining the performance just before and just after to
identify impact and causality. So how does this turnover impact organizational effectiveness
in the DoD and its ability to manage its performance?
10 Interestingly, the Wood and Marchbanks III study revealed that the prospects of private sector
employment and compensation following federal government service and the degree of conflict between the
executive and legislative branches were the two most important determinants of appointee tenure. Assuming
the model is valid, it would be interesting to see whether the economic and political climates of late 2011 will
produce longer or shorter tenures.
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Clearly, frequent leadership turnover is disruptive, whether for good or bad. Leaders
impact defense organizations in a number of ways, both directly and indirectly. The most
easily identifiable artifact is the translation of higher level enterprise strategies into
organizational strategies. When new leaders assume their roles, they must internalize and
interpret prior strategic goals and recast them in a form which they believe is consistent with
the direction they received in accepting the job. If they are taking over during a period of
poor organizational performance or heightened oversight attention, there is usually an
impetus for change in goals. In high-performing organizations, the new leader may wish to
create some distinguishing positive impact on the organization that is directly attributable to
them. Any change in strategic goals must be accompanied by a change in the associated
measures, which destroys the pedigree of prior data collected on obsolete objectives. It also
means that new metrics must be devised, communicated, clarified, and operationalized
through new collection mechanisms.
Leaders also impact their organizations through the tacit knowledge of the internal
and external networks they develop. When that leadership changes, the usual absence of
overlap at the top and the difficulty of explicitly conveying tacit knowledge translates to the
need for each new leader to rely heavily on their own preexisting networks or start from
scratch. Internal network understanding is crucial for effecting lasting transformation within
the institution, while external networks must be activated in order to secure resources, create
new opportunities, and defend against threats. As a leader develops experience with and
understanding of the organization, they augment the formal measures with their own
informal indicators of performance. The absence of these indicators for a new leader may
obscure the context within which the formal measures derive meaning.
Finally, leaders often, though not always, act to surround themselves with their
preferred management staff. Changing other members of the top management team can
degrade knowledge continuity and may otherwise repeat the cycle of disruption described
above. In organizations where the top position is externally focused and the deputy positions
are managing day-to-day operations, replacing both drives the need to reestablish
bidirectional trust with internal and external stakeholders simultaneously. The internal
organization may see that disruption as an opportunity to recast prior adverse performance
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Figure 21 Lack of leadership continuity hampered the DoD's Finance and Business Management
Modernization efforts in the early 2000s.
assessments in a new light. Without the informal context mentioned above, the new
management team may not fully grasp the implications of the formal measures they've
inherited.
Bringing the focus back to defense business enterprise, there is relevant recent
experience that shows leadership turnover has impacted performance in defense business
transformation efforts. In 2009, Gansler and Lucyshyn pointed out that the DoD's Business
Management Modernization Program (BMMP) was hampered in its goal of achieving real
efficiencies by a steady progression of six different managers in five years as shown in
Figure 21 (Gansler and Lucyshyn 2009). The BMMP expended over $400 million but fell
well short of meeting its stated goals, and the objectives of the program were then subsumed
within the BTA upon its creation in 2005. The BTA was led for the first two years by two
political appointees, then Deputy Undersecretaries of Defense for Business Transformation
and Financial Management, Paul Brinkley and Tom Modly, respectively. However, the DoD
anticipated the damaging effects of the regular pace of administration changes on long-term
transformation and established the BTA Director position as a career civil service billet.
Ironically, the BTA was designated for elimination as part of cost-cutting defense
efficiencies announced by the Secretary of Defense on August 9, 2010 (OASD (Public
Affairs) 2010).
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Figure 22 Quadrennial election cycles and the participation of two separate branches of government in
appointing senior leaders creates a highly compressed performance period that influences leadership
focus.
The GAO has suggested that the position of Chief Management Officer currently
executed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense be separated out and held by a career civil
servant with a term of five to seven years in order to provide dedicated leadership attention
and a greater degree of isolation from the political tides (Walker 2006). Although leadership
turnover is common in private sector firms as well, it is built in as a predictable and largely
foregone conclusion in leadership positions within public administration networks. The
GAO has suggested that the position of Chief Management Officer currently executed by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense be separated out and held by a career civil servant with a term
of five to seven years in order to provide dedicated leadership attention and a greater degree
of isolation from the political tides (Walker 2006). Although leadership turnover is common
in private sector firms as well, it is built in as a predictable and largely foregone conclusion
in leadership positions within public administration networks. As alluded to in Figure 22, the
quadrennial election cycle imposes significant constraints and potential disruption for
politically appointed leaders. This phenomenon will be discussed in more detail in the
upcoming incentives section.
Given that a Deputy CMO position has already been codified in law as a politically
appointed leadership position, it would make sense in this context to redesignate this position
as the CMO and convert it to career civil service using similar provisions for longevity that
are currently required for Program Managers who must sign tenure agreements in major
acquisitions (Krieg 2007b). Special authorities would be needed to offset issues of rank
disparity relative to the CMO's politically appointed-and therefore, senior-peers in OSD.
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6.2.7 Did We Get What We Wanted?
Another area that has gained focus both in the public and private sector is the value of
post-implementation reviews (PIRs) as part of the overall measurement framework. The PIR
is a results-oriented assessment of the degree to which a completed program has delivered
against the expectations of the user. The CCA of 1996 had required federal acquisitions to
include a PIR process, and the GAO continued to highlight this industry best practice in its
periodic reviews. However, a 2007 survey of over 1500 private sector firms in 60 countries
revealed that establishing a strong PIR framework is not a simple task: only 24 percent of
respondents indicated they had effective programs (Weill and Ross 2009).
Nicolaou (Nicolaou 2004) identified the importance of PIRs in business system
implementations along five factors. First, the reviews are useful for reassessing the fit of the
investment in the long-term strategy, providing opportunities to plan improvements that
maintain alignment with evolving goals. Second, the PIRs of the systems also forced a
reassessment of the underlying business processes of the organization. Similarly, the third
benefit was found in identifying misalignments of business system processes with
organization practices, allowing for correction of the implementation to improve that
alignment. Fourth, the review was important for assessing the degree to which the
investment provided the anticipated value. Finally, PIRs were found to be helpful for
knowledge capture and transfer across the organization.
What has most plagued DoD in the adoption of PIRs is the extreme length of its
programs. The Defense Science Board reported that major IT investment programs took an
average of seven and a half years to deliver initial operational capabilities (Defense Science
Board 2009). Clearly, conducting PIRs every seven or eight years when user requirements,
technologies, and policies change much more rapidly would not promote actionable
knowledge capture. Recent legislative and regulatory changes aimed at drastically reducing
delivery timeframes of business systems down to 12 to 18 month cycles through incremental
development should provide much more frequent opportunities to incorporate lessons learned
into course corrections within the life of a multi-increment program.
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6.3 INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL INCENTIVES
6.3.1 Theories of Incentives
Organizational theories have long acknowledged the importance of formal and
informal incentives in motivating desired behavior or avoiding undesirable actions. There
are both descriptive and prescriptive theories: some classify incentives and the behaviors
associated with them (Clark and Wilson 1961), while others present models that attempt to
identify optimal incentive strategies based on the nature of the organization (Englmaier et al.
2010). The other important distinction is between individual and organizational incentives.
The more commonly explored individual incentive theories focus on ways to influence
employee behavior, while organizational incentive theories look at the motivational factors
linked to the behavior of the organization in relation to other parts of the enterprise. In cases
where individuals are in a position to substantively affect organizational performance, such
as leadership and other key senior management positions, the two regimes intersect.
Clark and Wilson described three types of incentive systems at work in organizations:
material, solidary, and purposive (Clark and Wilson 1961). Material incentives include
financial instruments or benefits that can be easily translated into financial gain. These
would include salaries, stock options, and paid time off. Note too that this category of
incentives includes the motivation to avoid adverse changes such as being fired or demoted.
Solidary incentives refer to those accrued by virtue of association with the organization.
Camaraderie, social belonging, and a sense of distinctive identity are examples. Finally,
purposive incentives derive from the sense of achievement in realizing some greater
enterprise goal. Charitable organizations are often cited in this category. Although not
exhaustive, this framework opens the door to looking at how incentives are used in theories
of organizational dynamics. One of the more popular constructs falls under the broad
heading of Agency Theory.
Agency Theory attempts to describe behaviors that occur in situations of
interdependency between members of an organization, and in particular when the parties
involve have divergent goals and views toward risk. It derives its name from the relationship
that arises when "one party (the principle) delegates work to another (the agent)" (Eisenhardt
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Key propositions in Principal - Agent employment contracts
Agents are more likely to act in the Principal's interest
if the contract of employment is outcome-based
Agents are more likely to act in the Principal's interest
if the Principal has the means to verify the
performance of the Agent'
Monitoring systems support behavior-based contracts
and incentives but work counter to outcome-based
contracts
Outcomes are more uncertain under behavior-based
contracts and incentives than under outcome-based
contracts
The lower the degree of conflict in goals between the
Principal and Agent, the less motivationally effective
becomes the outcome-based contract
A more risk-averse Agent is more likely to respond
favorably to a behavior-based contract than an
outcome-based contract
A more risk-averse Principal is more likely to favor an
outcome-based contract than a behavior-based
contract
Tasks in which the behavior of the Agent can be
encoded into the task specification ("task
programmability'), such as in routine retail sales jobs,
are better suited to behavior-based contracts
When outcomes are easily measured, outcome-based
contracts become more effective
Longer term employment relationships favor behavior-
based contract where the Principal can come to know
the Agent's behavior pattems better, and shorter term
relationships structured as outcome-based contracts
will benefit the Principal
'(Added caveat) The agent must be aware that the Principle is monitoring for this effect to occur.
Table 4 Relationship of Agent behavior to employment contract type for various circumstances
(Eisenhardt 1989).
1989). In Agency Theory, the agent is presumed to always be acting in his own self-interest.
Since those interests diverge from the principal's, various forms of the theory attempt to
identify the effects that different forms of incentives will have in modifying self-interested
behaviors that don't align with the principal's goals. Eisenhardt highlights that incentives
can be either behavior-based or outcome-based, and she makes several interesting
observations about the relationship of these incentives to risk tolerance in the principal and
agent as well as the principal's approach to monitoring the agent. She makes the
propositions listed in Table 4 above.
Similarly, Baker et al and Gibbons and Wallman looked at different forms of
incentive contracts to identify strategies for improving the effectiveness of incentives. They
looked at situations where the Agent's measured performance may be different than their
actual contribution to the firm. When the incentives are attached to the measured
performance, the Agent is incentivized to work hard to increase measured performance.
When there is at best a weak correlation between measured performance and value
contribution to the firm, then strong performance incentives can actually be
counterproductive (Baker et al. 1988, p. 597; Gibbons and Waldman 1999, p. 2287).
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Tirole examined non-monetary incentives in the context of public sector civil servants
(Tirole 1994). In that environment, career aspirations and reputation concerns outweigh
monetary incentives and drive civil servants to cast their performance in the best light, even
if it means misleading others about their abilities. He goes on to state that given multiple
organizational goals, the civil servant will expend the most effort on the subset of goals that
most impact his performance ratings, neglecting the others to the extent that this also doesn't
adversely impact his performance assessment (Tirole 1994, p. 11).
At the same time, incentives play themselves out at the institutional level as well.
This is best exemplified by longstanding interservice rivalries, where the Service
Departments continually struggle against one another for mission relevance and obligation
authority. Examples from the post-Cold War drawdown and subsequent preparations for
Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s present the intense political maneuvering to
influence policy and preserve resources (Flynn 2011).
6.3.2 Intersecting Theories of Organizations and Decision-Making
An incentives view of the enterprise is essential to understanding what motivates the
behavior of leaders and other key decision-makers, but there are other theories that bear on
these same phenomena and can illuminate through different lenses. Behavioral theory of
organizations, bounded rationality, and bureaucratic politics theory all provide some measure
of descriptive power and will be discussed, albeit briefly, in this section.
Cyert and March (1963) presented the behavioral theory of the firm as an empirically
based model for how organizations make decisions about which goals to pursue, how to
pursue them, and how to learn from the outcomes. An important theme in this model is the
tendency for firms to avoid uncertainty in goal-setting and environmental contexts. The
behavioral theory holds that firms avoid goal uncertainty by emphasizing short-term
decisions that react to near-term needs. This leads to an equilibrium condition whereby
today's fire-fighting takes precedence over strategic planning for tomorrow. In the
environment, firms seek to minimize the external uncertainties by negotiating limits to the
important determining variables with external stakeholders, thereby reducing the number of
unknowns against which they would need to plan. An application of this view to the defense
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context might be an expectation by the Services that, within a small range of variability, the
ratios of their respective budgets will remain fairly constant.
The behavioral theory also posits that decision-making follows a problem-centered
method where decisions occur principally to address the failure of the firm to achieve a stated
goal. The search for a course of action that solves the problem starts first in the vicinity of
the symptoms of the problem or with variations to the current approach that is failing. The
search only expands beyond these comfort regimes when necessary, and the problem is
solved either by finding the "right" solution or by relaxing the goals to reflect what can
already be achieved. When measuring performance against those goals, organizations learn
to pay attention to some measures and not others, and in the long run adapt their
measurement schemas to present their performance in the most positive light.
Bounded rationality was pioneered by Simon (1956) in the mid-I 950s as an
alternative to strict rational theories that assumed perfect information and perfect processing
of that information in the decision-making of organizations. The "boundedly rational"
decision-maker does not have at his or her disposal all the information necessary to make the
decisions they face, nor do they have the mental computational ability to foresee all the
implications of all the potential courses of action available. The theory argues that
organizations and their leaders establish levels of aspiration that describe how good they
need their decisions to be to "do the trick". Once they find an alternative that meets this
threshold, their search for solutions stops and they proceed with the chosen course of action,
a behavior referred to by Simon as satisficing". At a macroscopic level, this theory allows
for uncertainties in information and the use of simple decision-rules to allow the decision-
maker to move forward given that reality.
Finally, bureaucratic politics theory (Allison and Halperin 1972) provides a more
nuanced interpretation of the organization, not as a monolithic single actor, but as a
bureaucracy of individuals with conflicting goals continually negotiating the goal-setting and
decision-making processes:
" In his paper, Simon coined the term to describe the process of satisfying the need for a solution to a
degree that suffices given the suboptimized aspirational criteria, hence "satisficing".
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For those who participate in government, the terms of daily
employment cannot be ignored: government leaders have competitive,
not homogeneous interests; priorities and perceptions are shaped by
positions; problems are much more varied than straightforward,
strategic issues; the management of piecemeal streams of decisions is
more important than steady state choices; making sure that the
government does what is decided - and does not do what has not been
directed - is more difficult than selecting the preferred
solution. (Allison and Halperin 1972, p. 44)
Decision-making is not an autocratic exercise by an individual leader. Rather, key
individuals in certain positions wield specialized knowledge and powers accessible to their
positions and networks to influence decisions according to "national security interests,
organizational interests, domestic interests, and personal interests" (Allison and Halperin
1972, p. 48). Problems are viewed both from the viewpoint of the individual's position in the
enterprise and through the filter of their interpretation and superposition of these interests.
Allison and Halperin also make several observations about organizational interests.
First, these interests are anchored by the organization's need to protect its autonomy of
execution for the missions it associates with its identity. Second, organizations compete for
missions and the resources to achieve them. Finally, organizations avoid adopting positions
that necessitate collaboration and coordination with other organizations (Allison and
Halperin 1972, p. 49). With respect to the timeline of their focus and planning, individuals in
senior positions, particularly appointees, have very near-term interests on any particular
issue. Those who associate more strongly with their organization by virtue of career
progression and longevity within it tend to have longer horizons.
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Principle-Agent
Behavior-based
employment
Timeline of contracts emphasize
Leadership's short horizons;
Focus outcome-based
agreements favor
long-term focus
Continuous and
frequent monitoring
undermines
outcome-based
goals in favor of
performance
indicators
The leader of an
organization will
seek to maximize
their performance or
outcome basedActions incentive equation
through their
decisions and
actions
Cooperation is
incentivized if it is
explicitly measured
Cooperation as part of a
Among performance based
Organizations contract; otherwise,
only if essential to
the achievement of a
necessary outcome
Behavioral Theory
Desire to avoid
uncertainty in
planning drives
leaders to focus on
short term decisions
addressing near-
term needs
Organizations learn
to pay attention to
and emphasize those
measures that
portray their
performance in the
most positive light
Organizations make
decisions to address
failures in goal
achievement, and
their search for
solutions centers
around the problem
symptoms and
familiar alternatives;
goals are relaxed
when solutions can't
be found
Cooperation is used
to constrain the
variability in the
external
environment,
thereby reducing
uncertainty
Bounded
Limited information
and problem scope
ambiguity forces a
practical emphasis
on dealing with the
more certain, near
term aspects
Not Addressed
Decision-makers
satisfice by choosing
the first suboptimal
course of action that
meets the decision
quality threshold,
starting with familiar
approaches and past
experience
Conservatism and
reluctance to
cooperate arises out
of fear of being
taken advantage of
by others with
better information
Bureaucratic
Senior leaders and
political appointees
will focus near term;
career civil servants
that grew up in the
organization will
have longer term
focus
Decisions are
generally not
amenable to
monitoring by senior
leaders to ensure
proper
implementation
Decisions and
actions are the
outputs of "games"
in which key
participants are
players working first
to influence the
decision according to
their interests and
then to implement
decisions in the most
favorable way
possible
Cooperation is a
necessity used to
build interest
coalitions or to avoid
creating enemies in
other parties that
may have some
influence over
longer term interests
Table 5 Comparison of enterprise decision-making factors through the Principle-Agent, Behavioral
Theory, Bounded Rationality, and Bureaucratic Politics lenses.
In the following sections, both individual and organizational incentives are explored
in the DoD with an eye toward an assessment of their impact on planning and management of
DBS investments. The field of incentives is substantially large and complex, and no attempt
is made here for a comprehensive analysis. However, incentives play an important role in
defense investment planning and management and have been documented by those within
and outside the Department.
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6.3.3 Individual Incentives
Borrowing from the Principle-Agent theory, we cast the politically appointed leader
in the role of the agent. On the surface, one might expect to draw the simple conclusion that
the Principle in these cases is the sitting President who appointed them, or perhaps other
political appointees to whom they are subordinate. However, in order to appreciate the
incentives at play for these leaders and their senior staff, it's worth noting the environment in
which they operate. Politically appointed leaders in the executive branch serve at the
pleasure of the administration, and the timelines under which they attain those positions can
have a strong influence on their focus. In addition, political appointees that undergo Senate
confirmation are subject to an extensive vetting and review process prior to nomination as
well as substantial scrutiny during the confirmation process.
Sen. Joseph Lieberman described the current state of affairs in his June 22 statement
on the floor of the Senate earlier this year as he introduced legislation to reform the
confirmation process.
"One hundred days into President Obama's Administration, only 14
percent of the full-time Senate-confirmed positions in his
Administration had been filled And after 18 months, 25 percent of key
policymaking positions were still vacant (Lieberman 2011)."
A look at the data supporting Sen. Lieberman's position reveals that the problem is
worse for agency heads and their deputies than for higher cabinet-level positions. As shown
in Figure 23, the average time for an agency head to get through the vetting and approval
process is just under 250 days, growing to over a year for deputy positions. Combined with
the four-year election cycle and the average tenure of 2.8 years for politically appointed
positions in the executive branch (Wood and Marchbanks III 2008), there would seem to be
intense pressure for near-term results.
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Figure 23 Average time to nominate and confirm politically appointed positions in the executive branch
based on data from 1987 to 2005 (Lieberman 2011).
Tirole's view of career interests as a primary motivator for civil servant behavior
would seem to indicate a curious dual-allegiance problem for politically appointed leaders
and their deputies. On the one hand, they serve an administration that has expectations for its
bureaucrats to implement policies in line with its values. Given that the President has the
power to nominate and remove appointees, there is a strong career incentive for appointees to
support the political agenda.
However, nominees to key leadership positions also face Senate confirmation. Once
confirmed and appointed, the agency leader's performance and ability to satisfy
Congressional interests will be tested in hearings, Congressional studies, and through the
GAO. For example, the current DCMO, Hon. Elizabeth McGrath, testified before Congress
on five different occasions in her first 13 months after being appointed in July 2010 (U.S.
Government Printing Office 2011). It seems, therefore, that the role of the Principle in our
Principle-Agent dynamic is not just the President, but the Congress as well. As we saw in
the earlier discussion on performance measurement, Congressional monitoring and the
regular annualized expectations for reporting progress establish a bias toward behavior-based
measurement, which, according to Eisenhardt, undermines outcome-based contracts.
Appointees must therefore strike a balance that involves compromising on implementation of
policies between administration agendas and Congressional interests, and the result is often
sub-optimal execution.
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This is not to say that appointees can be categorically described as "careerists" purely
from the perspective of wanted to further their own livelihood. Rather, it is likely that the
focus on near term results is at least partially motivated by the view that if they can maintain
the confidence and support of those with the power to remove them, they can remain in
office longer to achieve longer-term objectives. The shortcoming of this perspective is that
there will always be near-term needs for results that will supersede long-term goals.
6.3.4 Organizational Incentives
Organizational incentives are distinguished from individual incentives in that they are
institutionally rooted and can be considered part of the organization's culture. Leaders of
those organizations identify with that culture and adopt positions that advance the
organization's interests across a broad range of policy areas, particularly if those leaders have
come up through the institution's ranks. Often, it is the lack of an incentive that precludes a
course of action that might otherwise lead to an overall net benefit to the Department. In the
case of defense business systems, the lack of incentives to reduce duplication of investment
between the Services is a significant factor in wasteful spending.
Allison and Halperin, as referenced through Flynn (2011), observed this phenomenon
nearly four decades ago:
Members of an organization, particularly career officials, come to
believe that the health of their organization is vital to the national
interest. The health of their organization, in turn, is seen to depend on
maintaining influence, fulfilling its mission, and securing the
necessary capabilities. The latter two interests lead to concern for
maintaining autonomy and organizational morale, protecting the
organization's essence, maintaining or expanding roles and missions,
and maintaining or increasing budgets. (Allison and Halperin 1972)
Within the Services, the Secretaries and Service Chiefs have a responsibility to establish and
maintain the conditions that make it possible for their Service to successfully prosecute the
missions viewed as legitimate and important by that Service while maintaining the fiscal and
psychological health of the organization. They do not have the responsibility to ensure the
Department of Defense as a whole operates effectively and efficiently.
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Note that these characteristics are as viewed by the Service. There are ample
examples of each Department vying for a greater role in the joint mission, such as Gen.
Tommy Franks (ret.) reflecting on his planning session in preparation for Desert Storm, again
referenced in Flynn (2011).
I had spent thirty-five years trying to work around the problem of
service parochialism; now, as a CINC [Commander in Chief], I saw
how that kind of narrow thinking had qffected even the highest levels
of military planning. As I worked out force requirements for
CENTCOM [Central Command], it became obvious that each of the
services was focused on winning wars-alone [sic]. They were funded
as independent entities, and had no real inclination to fight together
[sic] as part ofa joint team.
This gets to the kernel of the problem with organizational incentives and their effect
on defense capability planning. Broad, strategic imperatives for improving business systems
investment developed at the top level are flowed down to the Services, but the Services
interpret the guidance in ways that seek to minimize disruption to their own interests.
According to an external GAO observer who has been working for years with the DoD
documenting its IT investment practices,
"OSD has good intentions... they provide guidance out to the
MILDEPs to do things a certain way, but then you have the Military
Departments where they really want to do things their own way, rather
than have one consistent approach across the Department of
Defense. "
There are no incentives for the Services to support the greater common good when it means
sacrificing on their own interests. When it comes to defense business systems, this manifests
as reluctance to adopt someone else's systems in support of business processes that should be
fairly common across the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines. From their point of view,
though, this can be seen as good risk management: control that which you depend on.
In commercial firms, senior leadership will often incentivize commonality and
standardization by allowing the business units to use part of any resulting cost savings toward
furthering their respective goals. To mitigate freeloading by business units leveraging
another's investment, firms often employ chargeback mechanisms in which the beneficiaries
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of the investment pay a prorated service charge. In contrast to overhead tax mechanisms that
distribute cost sharing regardless of system use, this approach encourages cooperation
between the investing and using units in defining the shared architecture and its capabilities.
Because the using units don't have to invest their own development dollars up front to create
a downstream capability, they can use those funds for other needs. Furthermore, the
chargeback methods provide a way to measure the value of the business system to its
principle users.
In the DoD and the Services, there are savings reinvestment mechanism
available, but programs are hesitant to give away dollars because of the significant
uncertainty of getting them back downstream when needed. Every investment dollar is tied
to a specific program element within a strictly controlled and monitored spend plan. If
savings are realized, those dollars must be reprogrammed by the Service or, above certain
thresholds, through OSD. Programs that identify excess funding due to cost savings are
virtually guaranteed to lose those dollars, although each Service has its own policy of quid
pro quo to allow in some cases for limited replacement of funds voluntarily "donated" in one
year or in one appropriation for funding in another. The uncertainty of that exchange and the
ramifications of reducing the reserve pool in the face of potential unanticipated problems
motivate programs to find ways to spend what they have.
Additionally, the perception that the defense budget calculus is a net zero sum
game has a strong influence over the politics of resource allocation. Services vie to maintain
or increase their share of the budget through a proxy war of mission relevance. If total
obligation authority is fixed, then increasing one Service's budget to accommodate a new or
shifting mission must surely come at the expense of one or more of the other Services.
Service leaders don't want their institution to be on the "expense" side of that equation.
Flynn (2011, pp. 9-10) describes the post-Cold War environment of influence competition in
terms of Service views of missions and capabilities: The Marines advocated scaling back the
Army in favor of a more agile, urban (and ostensibly Marine-led) capability and advocated a
reduced Air Force mission focused on space and cyber, while the Army argued that the
lightweight V-22 Osprey favored by Marines was insufficient to deploy the necessary
equipment to support an engagement.
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In the governance framework, incentives play a role in the alignment of workforce to
the goals of the organization and in the alignment of the organizations to the goals of the
enterprise. When the incentives are carefully structured to support those objectives and
goals, the incentives reinforce positive alignment. When the incentives are misaligned to the
strategic objectives, they reinforce behaviors that undermine goal achievement. Principle-
agent, behavioral theory, bounded rationality, and bureaucratic politics all provide different
insights that help understand what is observed in practice in defense business system
investment planning and management, and may provide clues about how to better incentivize
enterprise alignment toward improving investment practices.
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CHAPTER 7. CURRENT STATE IN PRACTICE:
COMMUNICATION METHODS
7.1 KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION AS AN IMPLICIT GOVERNANCE
FUNCTION
When members of an enterprise convene within governance bodies, they perform two
kinds of functions: explicit and implicit. The explicit purposes are the governance
objectives which the forum is chartered to achieve. In the context of the IRB, its explicit
purpose is to make decisions about system certifications and acquisition program viability
based on an assessment by the various stakeholders of the supporting information. The
outcomes of these decisions take the form of guidance and direction to the programs and
recommendations to higher level authorities. As was shown earlier, the IRBs must overcome
some significant challenges in meeting their explicit purposes. Yet these boards also serve
an implicit function by facilitating organizational learning through the integration of
knowledge across the enterprise.
Knowledge integration as defined by Grant (1996) is the accumulation of specialized
knowledge from different members of the organization. Grant goes on to identify two
flavors of specialized knowledge: explicit, or "knowing about", and tacit, or "knowing
how". The former might also be characterized as "awareness of', such as the status of an
acquisition program, and it can be conveyed simply by its communication. The latter might
equate with "understanding of', a form of knowledge that requires a shared or like
experience in its application in order to be transferred from one individual to another.
Consider this familiar proverb: "Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach a man to
fish and you feed him for a lifetime." Explicit knowledge transfer is the rough equivalent of
giving the man a fish. On the other hand, teaching that man to fish requires tacit knowledge
transfer.
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Governance bodies support knowledge integration and organizational learning in
three fundamental ways. In baselining integration, the participants bring together new
information from their respective parts of the enterprise in an explicit knowledge transfer that
brings everyone to a common state of awareness of important facts and circumstances.
During the problem-solving integration, the specialized knowledge and skills of the
participants are brought to bear to interpret and digest the information, incorporating it into
the decision-making process in order to identify remaining knowledge gaps or develop action
plans. The experience of applying decision rules to specific cases creates first-order tacit
knowledge. Additionally, reasoning through the thought process behind one's view on an
issue helps others understand how the member arrived at that position. Over repeated
instances, the participants gain an understanding of how each of the others approaches
problem-solving and their philosophy about the governance process. This understanding of
how the governance body operates and makes decisions represents a form of second-order
accumulated tacit knowledge. Finally, diffusion integration occurs as participants digest the
events of the board meetings, filter the information, and distribute it to varying degrees back
in their respective parts of the enterprise. This last stage is primarily explicit, although in
some cases the participant brings firsthand tacit knowledge of how the governance body's
decisions are made into other governance processes.
Because the exchange of tacit knowledge is an experiential process, it is very difficult
to transfer between governance bodies such as between the IRBs and the DBSMC. Because
the members of the DBSMC do not participate themselves in the IRBs, they must rely on the
diffusion of explicit knowledge through the Certification Authority's certification
memorandum or in the form of IRB briefings and reports. This is necessarily an imperfect
exchange because the information about how each IRB arrived at its recommendations is
Form of Knowledge Integration Directionality Type of Knowledge
Baselining Participant to Governance Explicit
Board
Problem-Solving Within the Governance Board Tacit
Diffusion Participant to Home Explicit (tacit)
Organization
Table 6 Knowledge integration in governance bodies.
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distilled into the minimum set required to justify those recommendations. One strategy for
coping with the limitations of filtered explicit knowledge transfer is to supplement the
DBSMC membership with advisory members who are the IRB Chairs. This provides direct
access to those with firsthand knowledge of the full set of issues and challenges considered
by the IRB in arriving at the recommendation.
Similarly, an IRB member pointed out that although they get Assistant Secretary level
participation from the Services, it would be particularly helpful to have the Service CMOs
there.
"We're not being as effective as we could be in communicating our
requirements [for business processes] to the CMOs, because they're
just getting the results of what we're doing and not seeing the
challenges throughout. If I was king for a day, I would include the
CMOs as part of that process.
In this case, the ability of the IRB to communicate its needs to the Services is inhibited by the
fact that only superficial explicit knowledge of IRB outcomes is transferred to those that have
the accountability for change management in those institutions. What the CMOs lack is the
specialized, tacit knowledge of the path it took to get to those outcomes and the challenges
along the way.
7.2 THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION MECHANISMS IN
INTEGRATING THE ENTERPRISE
One of the key objectives of investment governance is to reduce duplication of
investment across the constituent organizational elements in the enterprise. The IRB is one
of the few if not the only formal governance body that provides Services and Agencies the
opportunity for an in-depth look at investment activities occurring in sister institutions. Since
every qualifying business system must brief an IRB, and each IRB has representation from
the Services and Agencies, it stands to reason that each institution can potentially see every
other institution's programs. Note, however, that a great deal of the real value of this
information would be to foster coordination at the program level where PMs and Chief
Engineers can evaluate the approaches and technologies in use for other programs with
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similar needs to capitalize on the shared investment. Unfortunately, PMs don't sit on IRBs
and therefore lack visibility into other programs.
Consider the challenges of integrating the specialized knowledge required to evaluate
and adapt architectural and acquisition strategy decisions across programs when the linking
mechanisms are near the tops of the organizations involved. For example, in the Human
Resources Management IRBs, the Service representatives come from the respective Offices
of the Chief of Staff, far removed from the Program Office. How easily is this knowledge
shared down to the programs? More importantly for an enterprise seeking to better integrate
across the Services, how often do Program Managers hear about what those other Services'
programs are doing? Figure 24 provides a simplified view of the challenge in this network.
The opportunities start with a Service representative sitting at the IRB. Many
programs pass through the IRBs, and each provides a potential chance to leverage
investments going on elsewhere. The chain can fall apart here for several reasons:
* Important details about a similar program are not absorbed by the representative
because they're not known to be relevant to the program
* Important details about the program are not retained because there's no explicit action
to follow up on
* The Service representative chooses not to attend that session because none of that
Service's programs are briefing the IRB
Even if the connection is made and the details are communicated down, each
subsequent knowledge transaction occurs through a new filter that may change or attenuate
the information needed. Because of these constraints, Program Managers must rely on word
of mouth and a bit of luck in order to identify opportunities to leverage technologies and
investments in other programs. Breaking down cultural stovepipes will require better
integration across the institutions at the working level where the knowledge exchange will
have the biggest impact.
A more effective approach to knowledge integration across the enterprise would
necessarily involve a greater degree of horizontal interaction. Indeed, Wright and Pandey
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Figure 24 Fragility of knowledge integration when linking mechanisms occur at the highest levels.
identified strong correlation between lateral communication and successful transformation in
a recent study of 205 public sector organizations (Wright and Pandey 2010). One of the
principle challenges to this exists in the form of institutional boundaries that limit the flow of
information between the Services. Because the stakes are so high, programs are reluctant to
share information outside "the family" because of the uncertainty of where that informnation
will end up, fearing that it might be used to the detriment of the program.
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7.3 SPEAKING DIFFERENT LANGUAGES
The issue of nonstandard terminology arose in many of the interviews conducted with
OSD and at the Service level. The ability to communicate is such an important facet of
operating within an enterprise where knowledge is both the product and currency. Grant
(1996, p. 116) underscores the importance of a common language:
"The existence of a common language is fundamental to integration
mechanisms which rely upon verbal communication between
individuals, namely, integration through rules and directives, and
integration through group problem solving and decision making."
Within the defense business enterprise, portfolio management, business process management,
and performance measurement systems within the governance framework hinge on
commonality in the terms of reference one uses to define them. One IRB member summed it
up this way:
"Without a common language and standard reference points in the
end-to-end processes, you can still run into problems defining the
business processes and architecture. Without standards, you only
have the policy documents, which are open to interpretation in
implementation... and that also creates inconsistencies among the
implementations."
One example of this was highlighted in the context of the Human Resources
Management core business area. In attempting to define a common end-to-end business
process and data standards for Hire-to-Retire, OSD realized it had to overcome differences in
the way the Army and Marines defined that lifecycle. Although both Services maintain a
holistic view of hiring starting at the very earliest stages of recruitment, from a business
process perspective, the Army separates recruitment from accessions. This has created
challenges in standardizing the key process steps and data elements.
More fundamentally, several interviewees stated that different parts of the defense
business enterprise have varying views of which systems need to be certified. As written, the
law stipulates that only business systems modernizations over $1 million must be certified.
What constitutes a modernization? Is any change to a system considered a modernization?
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What if a program is only refreshing its data servers or renewing enterprise site licenses... is
that a modernization?
A simplistic view would be to look strictly at the appropriation of money used to fund
the change. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) dollars are commonly
associated with new capability efforts and would easily fall into the modernization category.
Operations and Support (O&S, also called Operations and Maintenance or O&M) dollars are
used to use and sustain systems and are the kinds of resources allocated to the operational
commands. However, these funds are sometimes used in the field to fill urgent capability
gaps that can't be satisfied by traditional acquisition processes in the timeline required. Are
those field upgrades considered modernizations? Similarly, Procurement dollars are used to
fund technology refresh efforts in information systems. Some would argue that refreshing is
a strategy to mitigate obsolescence and therefore wouldn't constitute modernization. Others
would argue that the intent of the law is to improve oversight on the vast resources spent on
IT improvements, and if that means tracking data center updates, then those programs should
be held to the certification requirements too. In fact, these cases occasionally do occur as
identified by one IRB chair:
"Sometimes, programs that are mostly sustainment efforts can broach
the threshold for modernization and therefore get to brief the IRB"
Legislative efforts to remove the "modernization" term from the rules will mitigate this
particular issue so long as the language includes explicit definitions of what constitutes a
covered system. The burden will then shift to clarifying distinctions between business
systems that require certification and National Security Systems' 2 that don't.
12 National Security Systems are defined in Section 5142 of the Clinger Cohen Act as "any
telecommunications or information system operated by the United States Government, the function, operation,
or use of which (1) involves intelligence activities; (2) involves cryptologic activities related to national
security; (3) involves command and control of military forces; (4) involves equipment that is an integral part of
a weapon or weapons system; or (5) subject to subsection (b), is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or
intelligence missions." Subsection (b) limits this definition to exclude systems that are to be "used for routine
administrative and business applications (including payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel management
applications)." (1996). Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996. 40 U.S.C. 1401. United
States, National Archives.
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7.4 FORWARD PROGRESS: SUCCESS STORIES AND INITIATIVES
One of the success stories identified by a number of OSD interviewees was progress
by the HRM IRB in standardizing the language of its business area. The HRM IRB has made
great strides in its Common Human Resources Information Standards (CHRIS) initiative,
defining common standards for processes and data within its integrated personnel pay
portfolio. OSD and the Services had learned from the failure of the Defense Integrated
Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) 3 acquisition that one of the contributing
factors was the tremendous complexity added in trying to map across different systems with
different data definitions and terminology:
"We recognized that in order to develop a single, integrated personnel
and pay system, had to have standards defined to an excruciating level
of detail in place and enforced"
With support and advocacy from the DCMO, the HRM business area has launched version
2.0 of its Joint Enterprise Baseline which integrates and reconciles the human resources and
finance and accounting aspects of personnel pay (OUSD (P&R) Information Management
2011 b).
13 DIMHRS was a ten-year effort to bring all the Services under a single integrated pay system. After
spending nearly $1 billion without delivery of a capability, Secretary Gates directed USD (AT&L) Ashton
Carter to cancel the troubled program in February 2010.
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CHAPTER 8. CASE STUDY:
COMMERCIAL PHARMACEUTICAL
8.1 Centralizing Investment Decisions in a Decentralized Enterprise
Commercial firms choose to centralize IT investment decision-making and
standardize business processes for a variety of reasons, although it's important to recall that
the two do not always go hand-in-hand. Virtually all organizations exhibit some degree of
centralization, in the form of senior leadership or boards of directors. With respect to
decisions about how IT investments are made, however, the full spectrum of governance can
be found in both the private and public sector, reflecting both the conscious and
unacknowledged priorities of the enterprise. Centralizing investment decision-making is an
aspect of the governance framework as discussed previously and it provides a way to ensure
that resource allocations are made with an enterprise perspective. Centralized frameworks
often use hierarchical review processes that allow for pushing less critical decisions down in
the organization and act as a filter to weed out issues that don't truly require senior
management attention. Ideally, these hierarchical decision mechanisms also introduce an
incrementally broader organizational perspective at each stage so that decisions made at the
top have incorporated the views and impacts of the various elements of the enterprise. On
the other hand, such hierarchies are often labeled rather unfavorably as "bureaucratic" and
cumbersome. For those reasons, enterprises focused on agility and local responsiveness in
their business units or operating divisions will often employ decentralized schemes for
decisions about the IT investments that support their individual needs.
Likewise, the choice to standardize business processes and technologies is driven by
strategic goals. The most obvious and common justification for standardization is to reduce
the cost of doing business. Operational efficiencies are expected to result when variability in
common processes can be reduced or eliminated. Firms also choose this path in order to
improve the quality and consistency of their products and services, emphasize safety and
security, or to present a common look and feel for the customer experience. When a firm
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attempts to standardize enterprise-wide technologies and business processes under a
decentralized IT funding model, priorities will collide. When push comes to shove, the
business unit's strategic performance imperatives will drive it to optimize its investment
decisions to support its own goals rather than to sacrifice for the "common good" which it
has less incentive to support. Such was the case for a major pharmaceutical company
looking to drive more value from its IT investments. In order to preserve anonymity for this
commercial case, the company will be referred to as XYZ Pharma.
8.2 BACKGROUND
8.2.1 Reorganization and Acquisition
In 2011, XYZ Pharma was in a state of transition. Over the last several years it had
been shifting its organizational model to from a geographically-oriented structure to realign
along vertical business units focused broadly on product development and manufacturing,
business operations and finance, human resources, enterprise resource planning support, and
information technology. As part of the reorganization, XYZ aligned it's IT support to the
business units and created a Shared Services group from three enterprise-level IT units to
champion and manage enterprise wide initiatives. In the midst of this tremendous
undertaking, the company completed the acquisition of another large company that required
substantial integration during the still-evolving reorganization.
8.2.2 Strategic Challenges
XYZ Pharma had always been decentralized in its approach to IT investments: the
business units made their own decisions about how to spend their IT dollars, but corporate
leadership recognized the need to standardize common processes across the enterprise to
capitalize on business efficiencies. At the same time, competitive pressures and expiring
patents were pushing pharmaceutical companies across the industry to establish future
revenue streams in the form of new products. As in many other pharmaceuticals, the product
lines were given wide latitude in discretionary IT spending to reduce any impediments to
business growth.
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The combination of these various forces in the context of a major enterprise
reorganization and a large corporate acquisition created significant strategic challenges for
XYZ's enterprise IT investment planning and management. The foremost of these were
issues related to its IT governance processes, capability and technology lifecycle planning,
and low success rates at getting enterprise initiatives approved. Shared Services was
constantly reacting to enterprise-wide and business unit-specific IT needs instead of
proactively planning for them, and they were falling short in meeting both despite heroic
efforts. The Enterprise Architecting team within Shared Services summarized their intent:
To compare and contrast models of how to more proactively manage
IT core capability and technology lifecycles and migration budgets
across multiple business units, supported by both business unit and
central IT organizations, while remaining agile to each business unit's
needs or constraints and managing the diversity and interdependence
of technologies and solutions.
Many across the organization realized the current model wasn't working, but they lacked
consensus on the underlying causes and how to address them.
8.2.3 XYZ's High-Level Investment Governance Structure
XYZ Pharma uses a three-tier governance structure for decisions about IT priorities
and investments as shown in Figure 25 below. Broad IT Strategies are set by the Level 1
executive leadership consisting of the Presidents, key Chief Executives, the Board of
Directors, and the CIO. As part of this strategy, Level 1 (LI) governance establishes capital
expenditure (CAPEX) and operating expenditure (OPEX) budget levels that set the overall
caps on spending for IT capabilities and services. Level 2 (L2) enterprise leadership aligns
the overall IT strategy to the business strategy and establishes architecture and investment
priorities across the business units. The CIO chairs the L2 governance in addition to
participating in LI governance in order to provide continuity, and the CIO's counterpart
business leads from each of the business units also sit on the L2 governance. In the Level 3
(L3) governance, each business unit conducts its own decision support processes involving
both business leads and their dedicated business unit IT leads and participates in cross-
business unit governance with Shared Services IT leads for enterprise-wide initiatives.
Portfolio governance occurs at this level and includes mechanisms for sponsorship, review,
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L1
CxO, BoD,
Presidents, CIO
CIO, BU Leads /
BU Leads, BU IT 0
PfMs, SS Leads ,(Approvals)
1. Infrastructure needs are advocated by Shared Services while Business Application needs are developed
by the individual business units; both compete for sponsorship support and resources within the
business units
2. Architecture decisions are owned by the business units except when those decisions have an
enterprise wide impact
Figure 25 XYZ Pharma IT Governance structure.
and approval of investment projects. Specific needs for business applications are driven by
the individual business units, while supporting infrastructure requirements are advocated by
the Shared Services teams within the portfolio governance. Architecture decisions also occur
primarily at this level with oversight and guiding priorities from L2 governance.
8.2.4 Investment Selection at XYZ
Each business unit owns its IT resources and the decisions for investments using
those resources. When project ideas are conceived, the activity is scoped in partnership
between the business unit or Shared Services IT project manager and the business side
counterpart. The project then goes into an endorsement workflow that first identifies whether
the project is already part of an existing resource-constrained portfolio roadmap. If not, the
project resource requirements must be counterbalanced within the portfolio unless the
business units can make the case to L2 governance that the trade-offs can be taken elsewhere
in the enterprise. Most projects are required to develop business cases that demonstrate their
value in the form of the return on investment (ROI) or internal rate of return (IRR) 14.
One of the business case issues identified in interviews with various internal
stakeholders was that the business cases do not typically include all costs associated with
14 ROI measures the net financial benefit of the investment as compared with the cost of
implementation. IRR is a metric that evaluates what the benefit yield of the project must be over the life of the
investment in order to break even relative to the lifecycle costs; decision-makers look for an IRR that exceeds
the cost of capital or the return rates of other investments of similar risk
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bring the project to fruition. For example, infrastructure impacts associated with a new
application or mobile technology are often underrepresented or neglected entirely, leading to
unrealistic ROI calculations. Internal labor is viewed as "sunk cost" and is also left out of the
business case. This makes it more difficult to compare the true costs of projects with
different requirements for integration support.
Under XYZ's funding model, there is no central budget to fund enterprise-wide
efforts that have cross-cutting impact. As a result, enterprise initiatives must compete with
business application needs for sponsorship within the individual business units. Not
surprisingly, projects that directly support business unit needs fare much better than
enterprise efforts. Compounding this challenge, infrastructure investments are notoriously
hard to articulate business value for due to higher up-front costs, extended implementation
times, and longer term payoffs. In some commercial firms, this problem is side-stepped
through segmentation of IT budgets with explicit infrastructure portfolios and funding. At
XYZ, Shared Services faced an uphill battle building compelling business cases to garner
business unit support.
Once the project has been endorsed by the business unit, it proceeds to financial
approval and functional review. If the project is low-cost, it may be authorized to begin
immediately. Initiatives exceeding a $1 million threshold and other special interest projects
go before the L3 IT Review Board for approval. The IT Review Board membership includes
key IT enterprise representatives from the business units, Shared Services, quality and
compliance, finance, and several other functional offices. Approved projects are given
baseline spending authority and transition into a design, build, test, and deploy phase where
they are monitored for performance against the baseline.
8.3 CASE METHODOLOGY
8.3.1 Overview and Scope Definition
The XYZ Pharma case was developed based on a three month enterprise analysis and
transformation study conducted in early 2011. The study team worked directly with an XYZ
sponsor from the Enterprise Architecture team within Shared Services whose participation
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was integral to the analysis process and instrumental in establishing the stakeholder buy-in
and interview linkages. The principle objectives of the project were focused on the key
challenges identified earlier: technology and capability lifecycle planning, business value
proposition and funding models for enterprise initiatives, and governance practices. The
problem statement elements are shown in Figure 26.
8.3.2 Current State Perspectives
After defining the scope of the study, the team worked with the sponsor to gather
relevant governance documentation in areas such as portfolio management, application
sourcing, architecture development, quality compliance, security, common technology
standards, and infrastructure sourcing. Additional documentation and conversations with the
sponsor provided insight into the strategic objectives for the IT enterprise and the
performance measurement framework in use at XYZ.
Early in the process, the sponsor identified over 20 stakeholders from across the IT
enterprise both within Shared Services and in the business units for interviews. The
interviews were focused to gain a better understanding of stakeholder perspectives of
organizational strategic and operational priorities, business practices, value exchange,
performance measurement, issues and challenges, and initiatives used to overcome the
challenges. The specific questions used are listed in Appendix C. As each interview was
conducted, the sponsor and the study team recorded the interview and transcribed the notes,
which were then provided to the interviewee for validation. Once the interviews were
completed, the team analyzed the responses to identify patterns that would indicate systemic
Redefining the Core Capability & Technology Lifecycle
Planning processes to be more proactive and inclusive of all
stakeholders
Gaining agreement on business value proposition, funding
strategy and cost allocation model
Improving governance and control of capability and
technology lifecycle planning
Figure 26 XYZ Pharma case problem statement.
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issues or significant differences of opinion from different parts of the organization. After
completing the current state analysis, it was presented in draft form to groups of stakeholders
from the business units and from Shared Services to give them an opportunity to view and
comment on the findings in context. In this way the team mitigated the potential for any
unintended bias in the capture of the responses or in their interpretation.
8.4 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
8.4.1 Expectations - Delivery Gap
Questions about stakeholder value expectations and enterprise delivery on those
expectations are helpful for several reasons. First, they give the stakeholder an opportunity
to identify what is most important to them in terms of the value they should receive for their
contributions and their assessment of how well the enterprise is actually performing. This
usually reveals some misalignments between the enterprise objectives and those stakeholder
values: objectives are often developed based on the objective-setter's assumptions about
what the customers, employees, or other stakeholders want rather than getting the ground
truth from the source. Additionally, the stakeholders' perceptions of the enterprise
performance can differ from those of the enterprise itself, which indicates inadequate
feedback mechanisms to those that can affect enterprise policies and their implementation.
Taken in aggregate across multiple stakeholders, the value assessments can also reveal
patterns of frustration. This helps leadership prioritize issues in order to more effectively
focus limited time and attention.
Recall in this case study that the portion of the enterprise of interest was the Shared
Services group and the stakeholders were employees within the three Shared Services
Divisions as well as their "customers" represented by IT leads in the business units. The
resulting pool of interviewees sampled from multiple levels across six different divisions
representing diverse opinions from portfolio managers, enterprise architects, infrastructure
and application integration specialists, business unit application developers, quality and
compliance, information security, and engagement partners, among others. The values
identified most commonly across the stakeholder interviews were Accountability, Unity
within the Shared Services group, the impact of the Funding Model on enterprise initiatives,
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Responsive
Funding Model
Standardization Collaboration
Eliminate
duplication Transparency
-0-Priority -+-Performance
Figure 27 Most commonly identified stakeholder values with the averaged ratings for importance (red
points) and Shared Services performance (blue points). Disconnects highlighted by bright red lines were
cited by the stakeholders as indicative of key frustrations.
Collaboration across the entire IT enterprise, Need for Cost Effective offerings from the
Shared Services group, Transparency of investment decision-making, Minimizing
Duplication of Effort, Human Capital Development, Process and Technology
Standardization, Quality of Services and Offerings, and a Shared Services group that is
Responsive to the business unit needs. Among these, roughly half of the issues were
emphasized for the disconnect between expectation and delivery as shown in Figure 27.
These are described below.
8.4.1.1 Funding Model
Stakeholders within the Shared Services group consistently identified the importance
of having a funding model that supported enterprise-wide initiatives. Existing funding
policies put the budgets in the business units with no centrally funded accounts for common
needs.
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8.4.1.2 Collaboration
This value stressed the importance of Shared Services and business units working
together to build strategy, technology roadmaps, and project planning, rather than the
predominant model of building these "in private", then bringing in other stakeholders later in
the process when it becomes more difficult to impact the decisions.
8.4.1.3 Transparency
A number of interviewees within Shared Services remarked that it was important to
them to understand how decisions are made at leadership levels and what those decisions are
after they're made. This was particularly true of investment decisions about enterprise level
projects that historically fared much worse than line-specific initiatives.
8.4.1.4 Minimize Duplication of Effort
Within Shared Services, the culture of a single group working as an aligned partner to
the business units was still maturing. The absence of clear direction on how roles and
responsibilities were allocated across the three divisions within Shared Services left some
stakeholders to identify the importance of working to reduce duplication of effort across the
group.
8.4.1.5 Standardization
With a culture that focused on business unit growth and independent decision-making
to foster market agility, XYZ Pharma had developed numerous different ways to do the same
tasks within each business unit. Furthermore, each business unit had the authority to spend
their IT budgets in whatever manner they felt would advance their business goals. Across the
enterprise, this meant different technical baselines, duplicate software licenses, and disparate
business processes. Stakeholders from across the enterprise recognized the need for
improved standardization, and it was a key strategic objective from leadership.
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8.4.1.6 Responsiveness
Stakeholders within the business units value responsiveness to the business units'
needs. The low performance assessment reflected the perception that service requests from
the business units to the Shared Services group take too long to address and that Shared
Services could do more to understand and anticipate their needs.
8.4.2 Key Challenges
The stakeholders were given the opportunity to identify what they considered to be
major challenges organizationally or within the areas of governance, capability and
technology planning, and business case development. The issues described below result
from an analysis of the feedback and synthesis of central themes based on the interviews and
other current state information such as enterprise process documentation.
8.4.2.1 Organizational
Unity of Purpose. One of the fundamental issues faced by Shared Services was a
recognition of the opportunity to improve unity of purpose and communication within the
group. The culture of "one Shared Services" was still being developed, and it was more
common for internal stakeholders to identify with their individual divisions than with a
Shared Services structure. Some interviews indicated a lack of awareness that there was a
formal designation of Shared Services, and there was a sense that a unified Shared Services
vision and goals were needed from which the individual division strategies and objectives
would flow.
Confusion in Roles and Responsibilities. Within Shared Services, there was some
confusion about how the various teams work together and how hand-offs occurred between
them. In some circumstances, the responsibilities between two teams overlapped and it
wasn't clear who led and who followed. According to one interviewee, the last
reorganization and major company acquisition contributed heavily to this confusion.
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IT Professional Development. XYZ Pharma truly believed in the value if its people,
but there was no formal development program to ensure its IT professionals maintained
proficiency or gained necessary skills specific to their jobs.
8.4.2.2 Governance
Process and Technology Standardization. XYZ Pharma's governance and business
processes had evolved under a business-unit focused culture into a series of independent
decision structures. These structures showed some degree of success in achieving business
unit goals, but enterprise wide decision-making suffered. Further, the separate business units
had established their own preferences for different technology baselines, which meant more
systems to support with that support tailored to each baseline. Additionally, there were few
metrics to track the use of common services and components and no way to incentivize
standardization. Those metrics that were collected became pro forma and generally didn't
drive decisions.
Don't Know How to Say "No" to the Client. A number of Shared Services
interviewees expressed frustration that the high pressure to support the business units led to a
tendency to overpromise and under-deliver. In some cases, this was a result of mandates
directed down to Shared Services to fit unplanned and unfunded requirements into their fixed
budget. Similarly, business units were granted exceptions to standards compliance with no
clear or documented processes for considering the impacts of those exceptions or establishing
sunsets for expiration of the exceptions.
8.4.2.3 Business Cases
No holistic, standardized business case process. Because the decision processes
were strongly aligned to the business units, each unit had developed its own rules for creating
business cases. Although those rules were documented within the business units, there was
limited visibility to those outside. Enterprise-level initiatives that had to go through those
business units for sponsorship were developed without the benefit of knowing the rules, and
the rules were different for each business unit. Business cases from the units, on the other
hand, often didn't reflect all the lifecycle cost impacts, including lifetime support, technology
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refresh, or internal labor costs, and they didn't always consider interdependencies among
programs and infrastructure impacts. The result of these two factors was that enterprise
initiatives usually fared much more poorly in comparison with the business unit's own
projects in its own decision processes.
Lack of decision transparency. Along similar lines, stakeholders interviewed
identified a lack of decision transparency when decisions were made at higher levels. It
wasn't clear how decisions were made in the higher level governance, what the expectations
were for a compelling business case, or what the approval criteria were for those investment
decisions. Other questions such as "how do affected stakeholders get an opportunity to
provide input to the decision?" had no clear answer. In short, these decision mechanisms
were something of a black hole. That sense was amplified by the lack of feedback down to
the enterprise when decisions were made. The outcome would eventually be known, but
perhaps not the rationale.
Enterprise-wide initiatives disadvantaged in decentralized funding model. As
mentioned previously, XYZ Pharma's IT funding model was decentralized. This business
value focus for IT investments was a positive move forward for the company, as was
embedding IT support within the business units. However, with no central source of dollars
to support enterprise-wide initiatives, Shared Services had to gain the backing and financial
commitments of each of the affected business units to resource their initiatives. Every
initiative under consideration within the business units had to compete on the basis of
economic analysis with Return on Investment calculations required for each proposed
investment. Typically, these calculations would use discounted cash flows to determine a net
present value for the project' 5 . As many firms have discovered, enterprise-wide initiatives
such as infrastructure modernizations cost more up front but have a bigger payoff in the out
years. Therefore, projects with higher near term payoff, such as a business unit's application
requirement, would be prioritized over those with larger benefits that accrued later. Since the
5 Net Present Value economic analyses involve comparing investments on the basis of the net cash
flows over the life of the projects. In recognition of the time value of money, these cash flows are discounted at
a rate that represents the rate of return that the firm reasonably believes it could generate through other
investments of comparable risk. The effect of compounding the discount over multiple years places greater
emphasis on near term cash flows. As a result, projects with low up-front costs that realize their benefits in the
near term compare favorably with those that have large initial costs and long-term benefits.
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enterprise-wide initiatives provide broad-based benefits, the impact for an individual
business unit might be low relative to other projects.
8.4.2.4 Technology Planning
SS versus Line View. In comparing the views of Shared Services interviewees with
those of their business unit counterparts, it became clear that each was making assumptions
about the other's preference for engagement on issues of technology planning. From the
point of view of the Shared Services stakeholders, they felt the business units weren't
including them in technology roadmap and business case development early enough, and
Shared Services was left to catch up without the opportunity to provide substantive input to
affect the direction. Ironically, the view from the business units was that Shared Services
needed to be more proactive in working with the units as a partner to recommend strategies
and roadmaps. They seemed frustrated that Shared Services acted more like order-takers
than the equal partners in the process.
Globalization of Standards doesn't account for local needs. In a global
environment, decisions to standardize technologies can have unintended consequences. In
the case of XYZ Pharma, decisions about technology standards made I the U.S.-based Shared
Services divisions tended to have a distinctly U.S. focus. Those standards don't always
translate well in other countries, and for business units that may have dozens of countries'
regulations to comply with, this can present a formidable challenge for implementation. The
stakeholders that identified this issue pointed to the need for improved dialog to account for
the international impacts of standards decisions. What may seem good on paper can generate
institutional resistance or unanticipated or unbudgeted cost impacts that undermine the value
of the initiative.
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Figure 28 Summary of recurring issues from stakeholder interviews.
8.4.3 Success Stories
To XYZ's great credit, they had recognized the potential advantages of aligning the
various business and governance processes to reduce costly variability where it wasn't
warranted. The rallying cry for this effort was the One Team, One Process initiative. Over
the first 12 months of the program, the enterprise had reviewed, streamlined, and rationalized
over 900 different IT-related processes by nearly 40%. The benefits of fewer processes
executed more consistently include lower overall execution costs, more predictability for
planning, and more input into improving a smaller set of processes.
Another avenue for improving the cost effectiveness of the IT services has been
judicious use of outsourcing for application development and routine maintenance. One
stakeholder identified significant cost savings through the use of third party support
contracts, noting also that it was often easier to enforce quality of service requirements
through a contractual relationship than with another internal division.
Finally, numerous interviewees noted that the move to empowering individuals to
help solve their own IT challenges through a self-service Help Desk was beneficial to both
the IT enterprise and the XYZ Pharma workforce. Clearly, the project reduced IT support
resource requirements. For the workforce, it also provided a way to incrementally improve
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the IT savvy of the users, and they usually got answers to routine questions faster than by
submitting a trouble ticket.
These examples underscore the commitment XYZ Pharma has to driving greater
value from its IT resources. The IT enterprise, through its own initiative, gained leadership
support for a transformation journey to address the fundamental issues identified above. By
anchoring their analysis with an explicit identification of what was important to its key
stakeholders, Shared Services gained credibility and opened lines of communication so that
each of those stakeholders becomes an owner of the future state and the strategies and plans
to get them there.
8.5 COMPARISON OF DOD AND XYZ PHARMA
8.5.1 Striking Similarities
One of the interesting findings in the comparison of this commercial industry case
study to the DoD was the striking similarity in the issues identified. One might at first blush
believe that the DoD's uniquepublic administration network consisting of largely
independent member organizations and rigid statutorily prescribed responsibilities set the
conditions for a different set of challenges than one might find in a profit seeking commercial
firm. However, a side-by-side look at the stakeholder analyses in the two environments
shows a great deal of overlap as shown in Figure 29.
It seems clear, then, that the problems that are manifest in defense business systems
investment planning and management are not unique to the DoD environment. Yet as we
saw in previous discussions from Chapter 5 through Chapter 7, the industry practices used to
address many of these issues on the commercial side aren't always directly translatable to
public enterprises like the Defense Department.
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DoD
- Inadequate project reviews.
- Circumventing Governance
- OSD doesn't say "No"
- Stovepipe system focus
- Lack of strategic linkages and
enterprise metrics
- No incentives for enterprise
approach
- Communication barriers inhibit
knowledge sharing
- Unclear governance policies
XYZ Pharma
- Technology standards US-
focused
- Lack of decision transparency
- Don't know how to say "No"
- Stovepiped culture
- Disconnected unit goals
- Few metrics to track / incentivize
enterprise focus
- Business Units reluctant to
sacrifice $ for enterprise efforts
- Shared Services, Business
Units talk past each other
- Unclear / nonstandard business
case policies
- Confusion in roles &
responsibilities
Figure 29 Comparison of DoD and XYZ Pharma governance challenges.
8.5.2 Key Differences
It is important not to oversimplify the comparison above. There are key differences
that distinguish the DoD from most other organizations. First, the sheer size and complexity
of the enterprise is an obvious discriminator. The DoD employs a workforce of 2.1 million
people distributed across three subsidiary Departments, seventeen agencies, ten field
activities, eight staff organizations, and nine Combatant Commands, spending roughly $700
What Distinguishes DoD from Industry?
Sheer Size and Complexity Pre-Programmed Leadership Turnover
Nominate. Confirm, 4
2 9019 and Appoint17 20I" Ramp up Y
200 Make Impact a
Transition S
incentive
StructuresFunding Authorities
Figure 30 Factors that complicate the resolution of DoD's governance challenges.
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billion per year. Second, the Department operates under a pre-programmed quadrennial
leadership turnover cycle aligned to the presidential elections. Third, budget authority is
distributed directly to the Services each year in the form of the Defense Appropriation and
Defense Authorization Acts. Fourth, Title 10 of the U.S. Code prescribes the authorities
granted to the Services to organize, train, and equip their forces to meet the missions
delegated to each. The combination of the funding model and the statutory authorities
creates a strongly independent network of organizations with a corporate layer of oversight
applied through OSD to coordinate the diverse efforts of the network members. The DoD's
challenges aren't unique, but the proven solutions from industry must be tailored to this
complex environment. This reality is reflected in the recommendations provided in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER 9. RECOMMENDATIONS
9.1 OVERVIEW
Practitioners of enterprise transformation will emphasize the importance of
establishing a future state vision as a prerequisite for developing a transformation plan.
Often, there seems to be a tendency to want to jump into solutions before fully analyzing the
problem and establishing a future state vision. So-called "solution-oriented solutions" focus
on the novelty of the solution in its ability to address the symptoms evident in the enterprise
rather than staying in the problem-space to fully explore the scope and dimensions of the root
cause.
While this thesis does not pretend to offer a transformation plan per se, it is just as
important to avoid the temptation to jump in and suggest such point solution changes without
considering the overall enterprise sight picture that describes the key characteristics desired
in the preferred end state. This chapter identifies the broad desirable characteristics in a form
that answers the general question, "How would we describe defense business systems
investment planning and management at a future state in which we've addressed the key
systemic issues?", then outlines the core governance changes that need to take place in
support of those objectives.
9.2 DESIRABLE FUTURE STATE CHARACTERISTICS
Improving defense business systems investment requires addressing several
foundational issues that bridge across the three core elements of governance, decision
structures, alignment mechanisms, and communication methods. In the successful future
state, the following fundamental characteristics describe the DBS investment enterprise:
C Explicit top level goals for business practice improvement are
communicated down and aligned through the governing planning and
policy documents in the DoD and Services
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: Feedback on strategic goal achievement is continual and accessible to
the whole enterprise
C DoD takes the initiative in its relationship with Congress on defense
business investment improvement by proactively presenting feedback
throughout the year on strategic goal achievement, challenges, and
plans to overcome those challenges
C The business language of the Department is standardized across OSD
and the Services
C Business processes replace individual systems as the point offocus for
investment planning and management with supporting portfolio
management aligned in support
C The DoD institutionalizes transparent decision making and exception
mechanisms to build governance clarity and promote trust across the
enterprise
C The Department fosters knowledge integration across the enterprise at
all levels, creating opportunities and incentives to share challenges
and solutions at the program level
C Defense business systems leadership is stabilized and de-aligned to the
election cycles to reduce influence of short-term political objectives on
longer term strategic goal achievement
Each of these statements is presented with supporting recommendations in the
following section.
9.3 RECOMMENDATIONS ALIGNED TO FUTURE STATE
CHARACTERISTICS
9.3.1 Strategic Goal Communication and Alignment
In Chapter 6, an analysis of the Strategic Management Plan revealed that despite the
explicit identification of "Reforming How We Do Business" in the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review, there was no single coherent strategic goal for improving defense business
systems investment practices to anchor the Department's efforts to improving the business of
its business. Individual objective elements were dispersed to support other SMP Business
Goals, but this unintentionally dilutes the focus on foundational improvements.
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In joint operations planning, unity of effort is of primary importance, achieved
through clear communication of commander's intent and key objectives in planning
documentation, Operation Plans (OPLANs), and related artifacts. These artifacts define the
strategic context within which the supporting component commanders build strategies and
develop options to contribute to the achievement of the broader goals. Given that most
military operations exhibit a far greater degree of situational awareness throughout the
command and control structure, this operational metaphor provides many lessons that would
be beneficial to defense business investments.
The first step to achieving unity of effort across the Department of Defense is to
explicitly establish a Business Goal for Business Operations Alignment in the upcoming
2013 SMP with SMP Objectives for each of the five core business mission areas to mature
end-to-end processes, standardize process and data definitions across the enterprise, and align
systems to the architecture within portfolios. Creating a point of focus in the SMP encodes
this defense priority in a persistent artifact and allows it to be more clearly articulated to the
enterprise. Capturing this Business Goal in the SMP also creates the vehicle for aligning the
priorities of the Services in support.
Aligning Service priorities to the SMP requires improving traceability between the
SMP Goals and Objectives and the individual Service strategic planning documents. Each
Service should establish supporting strategic goals for business investment practice
improvement that tie directly to the Business Operations Alignment goal in the SMP. This
would ensure that the focus is applied consistently across the Services and would further
facilitate measurement of progress in achieving the desired outcomes.
Another lesson learned from enterprise transformation practice is to maintain a long-
term perspective on strategic objectives when reviewing them periodically. All too often,
enterprise strategic objectives are reassessed periodically and the old objectives are tossed
out with the bath water, making it difficult to correlate enterprise effort with achievement of
longer term goals. Whenever goals and objectives are presented, they should be shown along
with the prior year(s) goals to indicate where those goals have changed and the reason for
that change. In the defense context, this would be enacted by showing the goals and
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objectives from the previous SMP, identifying where those goals were achieved, overcome
by events, revised, or discarded. This reinforces the message that the Department has a
longer term plan and is adaptively executing within that more holistic picture. The annual
Defense Business Operations reports to Congress should follow the same approach, giving
Congress confidence that progress is being made against these substantial goals.
9.3.2 Enterprise Performance Measurement Feedback
With the strategic goal for Business Operations Alignment articulated and derivative
priorities outlined within the Services, performance measures could be consolidated and
flowed down. Bringing these measures together under a single Business Goal improves
coherence, helps reduce the proliferation of metrics that don't drive decisions, and quickly
reveals duplicative measures. The measurement plan should be clearly described, too,
reflecting the way in which data is collected to support the assessment and the periodicity
with which the metrics should be reported.
In addition, the entire enterprise should receive feedback on progress toward meeting
defense business goals. This visible feedback practice reinforces positive performance,
allows in-progress course correction, and generally improves situational awareness across the
Department. Practitioners of lean production will find the analogous mechanism of visual
control familiar (Murman 2002, pp. 103-104; Womack and Jones 2003, p. 56), where
feedback tools such as andon boards keep the entire production floor aware of the overall
flow of activity and areas requiring attention. The approach works on the theory that such
cues keep flow status and impediments at the forefront of the mind using a commonly
accessible signal.
In contrast, the current array of annual reports authored by the DoD for consumption
by senior leadership and Congress are retrospective: they look back on the period of
performance they cover and show where the Department demonstrated progress in the most
positive light possible. What is needed is a Business Operations Alignment andon board:
monthly or quarterly feedback on alignment objectives gives OSD and the Services the same
"operational picture" of progress toward achieving the priorities so that those priorities stay
in the forefront.
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9.3.3 Take the Initiative with Congress
The DoD's relationship with Congress can be accurately described as reactive as
shown in previous chapters. However, instituting the enterprise feedback mechanisms
described above to demonstrate progress in achieving goals can be leveraged to take the
initiative with Congress as well. Instead of adopting a defensive stance that reveals only the
minimum information required, the DoD can drive the conversation by providing regular
feedback on its progress against strategic goals.
Good news stories repeated on a regular basis become ingrained in the minds of those
in the legislative branch, while proactive disclosure of problems and management's attention
to fixing them demonstrates sound leadership. This regular feedback would also reduce the
impact of GAO reports on terms more favorable to the DoD. As discussed in Section 9.3.1,
this progress should be presented in the context of the long-term objectives in order to more
clearly show where the Department is moving in the right direction.
9.3.4 Designate Process Owners and Portfolio Managers
Section 6.1.1 outlined the importance of establishing a clear business process focus
for the Department. While this is already clearly recognized within the DoD based on
numerous stakeholder interviews and in policy documentation, the emphasis for managing
investments is still at the system level. The business processes should reflect the needs of the
functional customers to accomplish the DoD's business operations, the business systems
portfolios should align to the business processes, and the systems should be managed in the
context of the portfolios.
One of the early priorities for the IRBs must be to designate accountable Process
Owners for each of the primary processes under their purview. These Process Owners would
be responsible for leading business process reengineering planning efforts in their area,
coordinating change management across the affected components and system owners, and
assessing the degree of performance improvement for the process. Working with subject
matter experts in industry, OSD, and the Services, the Process Owners can identify areas to
improve process effectiveness and efficiency based on technological advances. As principle
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advisors to the IRB, they would help the board plan for and execute enterprise architecture
efforts, bringing an end-to-end perspective.
Portfolio Managers must be designated as partners for each Process Owner. Where
the Process Owner is accountable for the end-to-end performance of the business process, the
Portfolio Manager ensures alignment of systems under the process. Each Portfolio Manager
works with the various system owners to match capabilities to gaps, identify duplicate
capabilities, and rationalize legacy systems that don't support the architecture. Like the
Process Owners, the Portfolio Managers are principle advisors to the IRBs on matters of
system alignment to the business processes and enterprise architecture.
Both the Process Owners and Portfolio Managers should be given special standing in
the IRBs. Each system coming before the IRBs must be pre-approved by both the Portfolio
Manager and the Process Owner who would attest to system alignment with the processes
and architecture. Those systems that are not aligned would not meet the IRB and therefore
lose the opportunity to petition for certification, although transparent exception processes
should allow the granting of limited waivers in special cases. For aligned systems, the
Process Owner would attest to how the system addresses documented gaps and helps meet
OSD business goals, and as the accountable business process reengineering agent, must also
attest to the completion of required reengineering efforts.
Section 6.1.1 highlighted the difficulties of portfolio management when similar or
related systems meet the IRBs asynchronously. Without the ability to see these systems
together in the context of the processes they support, it becomes difficult to compare how
they address common capability gaps. One solution to this is to establish quarterly Business
Process Portfolio Reviews (BPPRs) during which the Process Owners and Portfolio
Managers would jointly brief the IRBs on their progress in refining the end-to-end processes
and the architecture and presenting their recommendations for aligning systems to both while
also identifying opportunities for rationalizing duplicative investments. The Process Owners
would make business process and data definition standards recommendations in coordination
with the Portfolio Managers, who would be responsible for advising the IRB on technology
standards.
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These reviews would take on a much more holistic view of the respective
architectures and would provide a clearer overarching context within which to make
recommendations to the DBSMC. Because of the strategic perspective that these quarterly
reviews take, the Service CMOs or DCMOs should participate to understand and provide
input into decisions that impact their respective architectures. This also allows the Services
to take the initiative to sunset redundant systems of their own accord rather than awaiting
direction from the IRBs or DBSMC.
Eventually, as the IRBs gain experience with Portfolio Management and the DoD
demonstrates real improvements to Congress, the DoD could pilot a program within one core
mission area that shifts from individual system certification to business portfolio
certification. If successful the use of portfolio certifications would be extended to the
remaining mission areas. The IRBs would then spend more of their time focused on end-to-
end process and architecture outcomes and less on individual system certification reviews.
The IRBs would still review each system for acquisition oversight, but that oversight would
much more heavily leverage the inputs of the Process Owners and Portfolio Managers.
A critical supporting element in strengthening the IRBs through their Process Owners
and Portfolio Managers is to set aside the idea of creating a Central IRB as proposed by
DCMO and discussed in draft 2012 NDAA language. It is not clear whether that proposal
was to replace or augment the existing IRBs. Given the throughput constraints that exist
today, there is no conceivable way that adding another layer of management oversight to an
overburdened governance structure will improve decision-making and shorten
implementation timelines, particularly with the addition of sustainment programs to the list.
If the idea is to replace the existing IRBs, then bringing all stakeholders to a single common
board to address the full spectrum of programs requiring oversight and certification is sure to
divert focus away from end-to-end core processes and architectures toward dealing with
large, problem programs as individual systems.
9.3.5 Standardize the Business Language
The fact that variations in terminology and definitions appeared multiple times as an
obstacle to effective practices (see 6.1.2 Stovepipes and Systems, 6.2.5 The Language Gap
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and Its Effect on Performance Measurement, and 7.3 Speaking Different Languages) shows
just how important and pervasive this problem is. Clearly, the enterprise needs a common
lexicon for business processes, data, and metrics across its membership, but issuing
proclamations to that effect are unlikely to achieve any meaningful results. Instead, OSD and
the Services must work together from each end to develop the appropriate dictionaries to
standardize the language.
In support of this goal, the Services should assign the role of Business Process Leads
working in coordination with the IRB's corresponding Process Owners to individuals
knowledgeable of the Service's own process implementations and terminology. These
Service Process Leads would facilitate development of the common language and alignment
of process and data standards where applicable. This standardization in terms of reference
will allow for more meaningful measurement systems to be developed, requiring less manual
effort to translate the data exchanged into actionable decision support information. The DoD
has already embarked on process and technology standards, but until the constituent
organizations are speaking the same language, millions of dollars will be lost to the fog and
friction of business transformation war.
Finally, it is incumbent on OSD and the Services to clarify the relationship between
the acquisition and certification governance authorities of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the Deputy Chief Management
Officer (DCMO), and the Service Chief Management Officers. The overlap in authorities
and duplicative governance requirements serve to confuse the rank and file acquisition
community, particularly where Service and Corporate OSD oversight processes intersect.
OSD must articulate
9.3.6 Enhance Transparency in Decisions and Exceptions
Trust is an essential ingredient in the relationship between those who participate in
the governance and those who are subject to it. If the Services, system owners, and their
respective customers don't trust the decision-making processes that determine whether their
programs will move forward, they become reluctant to share information and look for ways
to circumvent the governance. In today's weapon and business system acquisitions, the
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Services and their customers must seriously weigh decisions to pursue formal acquisition
efforts or to "modernize through sustainment" in the face of mistrust of OSD oversight and
the high cost of complying with the myriad of acquisition constraints imposed through the
Defense Acquisition System. One of the contributing factors to that mistrust is the sense that
the decisions are made behind closed doors where the decision-makers are influenced
through political maneuvering within the Pentagon and the system owners have no insight
into the factors that lead to the outcomes. Improving the transparency of the decisions will
go a long way toward restoring that trust.
The first step in this journey is to require the IRBs to publish minutes of each of their
meetings and make those accessible across the enterprise. These minutes would provide
insight into the issues of greatest priority to the IRB, the key discussion points leading to
their decisions, and would serve to inform the enterprise on progress in maturing the
architecture and business processes. Furthermore, each Acquisition Decision Memorandum
issued by the Milestone Decision Authority for a system should discuss alignment to the
business processes and architecture, degree of investment duplication across the enterprise,
and individual program risk in supporting the decisions they document. Subject to
classification restrictions, all ADMs should be accessible to all programs to allow not only
the system owners but other programs to better learn from the collective experience.
Another governance mechanism used in successful commercial firms is a transparent
exception process. Exceptions are a fact of life when strict adherence to enterprise standards
might preclude the fielding of necessary capabilities. However, those exceptions must be
documented with sunset provisions that require the system owner to bring the system into
compliance within a certain timeframe or decommission it. The key is to document and
publish those exceptions in order to make explicit the decisions to grant them. Additionally,
the number of exceptions granted should be tracked as a metric in order to show progress
toward standardization and to incentivize reduction in their occurrence.
9.3.7 Institutionalize Knowledge Sharing
Barriers to knowledge sharing are among the hardest cultural stovepipe problems to
overcome. In many network enterprises, the linking communication mechanisms are most
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apparent in the decision-making bodies as discussed in Section 7.2, where representatives
from each member organization get together, exchange explicit knowledge, create tacit
knowledge during the meetings, then return back to their organizations. When those member
organizations are hierarchical in structure, the vertical knowledge transfer from the
representative to those further down in the organization who might best benefit is tenuous at
best for reasons described previously. Further, horizontal knowledge integration among
network organizations is often discouraged, either explicitly by policy or implicitly due to the
lack of organizationally sponsored or supported collaboration forums.
Within the DoD, knowledge shared and created in the IRBs is not effectively captured
at the point where it could make substantial impact: the programs. Knowledge created
within the programs is not effectively shared across the enterprise to other programs, either.
Both vertical and horizontal knowledge integration must be improved if the DoD is to move
more fully toward operating as an integrated enterprise and less as a confederation of
stovepipes. So how will this happen?
To answer this question, recall the differences between explicit and tacit knowledge.
Explicit knowledge is "knowing about" where the benefit derived is in the content of the
information itself. Tacit knowledge is much more experiential in nature and is transferred
when "knowing-how" is communicated. The benefit of tacit knowledge is that it can be used
to create derivative value without dependence on the source of the knowledge.
Vertical knowledge integration in hierarchical organizations is almost by necessity an
explicit knowledge transfer. Senior leaders who are Service representatives to the IRBs do
not bring Program Managers to the meetings to teach them about how to participate in IRBs.
Rather, the focus for knowledge integration from the IRBs down to the programs should be
on information discovery. Situational awareness of other programs and their status, key
points of contact in other organizations that can help solve existing problems, certification or
acquisition decisions made and the reasons behind them, and progress in architecture and
business process development are examples of information that could lead to other
knowledge sharing opportunities. In the previous recommendation, IRB meeting minutes
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were identified as an important way to improve decision transparency, but they would also
serve to support information discovery.
Horizontal knowledge integration can take the form of explicit or tacit sharing. As
mentioned above, explicit vertical information sharing creates cues that lead to other
opportunities for horizontal cooperation. Contacts in other programs and organizations are
established, explicit information is exchanged to determine whether there is utility in
pursuing a more substantive relationship, and tacit knowledge sharing evolves if, as von
Hippel (von Hippel 2002) describes, the need for innovative problem solving exists, there is
incentive for both sides to disclose information about their programs, and the cost of
exchanging that information in terms of effort relative to value is low for each party.
At present, the only existing enterprise-wide means for communicating explicit
information about other systems is the Department of Defense IT Portfolio Repository
(DITPR), a centralized database of IT program information. Programs are required to
establish and maintain entries in DITPR when Baselining new programs and in preparing for
acquisition milestone reviews. The tool has a search capability that allows users with
accounts to search by program name or ID, by mission area, or by system status, but there are
no keyword or tag search function to filter for applicable systems. However, as described in
the executive summary to the User's Guide, the DITPR system is used primarily as a
compliance tool for programs and a certification and status tool for senior leaders (AT&T
Government Solutions Inc. 2011). OSD should extend DITPR or a derivative tool to provide
a subscription-based functionality for PMs that want to be notified of new systems that meet
certain criteria or of changes to existing systems of interest in order to greatly improve
situational awareness of the business systems landscape at the Program Manager's level.
Moving beyond explicit horizontal integration requires more than web sites and news
feeds, however. Interpersonal collaboration is essential to building the relationships that
anchor tacit transfers. In the defense business enterprise, programs working directly together
from different Services are in the best position to determine whether the technologies and
strategies employed in one program are appropriate in a different context. An excellent
example of collaboration at this level in defense information technology programs is the
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Multi-Service Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) Consortium (MSC). The MSC is a
coalition of Service command and control acquisition and technology programs working
together to solve common complex problems in order to reduce duplication of effort and
investment while sharing lessons learned that can be applied to multiple programs. Forums
like the MSC specific to business systems should be sponsored by the Deputy Chief
Management Officer to promote and foster working level collaboration across the enterprise.
Finally, institutional know-how can be cross-pollinated among the Services to help
reduce barriers to collaboration through the use of rotational acquisition tours for both
civilians and military personnel. Under this approach, program managers in each Service
have an opportunity to serve in an acquisition assignment in another Service's program. The
ideal point in the career for this rotation is at the military 0-516 or government civilian GS-
1417 level where the member has already had some exposure to joint and sister service
doctrine but is not yet identified for critical 0-618 program management jobs.
Research by Dyer and Hatch (2004; 2006) demonstrates that Toyota gained
significant advantages over competitors by establishing collaborative network relationships
with suppliers and other strategic partners that included personnel transfers and supplier
associations. A thoughtful approach is required in the DoD that pairs leadership emphasis,
information technology and social media methods, and incentives in an Enterprise
Communication Strategy to promote collaboration across OSD and the Services. This
paradigm shift from knowledge protection to knowledge sharing must occur if the
Department is to make sustainable progress in reducing duplication, breaking down cultural
stovepipes, and leveraging specialized knowledge to common benefit across the enterprise.
9.3.8 Stabilize Defense Business Systems Leadership
This final recommendation deals with the issue of leadership tenure and the effects of
political cycles on leadership focus. As presented in Sections 6.2.6 and 6.3.3, the Deputy
Chief Management Officer (DCMO) is a politically appointed full-time position with a term
16 0-5 military grades in the U.S. are more familiarly referred to as "Lieutenant Colonel" in the Air
Force, Army, and Marines, and as "Commander" in the Navy
"7 Civilian GS-14 refers to the General Schedule 14 grade, roughly equivalent to a military 0-5
18 0-6 military grades are commonly referred to as "Colonel" in the Air Force, Army, and Marines,
and as "Captain" in the Navy
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of 4 years. Within the 4-year cycle, vacancies that exist at the start of a new administration
are filled through a series of steps that begins with selection and vetting, nomination to the
Senate, consideration and confirmation by the Senate, and appointment by the President.
According to the Presidential Transition Guide to Federal Human Resource
Management, it is customary for incumbents to tender their resignation at the request of a
new administration (OPM 2008). Additionally, most appointed positions serve at the
pleasure of the President and may be asked to resign at any time. The political cycles, the
lengthy process leading to appointment, and the potential for not being asked by the new
administration to remain in position contribute pressures to focus on short-term objectives.
As mentioned in Section 6.2.6, the GAO had previously recommended the DCMO
position to be held by a career civil servant with a term of 5 to 7 years instead of a political
appointee in order to better insulate this transformative leadership role from tidal political
influences. While it is likely true that a career civil servant would stand a greater likelihood
of remaining in the job longer to allow for a longer term horizon, it is difficult to see how
such a position would retain the authority to direct implementation across an enterprise with
so many political appointees that by their very positions hold seniority over such a DCMO
position. Further, it is not likely that Congress would restructure Section 132 of Title 10 of
the U.S. Code to redesignate the DCMO position as career civil service, thereby removing
the Senate's authority to advise and consent on appointments to that role.
An alternate approach would be to designate a fixed term of 6 years for the DCMO.
Although there are no other Presidentially Pointed, Senate confirmed (PAS) positions with
terms longer than 4 years in the Department of Defense, there are other executive branch
position with longer tenures. Certain regulatory positions are designated with statutory terms
of fixed length 9, meaning that they continue to serve until the completion of their term or
when removed for extraordinary circumstances. Given the importance of a long view for
change management within the largest single enterprise in the Federal Government, some
consideration should be given to stabilizing the DCMO position.
'9 Examples of longer statutory term positions include the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration (5 years) under the Department of Transportation, the Commissioner for Internal Revenue (5
years) under the Department of the Treasury, the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration (6 year terms each), and the Comptroller General (15 years) as head of the GAO.
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9.4 THE READER'S JOB
The recommendations provided in this section are meant to challenge the reader in
thinking critically about why the defense business enterprise behaves the way it does and
how that behavior can be changed. This is not a recipe for enterprise transformation-it does
not pretend to offer the play book of steps for navigating the complexities of change
management in the Department of Defense. If the reader is a member of the defense business
enterprise, then he or she is also challenged to think about what they observe as they are
immersed in the business of defense business, whether the observations documented from
stakeholder interviews reflect their own experience, and how they can contribute to
improving the environment around them.
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CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION
10.1 THE NEED IS COMPELLING
If ever there was a time to drive the defense business enterprise toward more effective
investment planning and management, it is now. The United States is on the threshold of
significant defense budget reductions that in eras past would have been largely absorbed by
personnel reductions. Today, the Department of Defense doesn't have the same flexibilities
with respect to force shaping that were used following periods of major conflict. Over the
next 10 years, the DoD will have to accommodate 16% less funding per year if statutory
sequestration cuts aren't reversed.
Improving the way the DoD invests in the systems supporting its everyday business
operations is an essential step in this direction, but it will require taming the "fiefdoms" that
reign supreme in what Secretary Gates referred to as the "semi-feudal system" of the
Department (Gates 2011). Over the last 15 years, the DoD's investment practices have been
characterized by the GAO and others as disconnected, duplicative, undisciplined, and
wasteful. The growing frustration with this quagmire has led to a recurring cycle of
corrective legislation leading to reactive defense investment policy, followed by painful
reform initiatives that miss their target and foster resistance in the enterprise, resulting in
documented failures. Within the last 6 years, Congress has stepped in to more actively
influence how investments are executed, but there has been much less attention paid to the
planning.
Today, the DoD is struggling with how to improve these practices, and they come at a
time when the Department is working in parallel to craft a more responsive and effective
information technology acquisition framework. Neither goal appears to show signs of
significant progress at this time, although the establishment of the Deputy Chief Management
Officer position as the focal point for enterprise alignment efforts, strategic goal and
performance measurement, and business transformation is an important start.
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Interviews with stakeholders participating inside the DoD's business systems
governance , those subject to its decisions, and independent outside observers reveal common
concerns and frustrations. Using the governance framework established by MIT's Center for
Information Systems Research (CISR), these challenges can be viewed through three
governance lenses corresponding to decision-making structures, alignment mechanisms, and
communication methods. Each lens highlights a different set of phenomena, but common
linkages exist with their roots in the networked and culturally stovepiped nature off this
public administration enterprise.
Stakeholder sentiments were particularly strong about the decision structures in their
responses during the interviews. Politicization of the system review and certification
process, insufficient time and attention allowed for adequate scrutiny of the systems under
development, the proliferation of ad hoc decision-making schemes that circumvent
established governance, and an inability to say no to programs were common themes. In
addition, Program Executive Officers and Program Managers felt a great deal of confusion
about the overlap and conflict among the acquisition governance and the certification
governance, both within the Services and at the OSD level.
Interviews also revealed problems in the alignment mechanisms used across the
Department. The most common comment to come out of the interviews was the recognition
that the investment planning and management framework, including acquisition processes,
were still very much system-focused rather than enterprise architecture and business process
focused. This system focus creates a myopic emphasis on optimizing locally at the system
level to the overall disadvantage of the end-to-end business processes.
Portfolio management is identified by many of those interviewed as a solution to
systems and Service stovepipes, but those portfolios must be anchored to the business
processes they support. Performance measurement, often cited as a problem for the
Department, requires explicit traceability to a set of guiding strategic goals in order to be
meaningful. At present there is no overarching goal to improve the Department's investment
practices, but there are a great many metrics tracked throughout the enterprise. Goal
alignment is immature at present, with only limited connectivity between the business goals
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of the Services and OSD. Unfortunately, a history of leadership turnover hampers efforts to
establish long-term goals and goal alignment in defense business systems.
Finally, one of the most important shortcomings in the DoD's alignment mechanisms
is the lack of incentives to drive cooperation across the Services and Agencies. Statutory
responsibilities assigned to the Services to organize, train, and equip their forces
independently coupled with strong separate cultural identities that seek to preserve or expand
each institution's authorities create an "us versus them" perspective that underlies the
budgeting and policy environments.
Related to this last observation is the fact that the Department of Defense does not
effectively capture or share knowledge as part of its communication strategy. The IRB
serves as the most visible clearing house for information exchange across the various
investment activities in the defense business enterprise, but the knowledge shared and created
in that forum is not made available to the PEOs and Program Managers that could leverage
the situational awareness to make contact with others across the Department who are
working to solve similar or complementary problems. In the few examples of program level,
cross-Service collaboration available, this tacit knowledge sharing at the point of practice has
resulted in "self-rationalizing" of investment effort to maximize use of common solutions to
common problems.
One of the cross-cutting themes in each of the three governance lenses is the effect of
cultural identity and the use of different languages in the member institutions. Language
disparity was identified by stakeholders as impacting goal-setting, business process
definition, common data structures, and performance measurement. The IRBs are making
progress in select areas on this front, but this seemingly simple challenge costs the
Department a tremendous amount of effort in tailoring what should be standard policies and
procedures to each environment and decoding organization-specific data to assess progress
toward achieving common goals.
Interestingly, these governance challenges are not unique to the DoD despite its
unique structure and exceptional complexity. A case study constructed from interviews with
over 20 stakeholders at a large, global pharmaceutical company revealed a high degree of
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overlap with issues identified in the defense context. However, one of the fundamental
differences that sets the DoD apart is the funding model and decision rights allocation. In
contrast to the pharmaceutical, where the governance pyramid can be traced up to a single
group of senior executives making policy, budget, and implementation decisions, the DoD's
enterprise network members stand as fortresses on the landscape. The Services and their
lobbying armies exert pressure on Congress to maintain equilibrium where disruption might
be what the enterprise needs to move to a more prosperous landscape. Because of that public
administration network structure, certain best practices that might be appropriate for a
commercial firm must be adapted for application to the DoD.
In order to make lasting progress in resolving the documented issues and challenges,
the Department must focus concerted effort in bringing the enterprise into alignment through
common goals for business systems investment improvement. With overarching strategic
direction in place and traceable Service-specific goals in support, performance measurement
should focus on a few key areas with a greater emphasis on outcomes and less on behaviors.
In addition, there needs to be an enterprise-wide feedback mechanism on progress toward
meeting goals and identification of roadblocks so that the workforce at all levels knows
where their contributions are helping move the ball down the field and where additional
weight of effort is required.
Investment planning and management must more fully focus on business processes
and the architecture rather than on the individual systems as the level of optimization.
Business Process Owners must be identified to manage the end-to-end process definition and
data standards for each key process in the core mission areas. Working in tandem with these
Process Owners, Portfolio Managers should be empowered to align and, as needed,
rationalize systems that don't adequately support valid capability gaps in the business
processes. The views of these two special advisors to the IRBs should carry a great deal of
weight in decisions on system acquisition approval and certification.
As part of an overall enterprise communication strategy, the DoD should take the
initiative with Congress to greatly increase communication of progress and challenges in goal
achievement to this important stakeholder. Other elements of the communication strategy
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include focusing on vertical and horizontal knowledge integration, supported simultaneously
by more transparent decision processes, sponsorship of program level collaboration forums,
and inter-Service rotation policies for acquisition professionals at the 0-5 and civilian
equivalent levels.
The final recommendation offered creates an opportunity for Congress to be part of
the solution. As mentioned earlier, leadership turnover and the compressed timelines under
which politically appointed senior leaders such as the Deputy Chief Management Officer
must operate necessarily drive their focus toward demonstrating near-term successes rather
than long-term outcomes. The position of the DCMO, like other key regulatory positions in
the executive branch, should be given a statutory term of 6 years in order to offer some
degree of insulation from the traditional 4-year cycle that often leaves appointees with little
more than 2 years to make the substantive impacts that would justify retaining them for a
subsequent administration. This creates the "buffer space" to allow the DCMO to take a
longer view toward developing and executing business goals that lead to a healthier defense
business enterprise.
10.2 AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
In the course of conducting this research, many more questions were exposed than
could be adequately addressed in this thesis. This section highlights a few of the more
important complementary areas of further study that could be pursued. The principle themes
are the influence of cultural identity on decision-making in public administration networks,
advanced comparison and application of governance and enterprise maturity models to the
DoD, principles of knowledge integration and flow patterns across networked enterprises,
and incentive homogeneity throughout an enterprise and the impact of incentive
misalignment to enterprise priorities. Each of these is discussed in more detail in the
following sections.
10.2.1 The Role of Culture in Public Administration Networks
This thesis has touched on the key challenges faced by the Department of Defense in
improving its business systems investment planning and management practices. Included in
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that analysis were issues of organizational culture and its influence on governance in a public
administration network. Organizational and individual identities are encoded in the language
of the institutions but there is little empirical evidence for the impact this has on investment
effectiveness. This intersection of language and enterprise integration offers an opportunity
to hold a mirror up to the defense business enterprise to demonstrate the importance of
clearing the communication channels and the parasitic effects of preserving the cultural status
quo. A worthwhile companion study would look at other public administration network
exemplars such as the Department of Homeland Security in the United States or the various
Ministries of Defence abroad to compare investment practices, cultural obstacles to progress,
and solutions to overcome those obstacles.
Likewise, it is possible that private sector firms pursuing diversification strategies that
support large numbers of independent business units behave more like public administration
networks than private firms when the governance structure holding them together is
immature or insufficiently empowered. Reviews of cases such as these would open the door
to an interesting middle ground of research between private firms and public administration
networks.
10.2.2 Governance and Enterprise Maturity Models
Chapter 2 provided a brief look at MIT CISR's five principle governance archetypes
in assigning decision rights for the five key IT decisions. Developed over the course of many
years with hundreds of companies worldwide, these archetypes are useful for analyzing
patterns of IT decision rights allocation within the enterprise, and it would be useful to apply
the framework to defense business systems decision-making for a comparison with industry.
On a similar theme, maturity models seem to be quite common these days as a
yardstick for assessing how one's enterprise compares with the best practices of industry. As
part of the exploration of governance models, as comparative study of MIT CISR's Stages of
Enterprise Architecture Maturity (Ross et al. 2006) with the GAO's Information Technology
Investment Maturity model (GAO 2004a) and their Enterprise Architecture Management
Maturity Framework (GAO 201 Gb) as applied to the defense business enterprise would
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further extend the conversation on the degree to which industry practices are applicable in
this context.
10.2.3 Knowledge Integration
Knowledge management is an essential discipline for the learning organization to
master and some organizations seem to do it better than others. What is the effect of the
network structure on the ability of a public administration network to effectively integrate
knowledge where it needs to? Can knowledge flows be charted to help the enterprise
identify and remove bottlenecks? Do the transactional costs of sharing knowledge among
programs exceed the benefit when there is no formal impetus to do so? If so, can those costs
be reduced? These questions get to the heart of building a more agile and responsive
enterprise, one that focuses as much attention on reducing duplication of investment in
knowledge creation as it does investment in systems.
On the operational military side of the defense environment, much has been written
on the subject of capturing and integrating knowledge to improve mission performance.
Investigation of the tools and techniques used to effectively collaborate across Services
10.2.4 Incentives
Finally, there is room for extending the analysis to look at the role of individual and
organizational incentives in enabling or constraining the results that can be achieved in
improving the way the Department of Defense governs its IT investments. Hicks (2008)
cited misalignment of incentives as an important obstacle to achieving lasting reform.
Further research to characterize the differences in incentive factors across various levels of
the defense business enterprise and among the Services would help illuminate the effect of
misalignments between strategic business objectives and incentives on efforts to improve the
DoD's practices. Can it be accurately assumed that these incentives are homogeneous across
the enterprise? Incentive "vectors" could be derived that describe the patterns of behavior
engendered by the incentive as well as the strength of those incentives. Maps of these
vectors could be drawn referenced to espoused desirable outcomes to demonstrate the extent
of alignment of incentives to strategic objectives.
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Looking at the incentives environment from a legislative perspective, it would also be
enlightening to review the many different pieces of legislation currently active in the U.S.
Code to examine the explicit and unintended incentives created in statute that contribute to
the behaviors observed in the DoD. What is the role of Congressional intent and statutory
language in motivating these behaviors that may run counter to desired outcomes? If the
incentives encoded in the law can be explicitly documented, tools drawn from Principle
Agency and Bureaucratic Politics Theories can be used to model expected effects within the
enterprise.
10.3 FINAL THOUGHTS
The Department of Defense is a very complex enterprise with very complicated
problems that elude easy solutions. High pressure external political environments, internal
expectations, and institutional norms form the crucible within which the temptation is forged
to demonstrate rapid progress in addressing the symptoms of those problems. Time and time
again, recommendations come in from all directions to simply apply "proven industry best
practices", but those initiatives fall short because they often target the observed surface
effects. Short-term gains unravel when the fundamental cultural, organizational, and
incentive barriers endemic to this public administration network reemerge to weaken or
destroy any concrete progress before it has a chance to set. Recognition of the deeper
dysfunction is an essential step toward dealing with the sources rather than the symptoms.
Although this research focused on the DoD's business systems investment practices,
that facet of the enterprise is but an instantiation of a much more fundamental set of
challenges that reach across all of the Department's many initiatives and mission areas.
Mistrust and confusion in governance systems, strategic goal misalignment, performance
measurement systems that incentivize the wrong behavior, a culture of guarding rather than
sharing information-there is nothing IT- or business system-specific about these. There is
likely nothing defense-specific about them either, but they are easier to recognize in this
Department because the cultural contrasts among the member institutions are so stark.
As stated previously, the recommendations provided in this thesis are not a
transformation roadmap. No transformation of any significant value can be generated from
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outside an enterprise this complex despite the many "independent studies" that attempt to do
so. Yet the research does set the trajectory for meaningful progress by characterizing the
foundational changes that must occur, anchored by a more robust and transparent governance
framework. Although legislated mandates and oversight attention tends to focus on decision-
making structures as the face of a governance framework, those structures won't stand unless
they're built on a solid foundation of enterprise alignment mechanisms and an inclusive
communication strategy that looks inward to the enterprise as well as out to the external
stakeholders.
The DoD is not lacking for enthusiasm, energy, or wherewithal to make headway in
its goals of improving business systems investment planning and management. Indeed, the
enterprise focus the Department is adopting is on the cusp of bearing some very real fruit in a
few areas, such as enterprise-wide human resource data standards, standards compliance
litmus tests in the financial mission area, and strong governance practices in real property
management that emphasize IT-enhanced business process design as the foundation for
standards and system investment decisions. It remains to be seen whether the looming
defense budget cuts elevate the sense of urgency and spur faster progress or force hasty,
short-term decisions with disastrous consequences. The pessimist would look at the last 15
years and circle the wagons. But hearing the passion with which defense business enterprise
stakeholders express a desire to move the Department in the direction of greater
accountability and investment effectiveness, one can't help but feel a little optimism rub off.
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APPENDIXA. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FROM DOD
STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS
DoD Internal Interviews
Purpose
The purpose of this interview is to gain a clearer understanding of the current state of
information technology (IT) investment planning and IT governance within the Department
of Defense (DOD) Information Enterprise (IE) with an emphasis on its business and
infrastructure systems. The focus of the questions is to capture the perspectives of enterprise
stakeholders regarding the alignment of DOD IE priorities with strategic defense objectives
and to help characterize the challenges and successes in the existing defense IT governance
framework. Of particular interest are cases in which practice differs from documented
processes and the driving reasons for those departures. A key aspect of this assessment is
gaining an appreciation for stakeholder views of the value they would expect the DOD to
derive from its IT investments and the degree to which the actual investments are meeting
those expectations. Many of the challenges faced by the DOD in this context are similar to
those in commercial industry where the ability to drive value from IT investments and
capabilities can be a critical differentiator in a competitive environment. To that end, the
questions below are similar to those that have been used with IT professionals in the private
sector.
Interview Questions
1. General
a. In which organization do you work and what are your responsibilities within
that organization?
b. What is the strategic focus of your organization? What are the strategic
objectives or key goals?
c. How are your organization's priorities linked to strategic defense priorities?
d. Are there conflicting priorities and how are those conflicts resolved?
2. Responsibilities and Authorities
a. With the responsibilities you're given, do you have the decision-making
authorities you feel you need?
b. If not, what authorities do you lack and what are the primary obstacles?
c. Is accountability aligned with responsibility and authority?
3. Issues and Challenges
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a. What do you see as the most pressing issues and challenges impacting DOD
IT investment planning and governance?
b. What initiatives have been used to overcome these challenges?
c. Are there any success stories that come to mind? What factors contributed to
or determined success?
4. Decisions about enterprise processes
a. Who decides to what extent and where processes will be standardized, shared
and common?
b. Who decides to what extent and where data will be standardized, shared and
common?
5. Stakeholder Expectations
a. What are your top 5 expectations for the value the DOD should derive from its
business and infrastructure system investments?
i. How important is each on a scale of I - 5, with 1 being least important
and 5 being most important?
ii. How would you assess that the DOD is delivering on each of those
expectations on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being low performance and 5
being very strong performance?
6. Key processes relating to Governance and Investment Planning
a. Who are the key participants from your organization in each of these systems:
Defense Acquisition System (DAS), Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
Execution (PPBE); Joint Capabilities Integration Development System
(JCIDS); Business Capability Lifecycle (BCL)
b. How do these participants share information and decisions?
c. Who (organizations or individuals) should be involved in these processes that
aren't?
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7. Key metrics:
a. What metrics does your organization use to assess its performance against the
strategic objectives, key goals, or high level performance targets?
b. Are there any metrics that your organization uses to evaluate the effectiveness
of any aspect of the IT investment planning process?
8. Interactions with others
a. What challenges have you encountered in interacting with other organizations
that you depend on to do your job?
b. Of the people you interact with inside and external to your organization, who
most impacts your decisions (positively or negatively)?
9. Other
a. Are there any other questions you were expecting me to ask or are there any
other aspects of the defense information systems investment process you
would like to discuss?
Thank you for your time and attention-I will follow up with you to validate my
interpretation of your responses or if I have any questions to clarify what I've captured.
External Interviews
Purpose
The purpose of this interview is to gain a clearer understanding of the current state of
information technology (IT) investment planning and IT governance within the Department
of Defense (DoD) Information Enterprise (IE) with an emphasis on its business and
infrastructure systems. The focus of the questions is to capture the perspectives of enterprise
stakeholders regarding the alignment of DoD IE priorities with strategic defense objectives
and to help characterize the challenges and successes in the existing defense IT governance
framework. Of particular interest are cases in which practice differs from documented
processes and the driving reasons for those departures. A key aspect of this assessment is
gaining an appreciation for stakeholder views of the value they would expect the DoD to
derive from its IT investments and the degree to which the actual investments are meeting
those expectations. Many of the challenges faced by the DoD in this context are similar to
those in commercial industry where the ability to drive value from IT investments and
capabilities can be a critical differentiator in a competitive environment. To that end, the
questions below are similar to those that have been used with IT professionals in the private
sector.
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Interview Questions
1. General
2. Iss
3. Decisions about enterprise processes
a. From your perspective, who decides to what extent and where processes will
be standardized, shared and common?
b. Who decides to what extent and where data will be standardized, shared and
common?
4. Stakeholder Expectations
a. What are your top 5 expectations for the value the DoD should derive from its
business and infrastructure system investments?
i. How important is each on a scale of 1 - 5, with I being least important
and 5 being most important?
ii. How would you assess that the DoD is delivering on each of those
expectations on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being low performance and 5
being very strong performance?
5. Key processes relating to Governance and Investment Planning
a. Are there governance bodies that you participate in or interact with that you
observe to be particularly effective? What factors do you believe contribute to
that success?
b. Conversely, are there governance bodies that are particularly ineffective and
what factors contribute?
c. Based on your interaction with these governance bodies, how would you
characterize the degree of information sharing across the governance
processes?
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a. In which organization do you work and what are your responsibilities within
that organization?
b. What is the strategic focus of your organization?
c. What aspects of the DoD business system or IT investment management
framework do you participate in, oversee, or review?
ies and Challenges
a. What do you see as the most pressing issues and challenges impacting DoD IT
investment planning and governance? To what extent do they impact your
ability to do your job?
b. What initiatives have been used to overcome these challenges?
c. Are there any success stories that come to mind? What factors do you believe
contributed to or determined success?
d. Are there models for success that might be applicable from other communities
(other defense, other Federal, academia, industry) in addressing these
challenges?
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d. How would you characterize the effectiveness of communicating investment
management policies and decisions across the DoD Information Enterprise?
e. Are there stakeholders that are underrepresented in these processes?
6. Performance Measurement:
a. What metrics have you observed to be particularly effective in assessing the
DoD's progress in achieving its strategic objectives, key goals, or high level
performance targets for the Information Enterprise?
b. Are there any metrics from other communities (other defense, other Federal,
academia, industry) that you feel would be useful in evaluating the
effectiveness of any aspect of the IT investment planning process?
7. Other
a. Are there any other questions you were expecting me to ask or are there any
other aspects of the defense information systems investment process you
would like to discuss?
Thank you for your time and attention-I will follow up with you to validate my
interpretation of your responses or if I have any questions to clarify what I've captured.
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APPENDIX B. RECRUITMENT MESSAGE AND
INFORMED CONSENT
Recruitment Message
Interview subjects will be specifically selected based on their positions in the
organizations involved in the Department of Defense processes for information technology
investment planning. Contacts with these interviewees will occur via phone and email. The
following script will be read to them for phone contacts:
Phone Script - "Sir (or Ma'am), Good morning (afternoon). My name is Lieutenant
Colonel Dustin Ziegler, an Air Force Lean Advancement Initiative Fellow at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I'm conducting research on the Department of
Defense Information Technology investment planning framework and I'm interested in
interviewing you as a stakeholder and a key participating member of one of the DOD
processes involved The purpose of this interview is to gain a clearer understanding of the
current state of information technology (IT) investment planning and IT governance within
the Department of Defense (DOD) Information Enterprise (JE) with an emphasis on its
business and infrastructure systems. The focus of the questions is to capture the perspectives
of enterprise stakeholders regarding the alignment of DOD IE priorities with strategic
defense objectives and to help characterize the challenges and successes in the existing
defense IT governance framework. Ofparticular interest are cases in which practice differs
from documented processes and the driving reasons for those departures. A key aspect of
this assessment is gaining an appreciation for stakeholder views of the value they would
expect the DOD to derive from its IT investments and the degree to which the actual
investments are meeting those expectations.
My intent is to record the interview digitally with your prior approval so that I may
refer back to it during my data analysis. Unless you give me permission, I will not quote you
by name nor will I associate any personally identifiable information with the answers you
give me in my published products. Prior to the interview you will have an opportunity to
review and sign an informed consent form.
With your approval I would like to schedule one hour on your calendar to conduct the
interview. Can you provide a point of contact to arrange for this appointment?"
If the contact refers me to someone else to interview in their stead, I will read the
same script with the addition "Mr./Ms. (referring contact's name) gave me your name and
contact information " after I introduce myself in the script.
For email contacts, the following message text will be used -
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Sir (or Ma'am),
My name is Lieutenant Colonel Dustin Ziegler, an Air Force Lean Advancement
Initiative Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I'm conducting research on
the Department of Defense Information Technology investment planning framework and I'm
interested in interviewing you as a stakeholder and a key participating member of one of the
DOD processes involved The purpose of this interview is to gain a clearer understanding of
the current state of information technology (IT) investment planning and IT governance
within the Department of Defense (DOD) Information Enterprise (IF) with an emphasis on
its business and infrastructure systems. The focus of the questions is to capture the
perspectives of enterprise stakeholders regarding the alignment of DOD IE priorities with
strategic defense objectives and to help characterize the challenges and successes in the
existing defense IT governance framework. Ofparticular interest are cases in which practice
differs from documented processes and the driving reasons fbr those departures. A key
aspect of this assessment is gaining an appreciation for stakeholder views of the value they
would expect the DOD to derive from its IT investments and the degree to which the actual
investments are meeting those expectations.
My intent is to record the interview digitally with your prior approval so that I may
re/er back to it during my data analysis. Unless you give me permission, I will not quote you
by name nor will I associate any personally identifiable information with the answers you
give me in my published products. Prior to the interview you will have an opportunity to
review and sign an informed consent form.
With your approval I would like to schedule one hour on your calendar to conduct the
interview. Can you provide a point of contact to arrange fr this appointment?
Very Respectfully,
Lt Col Dustin Ziegler
Air Force Lean Advancement Initiative Fellow
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
540-272-7560
zieglerd a-),mitedu
Informed Consent
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERVIEW
You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by Lt Col Dustin Ziegler, an Air
Force Lean Advancement Initiative Fellow from the Engineering Systems Division at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (M.I.T.). The purpose of the study is to obtain stakeholder perspectives about the
Department of Defense Information Technology (IT) investment planning framework, including key issues and
challenges, stakeholder expectations, and best practices. The results of this study will be included in Lt Col
Ziegler's Masters thesis. You were selected as a possible participant in this study because of your role as a
member of a key participating organization in an essential investment planning process. You should read the
information below, and ask questions about anything you do not understand, before deciding whether or not to
participate.
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- This interview is voluntary. You have the right not to answer any question, and to stop the interview
at any time or for any reason. We expect that the interview will take about 60 minutes.
- You will not be compensated for this interview.
- Unless you give us permission to use your name, title, and / or quote you in any publications that may
result from this research, the information you tell us will be confidential.
- We would like to record this interview digitally so that we can use it for reference while proceeding
with this study. We will not record this interview without your permission. If you do grant permission for this
conversation to be recorded digitally, you have the right to revoke recording permission and/or end the
interview at any time.
This project will be completed by February 2012. All interview recordings will be stored in a secure
work space until one year after that date. The audio file will then be destroyed.
I understand the procedures described above. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and
I agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.
(Please check all that apply)
[] I give permission for this interview to be recorded digitally.
[]I give permission for the following information to be included in publications resulting from this
study:
[] my name [] my title []direct quotes from this interview
Name of Subject
Signature of Subject
Signature of Investigator
Date
Date
Please contact Lt Col Ziegler (540-272-7560 or zieglerd@mit.edu) with any questions or concerns.
If you feel you have been treated unfairly, or you have questions regarding your rights as a research
subject, you may contact the Chairman of the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects,
M.I.T., Room E25-143b, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, phone 1-617-253-6787.
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APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FROM
XYZ PHARMA CASE
The XYZ Pharma case study was focused primarily on helping Shared Services
improve the support it provided to the business units in several fundamental areas as
described in Chapter 8. As part of this process, the study team interviewed stakeholders both
within Shared Services and in the dedicated IT teams aligned under the business units. For
this reason the interview questions used were tailored to the two stakeholder groups.
Shared Services Interviews
8. General
a. What is the strategic focus of Shared Services and your division within Shared
Services?
b. What are the strategic objectives, key goals, or high level performance targets
for Shared Services and your division within Shared Services?
c. Who are the key stakeholders or opinion leaders in Shared Services?
9. The role of IT
a. What are the Shared Services priorities from an IT perspective?
b. What are the current issues and challenges impacting Shared Services from an
IT perspective?
c. What initiatives have been used to overcome Shared Services challenges from
an IT perspective?
d. Are there any IT success stories that come to mind? What factors contributed
to or determined success?
10. Regarding your relationship with Shared Services
a. As an internal stakeholder, what are your top 5 expectations from Shared
Services?
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i. How important is each on a scale of 1 - 5, with 1 being least important
and 5 being most important?
ii. How would you assess Shared Services is delivering on each of those
expectations on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being low performance and 5
being very strong performance?
b. What challenges have you encountered in interacting with other units within
Shared Services?
11. Key processes relating to Governance, Technology Planning, and Business Case
Development
a. Describe the key processes Shared Services uses to make IT investment
decisions
b. Describe the key processes Shared Services uses to build budget requirements
c. Describe the key processes Shared Services uses to build, review, and advance
project business cases
d. How would you characterize your success at getting Enterprise level IT
investment projects approved?
12. Key metrics:
a. What metrics do you use to assess performance against the strategic
objectives, key goals, or high level performance targets?
b. Are there any metrics that are used to evaluate performance or effectiveness of
IT?
c. Do you use other metrics to assess your budgeting, IT decision-making, and
project proposal processes?
13. Documentation
a. Are there any documents you can provide to shed more light on Shared
Services IT capability, technology lifecycle planning, IT decision-making, or
business case development?
b. Would you be able to provide one or more examples of past Enterprise level
IT project proposals that were approved?
Business Unit IT Division
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1. General
a. What is the strategic focus of your BU IT Division?
b. What are your BU IT Division's strategic objectives, key goals, or high level
performance targets?
c. Who are the key stakeholder or opinion leaders in your BU IT Division?
2. The role of IT
a. What are your BU IT Division's priorities from an IT perspective?
b. What are the current issues and challenges impacting your BU IT Division
from an IT perspective?
c. What initiatives have been used to overcome your BU IT Division's
challenges from an IT perspective?
d. Are there any IT success stories that come to mind? What factors contributed
to or determined success?
3. Regarding your relationship with Shared Services
a. What are your BU IT Division's top 5 expectations from Shared Services?
i. How important is each on a scale of 1 - 5, with 1 being least important
and 5 being most important?
ii. How would you assess Shared Services is delivering on each of those
expectations on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being low performance and 5
being very strong performance?
b. What challenges have you encountered in interacting with Shared Services
and/or within Shared Services?
4. Key processes relating to Governance, Technology Planning, and Business Case
Development
a. Describe the key processes your BU IT Division uses to make IT investment
decisions
b. Describe the key processes your BU IT Division uses to build budget
requirements
c. Describe the key processes your BU IT Division uses to build, review, and
advance project business cases
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d. How would you characterize your success at getting both Business Unit and
Enterprise level IT investment projects approved?
5. Key metrics: Consider each of the following questions from both a pure Business
Unit perspective and from your point of view as an IT colleague representing the
Business Unit
a. What metrics do you use to assess performance against the strategic
objectives, key goals, or high level performance targets?
b. Are there any metrics that are used to evaluate performance or effectiveness of
IT?
c. Do you use other metrics to assess your budgeting, IT decision-making, and
project proposal processes?
6. Documentation
a. Are there any documents you can provide to shed more light on your BU IT
Division's IT capability, technology lifecycle planning, IT decision-making,
or business case development?
b. Would you be able to provide one or more examples of past Business Unit
and/or Enterprise level IT project proposals that were approved?
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